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ABSTRACT
For more than 1700 years in Christian theology, there has been a chasm between
just war thinking and pacifism. Advocates of these two ideological positions have
attempted to bridge this divide in a number of ways through the centuries. Some, such as
Glen Stassen, have brought together thinkers on both sides of the divide to propose a just
peacemaking theory. Others, such as Michael Schuck, Mark Allman, and Tobias
Winright, have added new stages to just war thinking in order to make that existing
tradition more robust. Some groups may identify as contingent pacifists. These would
generally accept the criteria of the just war theory, but would not ever acknowledge
violent force to be justified under certain conditions. This dissertation argues that, while
it may not be possible to overcome the impasse between pacifists and adherents to just
war thinking, it is possible for the two factions to work together for peace. One of the
main areas in which this goal may be advanced is through common care and respect for
the natural environment. In this study, the author examines the development of the
Catholic social tradition on the topics of peace and ecology, including a careful reading
of Pope Francis’s social encyclical, Laudato si’. The dissertation introduces a new type of
contingent pacifism: ecological pacifism. Ecological pacifism argues against any type of
violent intervention that will harm the earth, on the basis of earth’s sacredness as God’s
creation. The dissertation maintains that both pacifism and just war thinking in Catholic
social thought will be enhanced by this addition.
xiii

INTRODUCTION
What would happen if there were a summit concerning war and the environment
in the year 2016 between Jesus, Pope Francis, and John F. Kennedy? Although it may
seem like it, I am not presenting an insoluble riddle here. Instead, I propose a thought
experiment that could well serve as a primer for the following study. Allow me to explain
using each figure in turn. First, the teachings of Jesus of Nazareth are central to this
dissertation, as they must be to any work in the field of Christian ethics and theology. I
try to maintain a respectful outlook on the study of sacred scripture throughout these
pages, reading it not as statements to be taken as literally true in a fundamentalist way.
Rather, Jesus’ teachings in the gospels and Paul’s interpretation of that message in his
canonical epistles are foundational in discussing the two controversial topics – war and
the natural environment – that hold this work together. Even though I am generally wary
of the commercialized bracelets that read “W.W.J.D?” (What would Jesus do?), I
nonetheless believe that it is incumbent upon the Christian ethicist to ask this question of
him or herself while conducting research by holding the teachings of Christ and the
newsworthy events of the world in tandem and attempting to interpret both
simultaneously.
Next, the figure of Pope Francis undergirds this project in a very particular way.
His pontificate, which commenced on 13 March 2013, has been a truly revolutionary
time in the church’s treatment of ecological issues. In the days after he was elected as the
1

2
successor to Saint Peter, there was much public interest regarding the motivation for his
chosen name. As a member of the Society of Jesus, many commentators believed that he
had taken the name in honor of Saint Francis Xavier, one of the original members of the
new pope’s own religious congregation. Instead, Pope Francis confirmed the name had
come from the saintly man of Assisi. Why did the pontiff choose this figure for his
patron? In the early days of his papacy, he explained the rationale for such a decision:
“For me, [Francis of Assisi] is the man of poverty, the man of peace, the man who loves
and protects creation; these days we do not have a very good relationship with creation,
do we? He is the man who gives us this spirit of peace, the poor man … How I would
like a Church which is poor and for the poor!”1 This explanation is crucial for this
dissertation. Francis sees a clear link between war and the need for the protection of all of
God’s creation. Furthermore, the preferential option for the poor, a tenet of Catholic
social teaching, is inseparable from the connection between war and the natural
environment. This connection leads to new directions in Catholic social thought.
The third member of this trio, John F. Kennedy (1917-1963), served as the thirtyfifth president of the United States until his assassination on 22 November 1963. Only
five months earlier, Kennedy delivered one of the most remarkable presidential addresses
in the history of his office at the Commencement of American University. In that address,
Kennedy understood that at that particular moment in history, less than a year after the
United States and the Soviet Union found themselves at the edge of nuclear warfare

1

Pope Francis, “Audience to Representatives of the Communications Media,” March 16 2013, accessed
April 2, 2016, http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/francesco/speeches/2013/march/documents/papafrancesco_20130316_rappresentanti-media_en.html.

3
during the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, it was incumbent upon him to make a stand for
peace. Over fifty years ago, Kennedy already saw the clear connection between avoiding
nuclear war and care for the planet. During that address, he remarked that total war
“makes no sense in an age when the deadly poisons produced by a nuclear exchange
would be carried by the wind and water and soil and seed to the far corners of the globe
and to generations unborn.”2 The result of Kennedy’s landmark address that day was the
Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty with the Soviet Union, upon which the two nations and
the United Kingdom agreed less than two months later.
To these three historical figures I will add another two, whose significance to the
present study cannot be underestimated: Pope John XXIII and President Barack Obama.
Pope John XXIII, about whom I will say more in chapter one, was crucial in shaping not
only President Kennedy’s mindset but also in presenting a vision of global governance as
a whole. On 11 April 1963, Pope John promulgated the single most important papal
encyclical of the twentieth century, Pacem in terris. Pope John’s death only one week
before President Kennedy’s American University address signaled the end of a
pontificate that was focused on bringing about world peace and fashioning human rights
for all people. Kennedy, himself a Catholic, was deeply influenced by this pope and his
writings. The Russian translation of Pacem in terris, too, was made available to Soviet
President Nikita Khrushchev, with whom Pope John had already developed a close

2

John F. Kennedy, “Commencement Address at American University,” June 10 1963, accessed online
(transcript and video) April 2, 2016, http://www.jfklibrary.org/AssetViewer/BWC7I4C9QUmLG9J6I8oy8w.aspx.
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working relationship. Based on Pope John’s call for civil leaders of the world to present
warfare as a moral issue to their citizens, Kennedy delivered the aforementioned address
which has become known as his “peace speech.” Instead of listing the necessary actions
that the Soviets had to take, Kennedy called for Americans to be self-reflective and
understand their role in building up world peace. This was directly echoing Pope John’s
clarion call for peace: “Men are becoming more and more convinced that disputes which
arise between States should not be resolved by recourse to arms, but rather by
negotiation.”4 There is little doubt that the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty of 1968
stems directly from the aforementioned Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. The insights of
John’s encyclical were deeply congruent with emerging views in the United States and
Russia regarding the folly of using nuclear weapons and of spreading radioactive
materials via the atmospheric testing of nuclear weapons.5
Another watershed encyclical was promulgated on 24 May 2015 by Pope Francis.
In producing Laudato si’, Pope Francis framed the planetary ecological crisis in the realm
of a moral crisis, just as his predecessor John did with nuclear warfare more than a halfcentury earlier. This is where President Barack Obama joins the narrative. Just as his
predecessor John F. Kennedy found himself leading the nation at a time of grave danger
3

See Drew Christiansen, S.J., “Commentary on Pacem in terris (Peace on Earth),” in Modern Catholic
Social Teaching: Commentaries and Interpretations, ed. Kenneth R. Himes, O.F.M. et al. (Washington,
D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2005), 218-19.
4

Pope John XXIII, Pacem in terris (11 April 1963), in David J. O’Brien and Thomas A. Shannon, eds.,
Catholic Social Thought: The Documentary Heritage (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1992), no. 126.
Hereafter, I will cite simply by using the paragraph number of hierarchical and magisterial documents, as is
customary in citing these documents. Also, unless otherwise noted, I will rely on the translation provided
by O’Brien and Shannon for all magisterial documents found in their documentary reader.
5

The pope and political leaders were responding to scientific concerns about the spread of the radioactive
“strontium 90.” For more on this phenomenon, see Barry Commoner, The Closing Circle: Nature, Man,
and Technology (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1971), 51-7.
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for the world, so too does Obama find himself serving as president at a time when the
world is facing crisis. Obama and his immediate successor, along with the leaders of
every other nation on the planet, will have the prophetic words of Laudato si’ to remind
them in the coming years that, “The climate is a common good, belonging to all and
meant for all.”6 President Kennedy encouraged his audience in 1963 that the cause of
peace was possible: “Our problems are manmade – therefore they can be solved by
man.”7 Like Kennedy, Pope Francis points us to our own possibilities today, in the face
of great ecological destruction, much of which has been caused by human beings: “The
Creator does not abandon us; he never forsakes his loving plan or repents of having
created us. Humanity still has the ability to work together in building our common
home.”8 Just as we have avoided nuclear destruction, so too we can avoid ecological
destruction.
Sadly, however, maintaining a clear separation of the two issues in question – war
and the environment – is no longer possible in any meaningful way in the modern world.
The two issues, in practice, are inextricably linked with one another. Steady weapons
advances ensure that in many cases of modern war we see widespread damage being
done to natural ecosystems and the species they sustain. Likewise ecological degradation
– from deforestation, aquifer depletion, or soil erosion – and climate change sometimes
cause food shortages, social conflict, and war. Looking to the future, this phenomenon

6

Pope Francis, Laudato si’, 24 May 2015, no. 23. Accessed April 2, 2016,
http://w2.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/encyclicals/documents/papa-francesco_20150524_enciclicalaudato-si.html.
7

Kennedy, “Commencement Address at American University.”

8

Pope Francis, Laudato si’, no. 13.

6
may even become more widespread. In the present study, the thesis I am advancing is
that striving towards ecological renewal in the twenty-first century will necessarily
require a renaissance in the debate between just war thinking and pacifism. The lens
through which I am entering into this examination also stems from the legacy of Pope
John XXIII. That saintly pope introduced the ecclesial terminology “signs of the times.”9
The Fathers of Vatican Council II further clarified the role of the church as having “the
duty of scrutinizing the signs of the times and of interpreting them in the light of the
Gospel.”10
I begin in the first chapter with an overview of the relationship of the Roman
Catholic Church to warfare. I trace the evolution of thinking on war and peace during the
early centuries of Christianity, focusing on the tendency toward pacifism as expressed by
Tertullian, Origen, and some early Christian martyrs. I likewise examine Saints Ambrose
and Augustine, the “fathers” of just war thinking. The most recent magisterial
developments in just war theory are expressed in the 1983 Bishops’ letter, The Challenge
of Peace, which articulates the basic “presumption against war”11 that permeates the
Christian understanding of war and peace. I attend closely to this document and its
sources, particularly Gaudium et spes, to emphasize the centrality of the presumption
against war to Catholic social teaching.
9

See Pope John XXIII, Pacem in terris, nos. 126-129. While the term does not appear in the text proper, it
is the given title for the section including those four paragraphs numbers.
10

Vatican II, Gaudium et spes (7 December 1965), no. 4. I will cite this particular passage more than once
throughout the forthcoming text as a means of reorienting the reader and reminding her or him of its
significance in framing the study.
11

National Conference of Catholic Bishops, The Challenge of Peace: God’s Promise and Our Response
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Catholic Conference, 1983). Hereafter, I will refer to the document in notes as CP.
On this point, see especially nos. 71-80.
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As my overarching objective in this first chapter is to highlight the common
ground surprisingly shared by pacifists and adherents of just war thinking, I also describe
the evolution of the just war criteria and position the just war theory alongside the
contingent category of personal pacifism, a stance advocated by both Ambrose and
Augustine. Personal pacifism, the belief that violence in personal self-defense is not
permitted, does not rule out the possibility of killing others in warfare to protect our
innocent neighbors and to defend the common good and therefore can be located directly
within the lineage of the just war theory. Thus, the supposed incommensurability of
pacifist thinking and just war thinking is proven false. I argue that the proper use of just
war thinking actually creates conditions under which actual recourse to warfare is so rare
that just war proponents and pacifists often have a great deal in common practically, if
not philosophically. I explore ways that proponents of both these philosophical and
theological systems can unite to promote peace and justice for all creation.
The second chapter examines two burgeoning areas in war and peace studies that
are essential to a discussion of the importance of ecology in this realm of thought. One
area, the “Just Peacemaking” movement, is crucial because it includes both adherents to
just war thinking and pacifists alike, thus reinforcing the existing bridge between these
camps that I mention in chapter one. The other area, jus post bellum (justice after
warfare)12, opens up dialogue between just war theorists and pacifists by wondering, “can
good fruit come from a bad tree?” Jus post bellum is so important because it calls for
attention to the responsibilities of the “victorious” nation once a war has ended and
12

See Michael J. Schuck, “When the Shooting Stops: Missing Elements in Just War Theory.” Christian
Century 111, no. 30. (October 26, 1994): 982-983, and Mark J. Allman and Tobias Winright, After the
Smoke Clears: The Just War Tradition and Post War Justice. (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 2010).
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explores what that nation owes to the vanquished nation. Embracing the proposal that
the environment is a significant concern for postwar justice, I refute the commonly held
anthropocentric view that justification for warfare need only concern itself with the
protection of human life.
The third chapter turns to the present Catholic social teaching on the environment
and argues that the church must work together with environmental scientists in bringing
about a newfound solidarity with all of creation. I discuss and lament the fact that the
Catholic hierarchical teaching on the natural environment has been a late addition to
other work by both Christian and secular thinkers. In addressing global climate change in
particular, Barry Commoner notes this chilling fact: “In the short span of its history,
human society has exerted an effect on its planetary habitat that matches the size and
impact of the natural processes that until now solely governed the global condition.”13
Commoner’s point is that human beings, at the time of his writing, were oblivious to the
effects of their actions on the environment. The Catholic church has made some attempts
to call our attention to these effects, but more work remains to be done. Finally, I turn to
Saint Thomas Aquinas’s “Great Chain of Being,” which is, as William French notes, “a
vision of reality with ancient and Medieval roots holding that all levels of Being are
good, related one to another, and together make up what Aquinas called ‘the perfection of
the universe.’”14 I then offer the alternative framework of the “Great Circle of Being.”

13

Barry Commoner, Making Peace With the Planet (New York: Pantheon Books, 1990), 6. The first
edition of this book was released in 1975, which is important because it predated by some 15 years the first
utterance of human care for the natural environment by Pope John Paul II.
14
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In the fourth and final chapter, I consider the relationship between the moral
status of nature and the chronological stages of the just war theory. I extend and elaborate
upon the episcopal discussions of jus ad bellum and jus in bello. I also reexamine jus post
bellum and introduce a fourth stage, jus ante bellum, heeding Allman and Winright’s call
that the Christian just war theorist “be a vigilant peacemaker ante bellum and a strict
adherent to the norms of jus ad bellum, jus in bello, and jus post bellum.”15
This chapter also introduces “ecological pacifism” as a new type of Christian
pacifism. I contend that the twenty-first century will witness the emergence of a number
of ecological pacifists as a response to the increasingly dire environmental circumstances
our world faces due to war and other forms of destruction and depletion. My argument
emerges from the convergence of two strands of the Christian ethical tradition: the
position held by absolute pacifists that there is never justification for recourse to violent
force, and the tradition of care and respect for creation, which is witnessed in saints from
the earliest generation of Christians.
My goal in the course of this project is to break down the wall that has separated
warfare and the environment in Catholic social teaching. In some ways, Pope Francis has
begun this work in Laudato si’ and during some of his addresses in his 2015 apostolic
pilgrimage to the United States. In other ways, however, the church desperately needs to
move forward in the effort to confront both of these threatening issues together. As
Michael Walzer observes in his classic treatise on warfare, Just and Unjust Wars,
The first principle of the war convention is that, once war has begun,
soldiers are subject to attack at any time (unless they are wounded or
15
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captured). And the first criticism of the convention is that this principle
is unfair; it is an example of class legislation. It does not take into account
that few soldiers are wholeheartedly committed to the business of fighting.
Most of them do not identify themselves as warriors; at least, that is not
their only or their chief identity; nor is fighting their chosen occupation.
Nor again, do they spend most of their time fighting; they neglect war
whenever they can.16
Indeed, how much more can we criticize the war convention when we consider that
during war, not only soldiers but also noncombatants, despite any efforts of the
warmaking nations, are subject to attack even though such aggression is technically
outlawed by the jus in bello criterion of discrimination? And it is not only noncombatant
human beings that suffer irretrievable losses, but also dogs, cats, cattle, birds, plants, and
the very water, soil, and air that allows all of these creatures to live and thrive. Catholic
social teaching has the resources to address this issue. In the following study, I intend to
engage and integrate some of these resources.
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CHAPTER ONE
PACIFISM AND JUST WAR IN THE ROMAN CATHOLIC TRADITION
The relationship between pacifism and just war theory1 has always been a tenuous
one in the Christian community. On one side, the teachings of Jesus Christ seem to point
to an absolute rejection of any type of violence, though on the other, the majority of the
Christian community has acknowledged that there are times – unfortunate as they are –
where the causes of justice and right order cry out to be protected by the use of violent
force. This chapter will briefly introduce the relationship between war and peace in the
Christian tradition. I begin with this introduction here so as to lay the groundwork for a
discussion of a new form of contingent pacifism for the twenty-first century: ecological
pacifism. Ecological pacifists I define as a group of people who, like other types of
contingent pacifists, do allow for the possibility of using violent force in some
circumstances: for instance, ecological pacifists may well believe that an individual may
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Throughout this study, I will use the terms “theory,” “doctrine,” and “tradition” to describe just war
thinking. There is some debate over which is the proper term, and many respected thinkers have used one
or the other of the terms exclusively. For instance, John Howard Yoder explains, “It is appropriate to speak
rather of a ‘tradition’ than of a ‘doctrine’ or a ‘theory,’ for there is no one official statement of this
approach to which all would subscribe” (17) in his When War is Unjust: Being Honest in Just-War
Thinking (Minneapolis: Augsburg Publishing, 1984). On the other hand, the magisterial documents of the
Catholic Church almost always refer to the criteria as a “doctrine” (e.g. Catechism of the Catholic Church,
no. 2309; Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Church, no. 500; and The Challenge of Peace: God’s
Promise and Our Response, no. 80). Elsewhere, a great many Christian ethicists have used the terminology
“theory” to describe just war thinking. While I am sympathetic to being rhetorically consistent, I am also
cognizant of the fact that the variety with which scholars (many of whom will be directly cited in these
pages) define just war thought would make it impossible to use only one of these terms consistently.
Therefore, in the pages that follow, I use the three terms interchangeably, in order to identify the general
belief of some thinkers that in some cases, warfare may be justified.
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use violence in legitimate self-defense. These circumstances, however, cannot include
the use of violent force that harms the natural environment in any significant way.
Therefore, this new type of contingent pacifism simultaneously calls for two important
measures in ethical thought: first, that the just war theory be expanded from its current
criteria to account adequately for the role of the natural environment as a victim of
warfare; and second, that the introduction of the explicit category of ecological pacifism
expands the role of active nonviolence in the church’s tradition. I do not mean to say that
this group does not already exist; however, I hope to explicate their fundamental
approach to warfare in a systematic way.2
Furthermore, I here study the Catholic community in the United States. In doing
so, I rely especially on the most important document that the American Catholic bishops
have ever drafted on issues of war and peace: The Challenge of Peace. Since this
document was not without its detractors, I also examine the response of one such
commentator, George Weigel, who represents a counter to The Challenge of Peace and
puts forth an alternative understanding of Catholic teaching on this issue.
I readily acknowledge that this study is neither the first nor the last to deal with
war and peace in the life of the church. What I do claim, however, is that this study
responds to the call of the Fathers at Vatican Council II by taking up the mantles of
“scrutinizing the signs of the times, and of interpreting them in the light of the Gospel.”3 I
do so by applying the question of war and peace to the particular moment the world faces
in the twenty-first century. For the United States bishops writing The Challenge of Peace
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in 1983, the preeminent world challenge they faced was that of nuclear weapons.
Surely, these and other weapons of mass destruction remain a crucial problem today;
however, Christians and others now understand clearly that these weapons pose a threat
to more than simply human communities. These weapons represent the potential
destruction of the entirety of God’s creation. They were a unique historical reality in
1983 when the pastoral letter was written; they remain a unique historical reality in our
present moment; and they will continue to be important in the future. I propose
continually reading the signs of the times in light of the continued threat posed by nuclear
weapons.
In the course of this study, and especially in this chapter, I use the word “pacifist.”
I take the definition proffered by Lisa Sowle Cahill: “Christian pacifism is essentially a
commitment to embody communally and historically the kingdom of God so fully that
mercy, forgiveness, and compassion preclude the very contemplation of causing physical
harm to another person.”4 Accordingly, pacifists, if they do not even contemplate causing
physical harm, will never directly intend to harm another living thing. At other times in
these pages, as I have already done above, I also refer to various forms of “contingent
pacifism.” Contingent pacifists are those who disparage violence whenever certain
circumstances are met. To continue using Cahill’s thinking, contingent pacifists would
contend that a particular violent practice would always “preclude the very contemplation
of causing physical harm to another person.” They, however, are not “pacifists” in the
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classical sense alluded to above. Even though they are not strictly pacifists based on
these definitions, the label of “contingent pacifist” remains a fair representation of their
beliefs.
As I explain throughout this chapter, contingent pacifism has assumed a number
of forms throughout Christian history. For example, there have been “personal” or
“private” pacifists; for these persons, the contingency rests in violent self-defense, which
they believe is not allowed on the basis of Christ’s admonition to “turn the other cheek.”
Nevertheless, personal pacifism is also not classical pacifism because despite this stance
against violence in the case of personal self-defense, personal pacifism still may allow the
tragic necessity of warfare in cases where the defense is not of oneself, but of the
common good.
Simultaneously, I recognize that in the Roman Catholic tradition, pacifism is not
the only accepted understanding of the church’s relationship to instances of war and
peace. In fact, although it has been officially accepted through papal teaching as a
legitimate way of approaching the tragic cases of violence for at least fifty years,
pacifism remains a minority position among Roman Catholics. The more widely accepted
doctrine is the just war tradition. It is my argument that, much like pacifists, adherents to
the just war theory should also make a concerted attempt to live out their moral stance by
seeking to create situations of authentic justice. This chapter will examine the Roman
Catholic understanding of just war alongside its counterpart of pacifism. The United
States Catholic bishops have advanced the argument that these two ideologies can and
should be held in tandem in the church. Members of both sides in this debate should be
able to work together for peace and justice.
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I have decided to examine the debate between pacifism and adherence to just
war theory in this dissertation in large part because the United States bishops entered this
debate during a time in American history that was particularly engaged with the looming
specter of nuclear destruction. During the course of their drafting of The Challenge of
Peace, the bishops received responses from many government officials who “said
repeatedly and candidly that nuclear war cannot be won or lost in any recognizable
sense.”5 As those prelates drafted their pastoral letter in the midst of the Cold War, there
was at best a tepid sense of security among their faith communities. The threat of a
nuclear holocaust, however, was not enough to keep a number of Roman Catholic
commentators from criticizing the bishops for being influenced too heavily by this threat.
Foremost among these critics is George Weigel. Essentially, this chapter serves as a foray
into this debate. I also provide a thoroughgoing commentary on the distinctions between
pacifism and the just war tradition, specifically emphasizing that these traditions can exist
in tandem with one another. This work functions as both a historical summary of the
bishops’ project and the factors that influenced and critiqued them as well as a
continuation of their project to read persistently “the signs of the times.”
The chapter will proceed in five sections. It begins by focusing on the watershed
document published by the National Conference of Catholic Bishops, The Challenge of
Peace: God’s Promise and Our Response.6 In particular, I focus on the bishops’
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insistence that there be a “presumption against war.” Second, the chapter examines
how the bishops have applied this terminology in the pastoral letter as a part of the
Catholic tradition, which evolved from a strict commitment to nonviolence in the earliest
days of the church. I then provide a brief overview of the just war theory and its
relationship with pacifism. The chapter will, fourthly, consider George Weigel’s critique
of The Challenge of Peace and his argument that the bishops have abandoned the just war
tradition of the church. Finally, Chapter One concludes with a response to Weigel and a
discussion of a realistic variety of pacifisms for the twenty-first century, including what
the defining characteristics of such types of pacifism must be. I consider this new mode
of pacifism alongside a realistic just war theory. As I demonstrate, there are ramifications
of this realism in both the pacifist and the just war approach.8 Among the most important
ramifications are the ability for adherents on both sides of the debate to be in a more
productive dialogue with each other.
The United States Bishops and the “Presumption Against War”
When Bishops P. Francis Murphy and Thomas Gumbleton made interventions at
the 1980 Fall Assembly of the National Conference of Catholic Bishops to ask that their
brothers in the American episcopacy consider drafting a pastoral letter on war and peace,
the ball was set in motion for one of the most important documents ever published by a

7
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A common critique of pacifism has always been that it is overly idealistic and does not adequately
understand the real problems that face human beings in the world today. As such, a theologically robust
pacifist stance must be characterized by a realism that many commentators relegate to just war doctrine
alone. I argue that this shared realism is key in the ethical pluralism that results from the dialogue between
the two traditions.
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group of United States religious leaders. Over the next three years, a committee of
five U.S. bishops formed the group who drafted the pastoral letter, The Challenge of
Peace.10 This letter was so important because it not only interpreted but also developed
official church teaching on war and peace. It remains the most comprehensive statement
on war and peace that has been released by any Roman Catholic national episcopal
conference. In drafting this document, the U.S. bishops do not merely waver between just
war theory and pacifism. Instead, as David Hollenbach suggests, “The American bishops
state their openness to ongoing dialogue with these views. But their letter is no middle of
the road document that seeks to split the difference between the views found within the
church today.”11 The clearest proof of this fact is the pastoral letter’s insistence on the
presumption against war. In claiming such an insistence, the bishops are firmly in line
with authoritative Catholic teaching on war and peace since the time of Saint Ambrose.
From the first days of justified warfare in Christianity, the burden of proof always fell
squarely on the shoulders of those who would argue that war was necessary.
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In The Challenge of Peace, the bishops make a key statement as they introduce
the term “presumption against war.” They write: “The Church’s teaching on war and
peace establishes a strong presumption against war which is binding on all; it then
examines when this presumption may be overridden, precisely in the name of preserving
the kind of peace which protects human dignity and human rights.”12 There are three
parts of this description that I will unpack. First, the presumption is “binding on all,”
which includes those in governmental authority and those in the military; second, the
presumption may be overridden in official Catholic doctrine,13 which introduces the
criteria for a just war; and third, the just war is one that is fought to bring about peace.
The bishops also argue that it is altogether possible for pacifist individuals to hold an
even stricter presumption against war than do adherents to just war thinking; however,
both “share a common presumption against the use of force as a means of settling
disputes.”14
With their endorsement of pacifism as a legitimate stance in the Catholic debate
on war and peace, the bishops followed in the footsteps of the Fathers of Vatican Council
II, who advanced one of the most important developments of Catholic doctrine in the last
century. In the Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World, Gaudium et
spes, the Council fathers wrote: “It seems right that laws make humane provisions for the
case of those who for reasons of conscience refuse to bear arms, provided, however, that
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they accept some other form of service to the human community.” The American
bishops claim that this conciliar teaching “was the first time a call for legal protection of
conscientious objection had appeared in a document of such prominence.”16 In point of
fact, Gaudium et spes represents an authoritative development of doctrine17 and a change
of course from the 1956 Christmas radio message of Pope Pius XII. In that address, Pius
XII stated clearly:
If therefore, a body representative of the people and the government –
both having been chosen by free election in a moment of extreme danger
decide, by legitimate instruments of internal and external policy, on
defensive precautions, and carry out the plans which they consider
necessary, they do not act immorally; so that a Catholic citizen cannot
invoke his own conscience in order to refuse to serve and fulfill those
duties the law imposes.18
Not only was Gaudium et spes the first prominent magisterial document to support the
right to individual conscientious objection, it was also an extraordinary development in
church teaching in a short period of time.
For pacifists, the presumption against war is without exception; there could be no
reason, however noble, for killing another human being. There were also groups who
were contingent pacifists. The most popular form of contingent pacifism during the
drafting of The Challenge of Peace was “nuclear pacifism.” A number of the bishops
who were in active ministry during the publication of The Challenge of Peace were
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numbered along the scale of pacifists, both contingent and absolute. Along with
Gumbleton and Murphy were Archbishop Raymond Hunthausen, Bishop Carroll Dozier,
Bishop Leroy Matthieson, Bishop Walter Sullivan, and Bishop Michael Kenny. There is
no doubt that this group of bishops, along with others who were sympathetic to their
worldviews, shaped a key section of the pastoral letter which praised the witness of those
in the church who were committed to nonviolence. The bishops reflect: “The vision of
Christian non-violence is not passive about injustice and the defense of the rights of
others; it rather affirms and exemplifies what it means to resist injustice through nonviolent methods.”20 This statement means that those who hold an exceptionless
presumption against war are not neglecting their Christian duties by refusing to fight in
just wars; rather, they are legitimately responding to the duties of the Christian gospel,
which are founded in commitments to peace and especially to justice, without which
there is no grounds for peace. The bishops place those groups of Christians committed to
nonviolence in a long line of praiseworthy witnesses for peace.21 It is to this line of
Christian witnesses for peace and nonviolence that I now turn.
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“So Great a Cloud of Witnesses” to Nonviolence
Scriptural Exegesis Regarding Violence
Adherents to one or another variety of pacifism have often taken as motivation for
their lives the scriptural passage from the Letter to the Hebrews, where the author writes
these words:
Therefore, since we are surrounded by so great a cloud of witnesses, let us
also lay aside every weight and the sin that clings so closely, and let us run
with perseverance the race that is set before us, looking to Jesus the
pioneer and perfecter of our faith, who for the sake of the joy that was set
before him endured the cross, disregarding its shame, and has taken his
seat at the right hand of the throne of God. Consider him who endured
such hostility against himself from sinners, so that you may not grow
weary or lose heart (Heb 12: 1-3).22
Those in the Christian community who have taken on pacifism have almost always taken
Jesus as their exemplar and model. An interpretation of his words regarding violence is
crucial for this study.
Since Jesus was “the perfecter of our faith,” he is the principal witness. The
pericope that pacifists most frequently cite in favor of Jesus’ own commitment to
nonviolence is his Sermon on the Mount (Mt 5-7). Within these three chapters of the
Gospel of Matthew, Jesus proclaims, “Blessed are the peacemakers, for they will be
called children of God” (Mt 5: 9). Moreover, his antitheses also seemingly call the
Christian disciple to strict nonviolence, even in the most difficult of situations. Jesus
proclaims that not only is murder unacceptable, but also “if you are angry with a brother
or sister, you will be liable to judgment” (Mt 5: 22). Furthermore, Jesus continues to call
his followers to perfection: “You have heard that it was said, ‘An eye for an eye and a
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tooth for a tooth.’ But I say to you, Do not resist an evildoer. But if anyone strikes you
on the right cheek, turn the other also” (Mt 5: 38-39). The capstone of the teaching,
however, is Jesus’ remarkable “hard saying,” “You have heard that it was said, ‘You
shall love your neighbor and hate your enemy.’ But I say to you, Love your enemies and
pray for those who persecute you…Be perfect, therefore, as your heavenly Father is
perfect” (Mt 5: 43-44; 48). Finally, Christian perfection also entails forgiveness: “For if
you forgive others their trespasses, your heavenly Father will also forgive you; but if you
do not forgive others, neither will your Father forgive your trespasses” (Mt 6: 14-15). For
those Christians committed to nonviolence and universal forgiveness for wrongdoings,
there is solid teaching from scripture.
The words of Jesus as recorded in scripture have been cause for much discussion
and debate over the course of the last two millennia. While there is certainly no
unanimous consensus on what Jesus’ teaching on nonviolence means for his followers,
there are various worthwhile exegeses to consider. In his commentary on the Gospel of
Matthew, Daniel Harrington, S.J. concludes that the Sermon on the Mount “is not
addressed only to a Christian elite, nor is it so impossible to practice that its only function
is to remind people of their status as sinners and their need for God’s grace.”23 According
to Harrington, then, the speech is especially poignant because the principles laid down
therein are practicable by Jesus’ followers. With regard to the antithesis on nonretaliation (Mt 5:38-39), Harrington notes, “The setting of the saying is personal relations
on a smaller scale. Whether it can be transposed to the social or political realms is a
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matter of ongoing debate.” Based on this reading, at a minimum, Jesus calls his
followers to personal (or private) pacifism, which precludes the use of force in selfdefense.
The ongoing debate to which Harrington refers is summarized by two opposing
arguments. The first is that the personal pacifism which Jesus preached in the Sermon on
the Mount must always be extended even to larger situations where there is a temptation
to use violent force in the defense of all people’s rights. The opposing view is that
sometimes, experiences of human suffering make it tragically necessary to use violence
in order to limit the damage that would befall many people.
Coming down on the former side of this argument is Richard B. Hays. In The
Moral Vision of the New Testament Hays argues that active nonviolence is a lifestyle that
the entire church must take upon itself. Within the tripartite paradigm of his study, Hays
argues that nonviolence is scripturally advocated on the basis of the community-crossnew creation model. Hays uses these three images throughout his study to interpret the
various ethical messages brought to the fore in the New Testament. In the case of
nonviolence, Hays believes that each of these three images calls the Christian community
to an unwaveringly nonviolent lifestyle. Particularly in looking to Jesus as the foremost
among the “cloud of witnesses” though, we should take note of Hays’s account of “the
paradoxical wisdom of the cross (see 1 Cor. 1:18-2:5). Not only the teaching but, more
importantly, the example of Jesus is determinative for the community of the faithful. The
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passion narrative becomes the fundamental paradigm for the Christian life.” Hays
makes it clear that the entire People of God are called to strict nonviolence, both
individually and collectively.
The scripture scholar Gerhard Lohfink takes Hays’s interpretation even a step
further. Lohfink places Jesus’ teaching specifically within the context of gathering Israel
to announce the reign of God: “For according to Jesus, God does not want Israel to be a
people that fights, like all others, to assert itself as a nation. God wants a people in which
the peace of God and God’s kind of rule become reality.”26 Lohfink responds to the
question of the oft-cited “warrior-God” of the Hebrew scriptures by reminding us of the
call to nonviolence from the prophetic tradition. It was this tradition that inspired Jesus’
practice of nonviolence in his own life and teaching: “He used no violence at all. He took
the sword from Peter’s hand (Matt 26:52). He preferred being a victim to using violence.
And by that very fact he initiated in the world an unexpected and ongoing influence. It
still goes on, and no one can say where it yet may lead.”27 While Lohfink is correct in
noting that Jesus’ influence of nonviolence still reverberates in some sectors of the
church, he also may be a bit too optimistic, since there is another strand of exegesis on
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the Sermon on the Mount, which takes the other side in the debate to which Harrington
refers.
The other argument in this debate maintains that even admitting the Matthean
principle of non-retaliation to be personally important does not mean that this principle
extends to societal acceptance of nonviolence. In other words, even if a Christian may
accept the teaching that personal non-retaliation is important on an individual level, that
same Christian may not accept widespread nonviolence for a nation. One scholar in this
category is Charles H. Talbert. For this camp, strict adherence to these teachings of Jesus
in the Sermon on the Mount is unfaithful to the larger message of the New Testament.
Talbert notes, “The Matthean Jesus placed love and mercy as the overriding concerns in
terms of which everything else is to be interpreted. If so, then love for the neighbor would
override the value of non-retaliation.”28 It is clear that Talbert and his intellectual
adversaries on this point are in clear disagreement regarding the relationship between
neighbor-love and the use of violent force. For Hays and Lohfink, it would be
unthinkable for “love” to be expressed through violence in the ethic of the Matthean
Jesus. On the other hand, Talbert laments, “There may be occasions when love of
neighbor trumps one’s commitment to non-retaliation. Confronted by an evildoer, the
disciples, whose character incorporates both love of neighbor and non-retaliation but
privileges the former as more basic, would likely respond if necessary to defend, protect,
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and vindicate the neighbor.” This position, of course, appears in the work of
Augustine, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Paul Ramsey, among others.
One fascinating aspect of the debate over whether war is ruled out by Jesus’
preaching in the Sermon on the Mount is the morality of Christians serving as soldiers in
the military. An offshoot of Talbert’s argument is that the Sermon on the Mount certainly
does not exclude serving in the military, since retaliation is sometimes necessary in order
to love one’s neighbor.30 Talbert cites Hays on the topic of Christians serving in the
military, though I consider his to be a misreading of Hays’s view: “Thus, of the texts we
have examined that might seem to stand in tension with the New Testament’s central
message of peacemaking, these narratives about soldiers provide the one possible
legitimate basis for violence in defense of social order or justice.”31 However, Hays
makes it abundantly clear that he does not believe that Jesus supports such a career for his
followers. According to Hays, since we do not know how the soldiers go on to live their
lives after their encounters with Jesus, we may not make a final evaluation about this
occupation. Hays reminds the reader that Jesus likewise conversed with prostitutes, tax
collectors, and other sinners, yet there is certainly no argument to suggest that Jesus
recommended these paths to his followers.32 In summation, the debate over the Sermon
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on the Mount leads to the conclusion that scripture does not offer a final verdict
acceptable to all believers on the permissibility of warfare from a Christian standpoint.
The Problem of Violence in the Early Church:
Tertullian, Origen, and Justin Martyr
The issue of membership in the Roman army was a pivotal aspect of the debate in
the early church over whether or not the Christian must be committed to a life of strict
nonviolence. It is widely agreed that in the pre-Constantinian Christian community,
pacifism was the normative way for the church to live out its communal life. The two
most prominent Christian thinkers of this period who supported nonviolence were
Tertullian of Carthage (160-220) and Origen of Alexandria (185-254).33 It is not until the
end of the second century that there is any evidence for Christians taking up membership
in the Roman army. Until that time, strong evidence supports the likelihood that
Christians were strongly opposed to the military. This opposition rests on five areas of
consideration: hatred for Rome and opposition to the military seal (which was opposed to
their baptismal seal, and involved taking the military oath); expectation of an imminent
end of the present age; resistance toward idolatry; the immoral lifestyle associated with
membership in the military; and an abhorrence of bloodshed.34
Even the ethical practices of these first Christians are open to debate on historical
interpretation. One scholar of the period, John Helgeland, has been primarily responsible
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for noting the inaccuracies in the reporting that all early Christians were pacifists
because of a pure motive of nonviolence. More to the point, Helgeland claims that the
reason for opposition to warfare was often centered on problems with idolatry. In
particular, Helgeland reports that what was so idolatrous in the first few centuries of
Christianity was the “death culture” that encompassed the whole of society.35
What has remained a constant since the earliest days of the church has been the
fact that scriptural exegesis has been largely based on the political outlooks of the groups
of Christians who are interpreting the scriptural passages in question. As Helgeland has
maintained in no uncertain terms, the idea that the earliest Christians were pacifists out of
a strict adherence to the ethic of nonviolence as it is recorded in the teachings of Jesus is
due largely to the work of two interpreters: C. J. Cadoux36 and Roland Bainton.37
Helgeland makes a fair argument concerning the “pacifist perspective” of the early
Church Fathers created by Cadoux and Bainton. He notes, “This interpretation has a host
of lesser lights who followed them like the dogs that followed the wagon trains across the
prairie. Many of these followers satisfied themselves with mining Cadoux and Bainton as
though they were primary sources.”38 Helgeland’s point here is one that should not be
overlooked: the pacifist biases of Cadoux and Bainton shaped the material they produced,
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and the result was “that they quoted the Fathers out of context and cared to learn only a
few aspects of the Roman military system.”39
In his own review of the recent scholarship on war and peace in early Christianity,
David Hunter explains that Helgeland suffers from the same weaknesses as do Cadoux
and Bainton. Like his two interlocutors, Helgeland does not reveal his own biases when it
comes to the topic of war and peace.40 As a means of summarizing the debate of the early
church on the issue of military service, it would be important to acknowledge what
Hunter refers to as the “new consensus” on the question.41 To accept this “new
consensus” is also to accept that there is no concrete answer to the question of whether
the early Christian community believed it was morally licit to serve in the military. Both
sides of the debate today likely reflect the biases of those making the arguments. What
does remain evident is that the tradition of pacifism has continued to remain a vocal
minority in the church in the centuries after the reign of Constantine. I will now consider
how the tradition of Christian nonviolence has evolved.
The figures in the early church that are at the heart of the debate between
Helgeland and Cadoux/Bainton are primarily Tertullian and Origen; however, a few other
people figure prominently in the pacifist strand of Christianity in these first few centuries
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after the death of Christ. One such figure is Justin Martyr (c. 100-165). His own
testimony claims a significant shift in the whole persona of the Christian of his time: “We
who formerly killed one another not only refuse to make war on our enemies but in order
to avoid lying to our interrogators or deceiving them, we freely go to our deaths
confessing Christ.”42 Here we see three major factors that remain something of a constant
throughout the pacifist tradition in Christianity. The first factor is explained when Justin
notes such a prominent shift in the Christian’s personal character – a profound conversion
of heart – the profundity of which could never be overstated. Secondly, being a Christian
does not simply mean that one does not use violence in any circumstance (although
apparently it means at least that), but that this type of behavior is part of a larger lifestyle
that avoids all immorality such as lying and deception in an effort to “be perfect,
therefore, as your heavenly Father is perfect” (Mt 5: 48). Third, and finally, pacifism
accepts the ultimate sacrifice of death instead of inflicting this penalty on even an enemy.
As I noted above, one of the reasons for Christians avoiding service in the
military was the clear opposition between the baptismal oath and the military oath.
Tertullian expounds this point, noting the full significance it has for Christians serving in
the military:
There can be no compatibility between an oath made to God and one made
to man, between the standard of Christ and that of the devil, between the
camp of light and the camp of darkness. The soul cannot be beholden to
two masters, God and Caesar…Indeed how will [a Christian] serve in the
army even during peacetime without the sword that Jesus Christ has taken
away?43
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Tertullian’s point here is that it is not carrying out violence within battle that is
forbidden for Christians, but even merely being a part of the army, and taking a military
oath. It is worth noting that in a later writing, Tertullian changes course on this thought,
noting that a nonviolent role in the military could be permissible for an individual who
converts to Christianity. From a practical standpoint, Tertullian changes his mind on this
issue because, as Swift reports, “desertion was a capital offense” and also because it was
altogether possible for individual soldiers to carry out nonviolent careers in the military.44
It seems relatively clear, as a whole, that Tertullian was convinced of the immorality of
Christian membership in the military based on not only scriptural teaching but also the
concern about idolatry and the opposition between the military oath and the baptismal
oath.
Like Tertullian, Origen presents one of the most fervent Christian arguments
against serving in the military. Also like Tertullian, Origen points to the example of
Jesus’ teaching: “[Jesus] considered it contrary to his divinely inspired legislation to
approve any kind of homicide whatsoever.”45 As Swift chronicles, Origen was the first
Christian to take on squarely the problem of violence in the Hebrew Scriptures and what
this violence means for Christians, whom he believes should profess nonviolence. He
explains the allegorical nature of these scriptural battles:
Unless those carnal wars [i.e. of the Old Testament] were a symbol of
spiritual wars, I do not think that the Jewish historical books would ever
have been passed down by the Apostles to be read by Christ’s followers in
their churches…Thus, the Apostle, being aware that physical wars are no
longer to be waged by us but that our struggles are to be only battles of the
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soul against spiritual adversaries, gives orders to the soldiers of Christ
like a military commander when he says, “Put on the armor of God so as
to be able to hold your ground against the wiles of the devil” (Ephes.
6.11).46
It would be difficult to overstate the importance of the early Christians’ tradition of the
first two centuries, and especially the writings of Tertullian and Origen, in the
development of the Christian strands of pacifism. While Swift believes Origen was “the
most articulate and eloquent pacifist in the early Christian Church,”47 there is no
questioning the impact Tertullian had as well. Their influence on later pacifists in the
church (both Western and Eastern) is undeniable.
Personal Pacifism: Ambrose and Augustine
Clearly there is not adequate space here to deal with all of the significant pacifist
voices since the promulgation of the Edict of Milan by Emperor Constantine in the year
313 c.e. It will suffice to consider only a few examples of Christian pacifism in the
centuries since this time. First, it is incumbent upon such a study as this to note that in the
post-Constantinan period, Christianity did not become suddenly bellicose in nature.
Rather, the figures that are usually looked upon as being the “fathers” of the just war
tradition were actually interested in upholding order and peace. The two most prominent
of this class are Saint Ambrose of Milan (ca. 339-397), and Saint Augustine of Hippo
(354-430). Both of these men, due to their claims that sometimes warfare is a tragic
necessity, may also be placed in the category of contingent pacifism, particularly in the
personal, or private realm. It is worth noting that neither Ambrose nor Augustine believed
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it was ever licit for clergy to bear arms. What resulted was a two-tiered ethic that
placed clergy on a higher tier than laity (who could bear arms to defend the common
good). Clerical pacifism was personal and public, while the laity were not expected to be
anything other than personal, or private, pacifists.
For his part, Ambrose writes, “Indeed, even if a man comes up against an armed
thief, he cannot return blow for blow lest in the act of protecting himself he weaken the
virtue of love…But Christ who sought to cure everyone through his own wounds did not
want to be protected by doing harm to his persecutors.”48 Like Ambrose, Augustine could
also be categorized as a personal pacifist. He also finds it to be an injustice for a private
citizen to use violent force in self-defense: “I do not approve of killing another man in
order to avoid being killed oneself unless one happens to be a soldier or public official
and thus acting not on his own behalf but for the sake of others, or for the city in which
he lives.”49 As Robert L. Holmes puts it, “To kill another person in defense of this earthly
life represents an inordinate desire to cling to those things one ought not to love.”50 While
“the virtue of love” was of paramount importance for Ambrose, Augustine also focuses
on the importance of order and the common good in his own thought contra self-defense.
In both cases, the two saints fall into the category of “private” or “personal” pacifism,51
which fundamentally claims that the contingent basis on which pacifism would always be
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the appropriate lifestyle is in instances of self-defense; it is never morally licit,
according to the concept of “personal” pacifism, to use violent force to protect one’s own
person.
Franciscan Pacifism
Falling into the category of pacifism is one of the most beloved figures in the
history of Christianity: Saint Francis of Assisi (1182-1226). This is significant not only
because Francis is the object of countless acts of popular piety, but also because he
founded the Order of Friars Minor, a religious order of priests and brothers, and inspired
a contingency of laypeople known as third order Franciscans. Francis’s call to pacifism is
limited only to his brothers in the Order; however one could very well understand his
admonishments to his confreres to constitute a literalist reading of the gospel. Such a
reading would fall in line with the directives he gave the friars in the remainder of The
Earlier Rule. His instructions for the itinerant ministries of his religious congregation are
almost an exact replica of Jesus’ instructions to the seventy disciples in the Gospel of
Luke (10: 1-12): “All my brothers: let us pay attention to what the Lord says: Love your
enemies and do good to those who hate you for our Lord Jesus Christ, Whose footprints
we must follow, called His betrayer a friend and willingly offered Himself to His
executioners.”52 For his part, Francis is also one of the first figures in Christianity to link
the issues of care for all of creation and peacemaking in his well-documented Canticle of
the Creatures.53 In support of pacifism, Francis writes, “Praised be You, my Lord,
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through those who give pardon for Your love, / and bear infirmity and tribulation. /
Blessed are those who endure in peace / for by You, Most High, shall they be
crowned.”54 In reading the work of Francis on the issue of pacifism, it is doubtful that his
motives were anything other than gaining eternal life; nonetheless, the strict adherence to
a life of nonviolence is a sine qua non for all Franciscans.
Twentieth Century Catholic Pacifism in the United States:
Day, Berrigan, and Douglass
In the twentieth century, three Roman Catholics from the United States have
embodied three different, but not mutually exclusive, methods of living out their
commitment to pacifism: Dorothy Day, Daniel Berrigan, S.J., and James W. Douglass. In
the case of Day (1897-1980), her life of faith lives on in the Catholic Worker movement
and the newspaper by the same name, both co-founded by Day with her companion Peter
Maurin. Since the earliest days of the movement, the Catholic Worker has espoused strict
nonviolence and an attitude of non-participation in the works of warfare. Day carried out
her pacifism primarily by organizing the Catholic Worker movement, although she also
participated in acts of (nonviolent) civil disobedience and produced prolific writings.
While the Catholic Worker reached great levels of popularity in its infancy, the watershed
moment for Day’s insistence on pacifism came with her consistent call for nonviolence
during World War II: “We are still pacifists. Our manifesto is the Sermon on the Mount,
which means that we will try to be peacemakers. Speaking for many of our conscientious
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objectors, we will not participate in armed warfare or in making munitions, or by
buying government bonds to prosecute the war, or in urging others to these efforts.”55
World War II was such an important moment for Day for two reasons. First,
World War II was considered by a huge percentage of Americans to represent a justified
war. What is less clear is how these Americans considered it justified. It seems that many
Americans were what John Howard Yoder calls “blank check” people in the case of war:
“The value of the nation is not debatable, the authority of national government is not
subject to critique, and the moral value of their leaders is such that no questions are to be
put to them when they command.”56 In continuing to advocate for pacifism, Day
positioned herself, as well as those members of the movement who supported her,
squarely in the very small minority. Second, the popularity of the war caused many
supporters of the Catholic Worker movement to distance themselves from Day’s
persistence in the cause for nonviolence. As Day’s biographer Jim Forest recounts, “They
could see no other effective means apart from war to combat Hitler and his rapidly
expanding Third Reich. Neither could they accept that Dorothy’s personal convictions on
such an issue should be presented as the position of the entire movement.”57 As with all
other pacifists, Day’s unwavering insistence on nonviolence was a sometimes-divisive
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element of her persona, particularly among the Catholic Worker community that was
flourishing.
Both Berrigan and Douglass were greatly shaped by Day’s influence. Berrigan
(1921-2016), entered the Society of Jesus at age 18 and first gained fame for participating
in actions of nonviolent civil disobedience on 17 May 1968, when he, his brother Philip
(then a Josephite priest), and seven other activists known as “The Catonsville Nine”58
used homemade napalm to burn draft files in Catonsville, Maryland. Following a time
“underground” – that is, on the run from the F.B.I. – Berrigan was apprehended on Block
Island while hiding at the home of his friend William Stringfellow. Like Day, Berrigan
was not limited to these types of actions (although he would commit over a hundred antiwar actions over the next 45 years). He is widely regarded as the most accomplished
Jesuit poet of his time, and has written widely in the genres of prose and drama.59
Berrigan has also held leadership roles in the anti-war movement, and has ministered as a
hospice chaplain to those dying of AIDS.
In explaining what could accurately be considered his manifesto of a consistent
ethic of life, Berrigan writes of a need for a renewal of order that “includes in the nature
of things, such neglected virtues as compassion and justice toward the needy, the outcast
and victimized.” He continues: “And above all, and first of all, ‘Don’t kill. Have no part
in killing, either enemy or criminal or the aged or the disabled or the unborn.’ Everything
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depends on this.” Everything depends on this, Berrigan insists, because “this”—
nonviolence—is the heart of the gospel. As with Day, it is impossible for Berrigan to
look past Jesus’ teaching of nonviolence, resulting in a very simple Christian ethic. Also,
like Day, Berrigan has made a good many adversaries, both among his Jesuit brothers,
and among the rest of the clergy and the lay faithful. He has made a decision, for good or
ill, to assert his strong beliefs in society as a whole and has been unapologetic for
“breaking the law.” In this way, he has been important for United States history as the
first member of the Roman Catholic clergy who consistently practiced civil
disobedience.61 He is also important for church history as he embodies a new way to be
Catholic in public.
Like Berrigan, who has been known primarily for participating in actions of
nonviolent civil disobedience, and Day, who was known primarily for her leadership role
in the Catholic Worker movement, James W. Douglass (b. 1937) has also taken part in
those two aspects of the peace movement in the United States. Douglass, however, is best
known for his work in advancing the cause of pacifism from the academic side of the
issue. While Berrigan and Day both wrote prolifically, they both admitted that they did
not strive to write academic theology. Douglass, on the other hand, is a trained theologian
who taught at the university level for many years before moving full time into a Catholic
Worker community in Birmingham, Alabama. Douglass points to the relationship
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between violence and suffering in his writing. According to Douglass, these are
opposites, but neither leads necessarily to God:
Power is revealed not as violence, which destroys, nor even simply as
suffering, which endures, but as Truth, which resists injustice through
voluntary suffering, and as Love, which in that suffering resistance opens
victim to executioner and thus raises their relationship from the level of
objects, passive and active, to that of persons, confronting and
confronted.62
In the worldview of Day, Berrigan, and Douglass, the innocent must sometimes suffer
injustice in order for the ideal of pacifism to be met. For this view, adherents to the just
war doctrine since Augustine and Ambrose have taken issue with pacifism. The views of
three contingent pacifists of the twentieth century will be illustrative of this point. It is
helpful to recall that all contingent pacifists, by the very nature of their ideological
positions, maintain a fundamental trust in just war theory, but with a particular nuance.
Twentieth Century Catholic Nuclear Pacifism:
John XXIII, Merton, and Hollenbach
The most developed variety of contingent pacifism in the twentieth century has
certainly been nuclear pacifism. As mentioned above, many of the bishops who drafted
The Challenge of Peace were nuclear pacifists. As far as presenting nuclear pacifism to
the American church, however, three individual Catholics stand out: Pope John XXIII,
Thomas Merton, and David Hollenbach, S.J. While Pope John XXIII (1881-1963) was
not from the United States, it is unquestionable that his influence as pontiff (1958-1963)
was a turning point for the universal church. Clearly, John was best known as the pope
who convened Vatican Council II, which John O’Malley has called “quite possibly the
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biggest meeting in the history of the world.” However, John’s importance for
American Catholics, or for the universal church, should not be limited to convoking this
massive assembly. On 11 April 1963, John promulgated his encyclical Pacem in terris
(hereafter PT), which would later be called his last will and testament since it came only
months before his death in June of that year. The encyclical itself touches on a number of
issues but, “the topic of PT is peace,” according to Drew Christiansen, who concludes
that John’s understanding of peace is inseparable from his understanding of human
rights.64
Nuclear pacifism is defined as the belief system that maintains that nuclear
weapons may never be used under any circumstances within warfare. John spurred on
such an ecclesial mindset with these bold words from PT:
Justice, then, right reason and consideration for human dignity and life
urgently demand that the arms race should cease, that the stockpiles which
exist in various countries should be reduced equally and simultaneously by
the parties concerned, that nuclear weapons should be banned, and finally
that all come to an agreement on a fitting program of disarmament,
employing mutual and effective controls.65
Such a clear message of peace from the pope encouraged the peace movement. Many of
those who had committed themselves to a life of pure nonviolence in light of the gospel
believed that PT was a sign that Roman Catholic acceptance of the just war doctrine had
come to an end. Not even seven years earlier, the aforementioned Christmas Message of
Pope Pius XII had reminded individual Catholics that it was never licit for them to
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practice conscientious objection to a given war, even if the conflict did not meet the
strict conditions for a just war.
In convening Vatican Council II, John was also instrumental for the church in the
United States. In Gaudium et spes (hereafter GS), the council fathers write clearly about
the evils of total warfare. They authoritatively proclaim, “Any act of warfare aimed
indiscriminately at the destruction of entire cities or of extensive areas along with their
population is a crime against God and man himself. It merits unequivocal and
unhesitating condemnation.”66 In the nearly five decades since GS was promulgated,
however, the issues of abortion, artificial birth control, and same-sex marriage have
received more attention from the American episcopacy of the Roman Catholic Church
than has the issue of warfare. In point of fact, nowhere in the entire corpus of conciliar
documents can one find a single statement about any of those three moral issues receiving
such a resoundingly negative diagnosis. To be sure, this is the closest the fathers ever
come to issuing an anathema during the four sessions of the council. Charles E. Curran
refers to it as “the strongest condemnation in all of Vatican II.”67 This condemnation, no
doubt, had its origins in the strong anti-nuclear rhetoric of PT and the prophetic
pontificate of John XXIII.
For as crucial as John XXIII was in spreading the message of nonviolence and
especially opposition to nuclear weaponry, there was a Roman Catholic who was even
more instrumental in the American church: Thomas Merton (1915-1968). Merton’s
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conversion account, The Seven Storey Mountain, was and continues to be a bestseller
among religious and non-religious readers alike. It was Merton’s writing against the
Vietnam War and nuclear weapons in particular which garnered the attention of the
Catholic peace movement in the United States. As a Trappist monk, Merton was bound to
obey his evangelical vow of obedience to his legitimate religious superior. After writing a
series of articles challenging nuclear proliferation that had been published in the early
1960s in Commonweal and The Catholic Worker, Merton was forbidden by his superior
from writing further on the subject: “On April 27, 1962, Dom James Fox handed Merton
a letter from Abbot General Gabriel Sortais, requesting that Merton no longer write on
the issues of war and peace, particularly on nuclear weapons.”68 One volume that Merton
worked on during his silencing, Peace in the Post-Christian Era, remained in
mimeograph form for nearly fifty years until it was finally published in 2004. It remains a
testament to Merton’s understanding of his monastic vocation, as well as his nuclear
pacifism.
Like John XXIII, Merton was not a pacifist who denied the just war doctrine out
of hand. As Lisa Cahill puts it,
It would be possible to interpret Merton either as a just war theorist who
was rigorously faithful to the exclusions of violence implied by his criteria
and to the presumption that violence is a sinful solution; or as a pacifist at
heart who felt accountable to the parameters outlined by his hard-won
Catholic faith, and who, as Zahn suggests, could allow a margin for
violence at the theoretical level that he could never really envision in
practice.69
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While it may be a matter of debate as to the ideological camp in which Merton belongs,
there is no ambiguity whatsoever regarding his disgust with nuclear weapons. He
believed that continuing to create these weapons was a surefire way to destroy God’s
world, and lamented, “The free choice of global self-destruction, made in desperation by
the world’s leaders and ratified by the consent and cooperation of their citizens, would be
a moral evil second only to the crucifixion.”70 There is little doubt that Merton’s writings
on the issue of nuclear war encouraged the American Catholic peace movement, and this
encouragement continues to this day.
From a more properly academic point of view, David Hollenbach (b. 1942) has
presented a most coherent nuclear pacifism that is grounded in his understanding of
Catholic social teaching. It is also based on a theological vision of human rights that
regards human beings as created by God in the divine image and likeness. More than just
a theological argument, however, Hollenbach also presents an argument for public policy
with respect to the development and use of nuclear weaponry. Recognizing that human
beings would be most directly, negatively, and unjustifiably affected by the use of
nuclear weapons, Hollenbach sees a clear interrelation between Christian ethics and
political discourse on this issue. He boldly declares, “I think the conclusion is clear: no to
the use of nuclear weapons; and no to the plans and schemes for their use. Negotiations
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and strategies must all be bent to this end. This is the moral-political challenge to
Christians in our time.”71 This writing only very closely preceded The Challenge of
Peace, so Hollenbach’s words were prescient in giving a foretaste of the episcopal
opposition to the use of nuclear weapons, and also the building of nuclear weapons with
the intent of using them as a deterrent to mutually assured destruction. Both Hollenbach
and the bishops believe that deterrence is only helpful insofar as it is able to prevent the
actual use of the weapons.
For Hollenbach, the U.S. Bishops have done a service to both the church and
society in general with The Challenge of Peace. He believes that the letter marks a
moment of historical importance in that it is “at once more forceful and more nuanced
than any of the documents produced by the popes or the council in the years since World
War II.”72 As the bishops themselves note in the pastoral letter, their teachings do not
carry the same moral weight as do other ecclesial pronouncements. This point
notwithstanding, Hollenbach clearly believes that the document places the bishops
squarely within a tradition that tries to analyze war from a morally sophisticated level.
They are heirs to the intellectual legacy of Augustine on the question of war and peace:
“As good practitioners of Augustinian moral theory, they seek to transform and redeem a
broken polis by seizing those opportunities for peace, order, and justice that history has
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given us today.” For Hollenbach, nuclear pacifism falls within a fair reading of
Augustinian ethics.
Doing Good to Those Who Hate You? A Reading of the Christian Just War
Tradition
If the earliest days of the Christian community were marked by a total
commitment to nonviolence, the development of certain criteria that could be met for
warfare to be considered morally justified would certainly leave its mark on Christianity
for all of the centuries since the doctrine’s inception. Despite the fact that Saints Ambrose
and Augustine practiced personal and clerical pacifism, they believed that certain
conditions would always necessitate the use of violent force from an organized army. As
Cahill puts it, “Augustine was willing to commend the use of violence if undertaken at
the behest of a legitimate civil authority (understood to have authority from God), if
necessary to punish crime or to uphold the peace, and if the combatants intended to
establish justice rather than hatefully to inflict suffering on their enemies.”74 In this
section, I will trace the impact of three key thinkers on the Roman Catholic just war
doctrine: Ambrose of Milan, Augustine of Hippo, and Thomas Aquinas.
As one might expect, the just war theory was not a systematic and comprehensive
checklist of conditions in its infancy. At first glance, it would appear that Ambrose’s and
Augustine’s formulations of these criteria for justified warfare are totally out of step with
the early Christians discussed above; however, Augustine certainly thought himself to be
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in continuity not only with the burgeoning Christian tradition, but also with the
teachings of Jesus. As noted above, there is no unanimous agreement on the meaning of
Jesus’ teachings on violence and resistance to violence. Additionally, it is also important
to recall that Augustine correctly saw Christian moral thought in a constant state of
development. Even in the fourth century, Augustine was noting the signs of the times and
attempting to respond accordingly to the needs of the community.
The Foundation of Ambrose
As the mentor for Augustine, Ambrose signaled through explicit writings a shift
within Christian thought on war and peace. As Swift explains, “One must keep in mind
that Ambrose’s election as bishop in 374 A.D. occurred while he was enjoying a
distinguished public career…It should come as no surprise, then, that his attitudes on war
and violence were much influenced by Roman sentiments of justice, loyalty, courage and
public responsibility.”75 Whereas his predecessors had largely carried a hatred for Rome
as an occupational force and a source of persecution, Ambrose’s perspective on Rome
was one of kinship. Ambrose felt at home within the church and the empire to a degree
that his predecessors would not have enjoyed.76 Ambrose’s sense of dual citizenship is
key to understanding his own stance on this issue.
Despite the earlier explanation of Ambrose’s personal pacifism, it is clear that this
private ethical imperative did not extend to the public realm of war. In his treatise On the
Duties of the Clergy, Ambrose makes the following broad argument: “Everyone believes
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it is much more commendable to protect one’s country from destruction than to protect
oneself from danger and that exerting oneself for one’s country is much superior to
leading a peaceful life of leisure with all the pleasures it involves.”77 As with Ambrose’s
more comfortable position within both the Roman empire and the church, it is also clear
that there is no longer a general abhorrence of shedding blood, which was of foremost
importance in the writings of his predecessors who argued more stringently along the
lines of renunciation of warfare. For Ambrose, there is an introduction of the idea that not
only is war sometimes tragically necessary, but also that service in the army is a point of
commendation for Christian soldiers. Ambrose also offers to the Christian community an
interpretation of the Roman principles of warfare, which are also the origins of what we
now understand as the Christian just war theory.
One origin of the just war theory in particular is the oft-cited Christian practice,
“love the sinner; hate the sin.” What results from an authentic implementation of this
practice is an ethic that makes it possible to love the enemy, while still fighting that
enemy in battle. Speaking of the Psalmist, Ambrose writes, “You should interpret the
words as meaning that he hated evil itself rather than evildoers, who, despite their
actions, are subject to conversion through the preaching of the gospel.”78 This is a
tremendous statement, because the result of such a belief is that the gospel can actually be
preached while on the battlefield. This shift in Christian thought is significant, to say the
least. Despite Ambrose’s willingness to justify war in certain cases, these cases remain
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limited, which to this day remains a hallmark of the just war tradition. As Swift notes,
Ambrose believed that “a war that is designed to punish wrongdoing or is defensive in
nature is justified, as is one undertaken to gain possession of territory that has been
promised by God.”79 When the United States bishops cite a traditional presumption
against war, they surely take to heart Ambrose’s instruction on the church’s role in
conflict: “The church, however, does not conquer the forces opposed to it with temporal
arms but with the arms of the spirit, which are capable in the sight of God of destroying
the fortresses and heights of spiritual wickedness (cf. II Cor. 10.4)…The Church’s
weaponry is faith; the Church’s weaponry is prayer, which overcomes the adversary.”80
The Significance of Augustine
In Augustine’s particular case, there is evidence that these needs of the
community played an important role in his own development of the Christian justification
for violent force in the matter of defense of a state. As Thomas Massaro, S.J. and Thomas
Shannon helpfully note, “In his years as Bishop of Hippo, Augustine lived in North
Africa, and this province of the Roman Empire was in danger of being invaded by the
Vandals. Only the Roman Army stood between them and the destruction of the
empire.”81 Here, it is important to note that there is a serious shift in the thought of
Augustine from the early Christian figures noted above.
Unlike many of his predecessors, Augustine views the time in which he lived as
important in itself and not merely an indicator of a future providential society that is
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entirely free of violent conflict. In spite of the lack of systematic development in
Augustine’s just war theory, there are some key elements of his thought which demand
close study, particularly because of their importance when considering the development
of the tradition in the centuries since Augustine’s writing. In what follows in this section,
I will discuss these elements as they appear in three distinct stages of Augustine’s
thought. In particular, I divide Augustine’s thought on war into three stages, where one
work from each stage will be emblematic of his general thinking at that time. As R. A.
Markus writes, “The one thing which has emerged from almost all serious studies of
Augustine…is that whatever can be said about almost any aspect of his thought is
unlikely to be true of it over the whole span of his career as a writer and thinker.”82
In the first stage of Augustine’s thinking on war, the act of warfare is punishment
to restore order. This is the stage of Augustine’s life when he is in philosophical dialogue
with his critics on the question of free choice of the will. It is crucial to understand that
Augustine consistently portrays a positive view of peace. In other words, peace is always
the construction of communities where people flourish in right order. To this extent, I
would agree with John Langan, S.J., who asserts that these thoughts constitute “a set of
ideas which show a reasonable constancy and coherence in Augustine’s view of war and
which manifest interesting connections with larger themes in his theology and his moral
theory.”83 In this first stage, however, we can see Augustine’s view come out clearly in
The Free Choice of the Will, written in 388 c.e.
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Augustine’s early thought on war establishes a special concern about the evil of
self-defense that never truly leaves the Augustinian corpus.84 In an exchange in On Free
Choice of the Will, Augustine’s interlocutor, Evodius, shows concern for the presence of
libido, an inordinate desire for material goods, to be a problem for the soldier in warfare.
After denouncing violent acts committed in self-defense, Augustine hears Evodius make
a further distinction about violence in warfare: “E: The law of the people deals with acts
it must punish in order to keep peace among ignorant men, insofar as deeds can be
governed by man…A: I praise and approve this distinction that you have made.”85 This
distinction that Augustine is so fond of is of great importance for his thinking on war for
two reasons. First, Augustine makes a connection between earthly and heavenly peace. In
a social context, it is up to human beings to create peace. War may only be waged for
peace, and may only be done to restore God’s order. The second theme here, as Swift
notes,
is that an assailant can take from his victim only those things (including
life itself) which the latter will inevitably relinquish at some time in the
future and over which he has no ultimate control…It is precisely because
the soldier or magistrate acts on behalf of others that he is free of such
desire and is thus allowed or even obligated under certain conditions to
take another’s life.86
Basically, the first stage of Augustine’s development can be summed up by a question for
the warrior: “Are you honestly seeking God’s will or your own agenda?”
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Augustine’s second stage of development may be seen well in his Answer to
Faustus, a Manichean, written between 386 and 390 c.e.87 In this stage of his thinking,
Augustine considered war to be a fulfillment of prophecy. Augustine writes that the
actual act of killing in itself is not the punishable offense of war. Rather, the punishable
offense is “the desire to do harm, cruelty in taking vengeance, a mind that is without
peace and incapable of peace, fierceness in rebellion, the lust for domination, and
anything else of the sort – these are the things that are rightly blamed in wars.”88 Again,
this is a major tenet of Augustine’s thinking that remains consistent throughout his
writings. What is particularly emblematic of this particular stage of his thought, however,
is Augustine’s notion of legitimate authority: “And at the command either of God or of
some legitimate authority, good men often undertake to wage wars against the violence of
those who resist so as to punish these things in accord with the law.”89 War, in certain
instances, is a divine commandment and it thus becomes incumbent upon Christians to
carry out such just wars.
Of particular poignancy in Augustine’s writings against Faustus the Manichean is
his use of the Hebrew Scriptures, and especially the figure of Moses. Augustine notes,
Slanderous ignorance…criticizes Moses because he waged war. For he
ought to have been criticized less if he waged war on his own initiative
than if he did not wage war when God commanded him to. But to dare to
criticize God himself because he commanded such actions, or not to
believe that the just and good God could have commanded such actions is
– to put it mildly – the mark of a person unable to grasp that, for divine
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providence, which extends from the highest to the lowest, what comes
to be is not new and what dies does not perish, and each individual thing
gives way or comes along or remains in the proper order of natures or of
merits.90
It is not simply a coincidence that Augustine deals with the authority of the God of the
Hebrew Scriptures, as this was a critique made by the Manicheans who saw a clear
difference between that God and the God of early Christianity. For Augustine, the
Christian attitude to war is really about the Christian’s relationship with God. As Langan
writes, “Not merely is the kingdom of God ultimately what we are to aspire to in our
desires and attitudes; but the authority of God is our ultimate guarantee of the
righteousness of what we do.”91 God’s authority is not only the same throughout history,
but such divine authority also has human representatives on earth. In the Hebrew
Scriptures, Moses was such a representative; in Augustine’s time the representative was
the emperor.
The prologue to the third phase of Augustine’s thinking on war and peace
provides the historical context for his writings. The City of God began appearing in 413
c.e., as Augustine began the project in the final stage of his life. In addition to drawing on
his years of learning and ministry, Augustine could also point to the events that were
happening around him during his writing to inform his thought. As one biographer puts it,
“the whole context of his life and thought was forever obliterated by the Vandal invasion
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of North Africa.” The agenda of The City of God was a theological one, but the point
of writing it at the time in which he did goes beyond the intellectual argument contained
therein. As Peter Brown explains, “It is particularly superficial to regard it as a book
about the sack of Rome…What this sack effected, was to provide Augustine with a
specific, challenging audience at Carthage.”93
Still, The City of God is informed by this event from 24-26 August 410. As
another biographer of Augustine, James J. O’Donnell, puts it, “Death and destruction on
a scale unparalleled in the city since the sack of the city by the Gauls exactly 800 years
earlier were shocking.”94 Regardless of one’s judgment concerning the importance that
the sack of Rome had on Augustine’s writing of The City of God, it is clear that the
problems of heresy and paganism were at the forefront of Augustine’s mind. These
problems caused disorder in the Roman Empire, disorder that Augustine despised. As
Brown notes, “[Augustine’s] whole perspective implied a belief in the resilience of the
Empire as a whole. Corrective treatment fails in its purpose, if it exterminates its subject:
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Rome, in his mature view, had been ‘punished, but not replaced.’” War, then, is the
creation of order and unity where there had once been chaos and disunity.
This historical note brings us to the third and most mature phase of Augustine’s
thinking with regard to warfare which comes through most vividly in Books XV and XIX
of The City of God. Here, Augustine treats war primarily as a tragic necessity. The single
most important departure in this phase from the previous two stages is that now, for
Augustine, there is some possibility that a Christian may decide legitimately to become a
pacifist. In this latter stage, there is little doubt that Augustine sees warfare as lamentable:
“Let every one, then, who thinks with pain on all these great evils [wars], so horrible, so
ruthless, acknowledge that this is misery. And if any one either endures or thinks of them
without mental pain, this is a more miserable plight still, for he thinks himself happy
because he has lost human feeling.”96 For Augustine, part of being human is to shun
violence if at all possible. Any occasion that necessitates a violent response in warfare is
a time for sorrow. Any sort of pleasure that one may feel because war is being waged is
actually inhuman according to Augustine.
Perhaps the most striking thing to take from Augustine’s third stage of thinking
on war is the idea that war must only be waged as a means of peace. There should be no
ulterior motives in the fighting of war. Augustine writes, “The things which this [earthly]
city desires cannot justly be said to be evil, for it is itself, in its own kind, better than all
other human good. For it desires earthly peace for the sake of enjoying earthly goods, and
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it makes war in order to attain to this peace.” For Augustine, the “earthly city” is
composed of the ungodly, while the “heavenly city” is made up of holy people.98 Because
of the clear distinction between the two cities – earthly and heavenly – the reader must be
clear about Augustine’s emphasis that true peace may only be found in heaven. Cahill
succinctly analyzes Augustine’s position on the two cities: “Every analogy builds both on
similarity and on difference, both on derivation and on discontinuity, and this is true of
Augustine’s comparison of earthly to heavenly peace.”99 Even though pure justice on this
earth is impossible, Augustine believes that the Christian at least must strive for such a
just world.
One thing that is especially important to note is that the presumption against war
is a theme that recurs and is maintained throughout all three of the stages of development
in Augustine’s thinking. Augustine is clear that war is never truly a good. He writes, “To
carry on war and extend a kingdom over wholly subdued nations seems to bad men to be
felicity, to good men necessity.”100 Here, it is clear that Augustine wishes to make a
distinction between those just warriors who fight to preserve justice for all and those who
we might consider warmongers, who have ulterior motives in waging wars. For the latter,
warfare is used to gain power or prestige, wealth or honors, rather than to secure the
common good and to protect the rights of all human beings. For Augustine, this may be
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the only concern. When applying the criteria for a just war, even in the 21 century,
such a crucial distinction must be at the forefront of such an application.
I should recall the importance that Augustine places on the interior disposition of
the warrior or the ruler who declares war against another nation. He expounds on such
interior virtues in a letter to the imperial commissioner, Marcellinus: “We must always
have benevolence in the will so that we do not return evil for evil…If this earthly state
keeps the Christian commandments, even wars will not be waged without goodwill in
order more easily to take into account the interests of the conquered with a view to a
society made peaceful with piety and justice.”101 This is certainly a complex statement
that yields a number of important insights. The first is an affirmation of the element
explaining the interior disposition of the just warrior. This extends to other areas as well.
For instance, this exemplifies Augustine’s own personal pacifism. The violence that a
nation exerts in war is not to protect individuals, but rather to protect a society.102
Therefore, their disposition may be one of “benevolence.” Furthermore, Augustine
introduces what we might understand today as concern for justice after warfare, or jus
post bellum.103 He expresses a care for the vanquished in war and what will befall them in
the future; he yearns for “a society made peaceful with piety and justice.”
One of Augustine’s most impassioned pleas to test all the waters of nonviolence
before waging war is found in a letter to Count Darius, who possessed the authority to
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declare war: “But it is a mark of greater glory to slay wars themselves by the word
rather than human beings by the sword, and to win and obtain peace by peace, not by
war…But you were sent in order that no one’s blood would be spilled; others, then, are
under that necessity, but you have this good fortune.”104 Elswhere, Augustine has not
denied the valid and important role of the soldier as one who is to protect earthly
peace.105 Augustine’s principal message is to that legitimate authority who has the power
to wage war. This is vitally important for Augustine’s thinking on the just war because it
places a serious responsibility on the shoulders of those in power. Declaring war is not
something to be taken lightly; rather, Augustine contends that such a duty is of utmost
importance. Here, the presumption against war takes the form of warfare being a last
resort for the authority whose responsibility it is to decide whether to enter into war. For
Augustine, the idea of a just war is not something that can only exist in theory, but is
rather something that is practical for rulers who are faced with the possibility of engaging
in such conflicts.
Finally, it is important to understand Augustine’s thinking about the type of peace
that may come from a just war. The goal of any just war is peace, and Augustine explains
that peace is a delight to all human beings: “For peace is a good so great, that even in this
earthly and mortal life there is no word we hear with such pleasure, nothing we desire
with such zest, or find to be more thoroughly gratifying.”106 Of course, such an earthly
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peace must be of great import, or else it would not necessitate killing countless people
to attain it. For Augustine, however, it is a mistake for human beings to prize this earthly
peace absolutely. There is a peace that is promised to believers that is far greater than any
peace that war may attain for them on this earth. Augustine explains, “The place of this
promised peaceful and secure habitation is eternal, and of right belongs eternally to
Jerusalem the free mother.”107
Eternal life is the only authentic peace, but that does not mean that human beings
should ignore the earthly life entirely. Because our earthly existence is important we must
try to imitate the heavenly existence of eternal life. Human beings are called to strive for
an earthly peace, which is an imperfect image of heavenly peace. Robert Holmes’s study
of Augustine suggests that Augustine falls short in adequately attending to this earthly
peace from a Christian perspective, which calls for followers of Christ to view the world
differently, by following Christ’s teachings: “But under Augustine these teachings, so far
as they pertain to violence and the taking of human life, reduce in practice to little more
than what is conventionally accepted.”108 For his part, Saint Thomas Aquinas (12251274) also dealt with the relationship between the peace of this world and that of God’s
kingdom. It is to Thomas that I now turn.
The System of Thomas
In discussing Thomas’s understanding of violence in the Christian tradition, it
would be most helpful to focus on three particular questions that he poses in his Summa
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In examining these three topics that Thomas addresses, I will show how

Thomas further lays groundwork for the United States bishops in their effort to compile a
list of criteria that must be met before a war may be considered justified. In what follows,
I first address Thomas on the topic of peace; next, I turn to Thomas’s understanding of
the individual’s right to violence in legitimate self-defense; finally, I focus on Thomas’s
understanding of warfare in particular.
Like Augustine, Thomas maintains the fundamental belief that peace is a goal of
all human beings: “Whoever desires anything, desires to attain, with tranquility and
without hindrance, to that which he desires: and this is what is meant by peace which
Augustine defines the tranquility of order.”110 The ultimate goal of warfare is not so that
human beings should perish in battle; rather, Thomas suggests, like Augustine before
him, that “those who seek war and dissension, desire nothing but peace, which they deem
themselves not to have…Hence all wars are waged that men may find a more perfect
peace than that which they had heretofore.”111 Furthermore, as a response to the divine
commandment to love one’s enemies, Thomas makes it clear that there is a proper type of
love in this case. He claims that it is totally improper to “love our enemies as such,” since
that would mean loving the sin that is in them. From an individual standpoint, Thomas
acknowledges that it is impossible to love each enemy in her or his own right, but “that
we should be ready to love our enemies individually, if the necessity were to occur.”
Thomas believes, simply, “we should not exclude our enemies from the love given to our
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In a particular way, then, Thomas’s understanding of the love

of one’s enemies falls in line with his understanding of peace because “charity causes
peace precisely because it is love of God and of our neighbor…[and] there is no other
virtue except charity whose proper act is peace.”113
The Christian call to be a peacemaker, for Thomas, is crucial to developing in
wisdom:
Now a peacemaker is one who makes peace, either in himself, or in others:
and in both cases this is the result of setting in due order those things in
which peace is established, for peace is the tranquility of order, according
to Augustine…The reward is expressed in the words, they shall be called
the children of God. Now men are called the children of God in so far as
they participate in the likeness of the only-begotten and natural Son of
God…Who is Wisdom Begotten. Hence by participating in the gift of
wisdom, man attains to the sonship of God.114
It is clear through Thomas’s arguments noted here and above that, as for Augustine,
peace holds an important role. For Thomas, there is an intimate connection between the
theological virtue of charity (caritas) and peace. As Eberhard Schockenhoff explains,
“Because human beings love themselves by charity in its orientation to God as their
uniquely fulfilling good, joy and peace are its most noble effects (nobilissimus effectus),
which are immediately united with the possession of the highest good.”115 Since
peacemaking is so closely connected with the highest good (union with God), peace
maintains a place of great importance in Thomistic thought.
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While Thomas and Augustine both had similar understandings of what causes
peace, they differ widely in their appropriations of how that peace may come about in
interpersonal relationships. Particularly, on the issue of private self-defense, there is some
disagreement between the two thinkers. As I noted above, Augustine’s personal pacifism
was a hallmark of his own thought on violence and in some senses is at odds with his
own just war doctrine. Thomas, on the other hand, explains that it is licit for a lay person
to defend oneself against an attacker even if this results in the attacker’s death through
what would later come to be known as the principle of double effect: “Nothing hinders
one act from having two effects, only one of which is intended, while the other is beside
the intention.”116 In the case of personal self-defense, the victim of an attack is justified in
attempting to save his or her own life from the hands of the assailant, which is a good
action (saving one’s life). The other effect of such an action may be the death of the
assailant in question (which is evil in itself), and must never be the intent of the victim.
Thomas notes, “If a man, in self-defense, uses more than necessary violence, it will be
unlawful: whereas if he repel force with moderation his defense will be lawful.”117
Therefore, it seems as though the use of moderate force in self-defense, which by the
definition of moderation must stop short of killing the attacker, is justified. For Thomas,
the intention of the actor is key. Likewise, in the case of warfare, intent is an important
point. I will now consider Thomas’s explanation of justified force in warfare.
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It is helpful to consider the initial question Thomas poses on the subject of
justified warfare: “Whether it is always sinful to wage war?”118 The inclusion of the word
“always” in this question means that it is at least often sinful to wage war. As David
Hollenbach puts it, “The just-war theory, properly understood, rests on the conviction
that violent warfare should be presumed to be morally unacceptable and even sinful.”119
That Thomas has a strong presumption against violent warfare should come as no
surprise and is not unique within the tradition. In fact, as I noted above, this presumption
is a matter of importance in Augustine’s own understanding of justified conflict. From
the earliest days of the just war doctrine in the Christian church, there has always been a
presumption against warfare. It is only natural, then, that the United States Catholic
bishops would highlight such a vital aspect of the Christian thinking on warfare in The
Challenge of Peace.
To be sure, Thomas’s presumption against warfare was not absolute. In the
answer to the question he posed above, Thomas establishes three criteria for a war to be
considered just. In other words, once these three criteria are met, the strict presumption
against war is overridden: “First, the authority of the sovereign by whose command the
war is to be waged…Secondly, a just cause is required, namely that those who are
attacked, should be attacked because they deserve it on account of some fault…Thirdly, it
is necessary that the belligerents should have a rightful intention so that they intend the
advancement of the good, or the avoidance of evil.”120 Martin Rhonheimer suggests that
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there is significant overlap between Thomas’s thought on killing in self-defense and
killing in battle. In both cases, the victim, “does not will the death of the attacker, but
only to render him harmless, in order to fend off the assault.”121
A final point to consider in Thomas’s understanding of justified warfare is his
prohibition on the clergy’s participation in battle. Thomas provides two reasons why he
considers the clergy unfit for military service:
The first reason is a general one, because, to wit, warlike pursuits are full
of unrest, so that they hinder the mind very much from the contemplation
of Divine things, the praise of God, and prayers for the people, which
belong to the duties of a cleric…The second reason is a special one, to wit,
all the clerical Orders are directed to the ministry of the altar, on which the
Passion of Christ is represented sacramentally…Wherefore it is
unbecoming for them to slay or shed blood, and it is more fitting that they
should be ready to shed their own blood for Christ, so as to imitate in deed
what they portray in their ministry.122
In clarifying the role of the clergy vis-à-vis warfare, Thomas is placing himself in a long
line of thinkers on the issue, dating back to the initial thought of Ambrose and
Augustine.123 The ecclesiastical prohibition on members of the clergy serving as activeduty (non-chaplain) members of the armed forces remains in place to this day. There is
some question, particularly among pacifists, as to whether this standard to which
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With a new understanding

of the relationship between the clergy and the laity since the promulgation of Lumen
gentium in 1964, it is unclear to many opponents of all warfare why such a Thomistic
separation of clergy and laity with regard to warfare would remain in place.
In sum, The Challenge of Peace is indelibly marked by the influence of the three
thinkers discussed in this section. Many others also influenced the formulation of the
bishops’ just war doctrine, but Ambrose, Augustine, and Thomas were clearly the most
crucial in formulating the criteria currently in place.125 However, not all analysts of The
Challenge of Peace believed that the bishops were faithful to the Augustinian tradition
laid out in this section. The most outspoken of these detractors is George Weigel, whose
disputes with the bishops I consider later in this chapter.
Twentieth Century Just War Theory in the United States:
Ford, Murray, and Hehir
Before moving to Weigel’s critique of The Challenge of Peace, I wish to focus
briefly on the work of three adherents to just war teaching in the twentieth century: John
C. Ford, S.J., John Courtney Murray, S.J., and J. Bryan Hehir. The work of these three
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theologians has influenced the majority position in the church today. The just war
legacy, however, has entered a new stage of its history. In the twentieth century, these
three Roman Catholic priests in the United States had a particular impact on how just war
theory would be practiced in theological discourse. Their own impact on the tradition is
unquestioned now.126
I first turn my attention to John C. Ford, S.J. (1902-1989). In some quarters of
moral theology, Ford – a professor at Weston College and Catholic University of
America for many years – is best known for his pioneering work on the topic of
alcoholism; in other quarters, he is known for his staunch support of Humane vitae and
the traditional Roman Catholic teaching opposing artificial birth control.127 His most
influential single article, however, appeared in Theological Studies in the midst of World
War II and dealt with a topic that was of utmost importance to the Church and the world:
saturation bombing.128 As his inclusion in this section betrays, Ford himself was firmly
entrenched in the just war tradition. He wrote about the proper expression of American
patriotism and its crucial role during World War II, which he supported as a justified
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However, Ford also upheld the rights of Catholics to be conscientious objectors

to all warfare or to practice selective conscientious objection to unjustified wars.130
Ford’s article itself is quite important both contextually and theoretically.
Contextually, the article is situated in the midst of World War II, and in it Ford responds
to the “obliteration bombing” of German cities. Of these operations, he explains: “The
target is a large area, for instance, a whole city, or all the built-up part of a city, or at least
a very large section of the total built-up areas, often including by design residential
districts.”131 Since Ford wrote during the midst of such a destructive period of world
history, his writings are obviously affected by these actions. However, the events also
gave Ford the opportunity to highlight the two jus in bello criteria as identified by the
United States bishops some 40 years later: noncombatant immunity (discrimination) and
proportionality.132
A key point throughout the consideration of the justice of war in certain cases
throughout this chapter has been the “presumption against war.” For his part, Ford admits
that the starting point for Catholic theology on this point has always been, “Thou shalt
not kill.”133 Perhaps the greatest contribution of the essay is that Ford puts in no uncertain
terms the exhaustive list of people that are almost always noncombatants.134 It is
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especially poignant that Ford uses the principle of double effect to test the morality of
obliteration bombing. Another version of this principle is used to justify warfare, since
double effect can explain the decision to override the presumption against warfare.
However, Ford concludes that using the principle to justify such bombing techniques “is
an unwarranted application of the principle of the double effect.”135 Without ever
changing his opinion on the just war theory, Ford determines that obliteration bombing
fails both jus in bello criteria, and therefore is not ever morally acceptable.136 This is one
of the greatest contributions to just war theory of the twentieth century and consequently
was vital to the bishops’ pastoral letter. The principle of double effect, in Ford’s view,
must be carefully utilized as a moral – not a mathematical – principle. Finally, he
concludes, “the principle is not an ultimate guide in difficult cases, because it is only a
practical formula and has to be applied by a hand well practiced in moral principles and
moral solutions.”137
A colleague of Ford’s was John Courtney Murray, S.J. (1904-1967). Among
twentieth century Roman Catholic theologians in the United States, however, Murray had
very few peers. Instrumental in drafting the Vatican II document Dignitatis humanae,
Murray is perhaps best known for his writings on religious freedom. This point
notwithstanding, Murray’s corpus of writings is a veritable tour de force.138 Furthermore,
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the secondary literature dealing with Murray’s thought is much more far-reaching than
that concerning Ford.139 Murray’s thought concerning war and peace, for its part, had an
enormous influence on the United States bishops.140
Murray’s most famous work is undoubtedly We Hold These Truths: Catholic
Reflections on the American Proposition, a compilation of his classic essays on various
topics of theological inquiry. One such essay, “The Uses of a Doctrine on the Uses of
Force: War as a Moral Problem,” has been crucial in forming what currently stands as the
majority Catholic teaching on justified warfare.141 In this article, Murray is clear from the
outset that his view considers that “relative pacifism” (what I refer to as contingent
pacifism in this study) “is not to be squared with the public doctrine of the Church.”142
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Next, Murray explains that it is also forbidden to support “preventive” or “preemptive” warfare.143
Murray’s own understanding of just war doctrine in 1959 when he wrote this
article is not unlike that put forth by the United States bishops some 24 years later. In
Murray’s exposition of just war theory, he notes four conditions: the war is a response to
an unjust attack, and thus a right intention; the war is the last resort; proportionality (and
the noting of the probability of success as part of this criterion); and the limited use of
force.144 It is worthwhile to note that Murray cautions between two extremes that create
“false dilemmas”: “a soft sentimental pacifism and a cynical hard realism.”145 Murray
notes that these dilemmas can be solved through a proper understanding of the
relationship between war and peace, which very few Americans are able to grasp:
The basic fallacy is to suppose that “war” and “peace” are two
discontinuous and incommensurable worlds of existence and universes of
discourse, each with its own autonomous set of rules, “peace” being the
world of “morality” and “war” being the world of “evil,” in such wise that
there is no evil as long as there is peace and no morality as soon as there is
war. This is a common American assumption.146
It would be an error to view Murray as overly bellicose, however. His
contribution to the war and peace question in Roman Catholic theological circles in the
United States brings forth an overwhelmingly important possibility of dialogue between
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representatives of both camps. While the United States bishops eventually disagreed
with Murray concerning the place of pacifists and contingent pacifists in the church, they
unquestionably benefitted from his delicate treatment of the relationship between the two
sides in such an argument. Without Murray’s contribution, it is unlikely that the bishops
would have been able to position just war doctrine and pacifism as parallel options in
Catholic thought. Murray encouraged those responsible for making the public policy to
work toward establishing the possibility of limited nuclear war.147 One could reasonably
expect that this has been accomplished through the nuclear deterrence policy, which the
United States bishops reluctantly endorsed.
The bishops’ tentative endorsement of nuclear deterrence, as well as the vast
majority of The Challenge of Peace as a whole, is largely attributed to one person: Rev. J.
Bryan Hehir (b. 1940). Hehir, a priest of the Archdiocese of Boston, is currently the
Parker Gilbert Montgomery Professor of the Practice of Religion and Public Life at
Harvard University’s Kennedy School of Government. Hehir’s impact on the question of
war and peace has gone far beyond the pastoral letter. He has written many articles on the
topic that have been illuminating not only on the history of the question, but also on the
future of a world where war often seems inevitable.148 What is particularly interesting
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about Hehir’s perspective now, however, is that he believes that there has been a
further shift in just war thinking since the publication of the 1983 pastoral letter.
This further shift is not altogether welcome, in Hehir’s estimation. The particular
development in question is one worth noting here to the exclusion of the remainder of
Hehir’s work, because its ramifications for Roman Catholic teaching on war and peace
can be seen reasonably clearly, especially in light of papal statements on war and peace in
the last three pontificates. Hehir points very clearly to this phenomenon in the papacy of
Pope John Paul II, who “made clear early in his papacy that he would oppose all attempts
to change conditions of injustice by resort to force. In each instance the pope made clear
that unjust patterns of political and economic relations were to be vigorously resisted, but
in no case did he yield on the prohibition against force.”149 Later, Hehir notes, John Paul
did uphold the hypothetical possibility for the justified use of force,150 but when it came
time to apply that in the case of the Gulf War, Hehir explains that John Paul’s resistance
to intervention during the Gulf War (a resistance that was upheld a decade later during
the waging of the Iraq War of 2003) and the publication of a controversial editorial in
Civilta Cattolica in 1991151 show a movement towards functional pacifism.
The term “functional pacifism” essentially means that, although a person or group
(in this case, Pope John Paul II, or the magisterial church) claims to adhere to just war
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doctrine, their rhetoric betrays pacifism in almost every sense. This has been a critique
levied especially against the last three popes; Hehir himself finds fault with John Paul II
in this very regard. Hehir expressed that he was wary of the possibility that pacifism may
become a majority position in the church thanks to the writings of John Paul II. More
than 30 years after Hehir’s wariness was first expressed, however, there does not seem to
have been a significant shift amongst the laity in this regard. Papal pronouncements
notwithstanding, the just war theory remains the majority position in the Roman Catholic
Church.152 One year before the pastoral letter that was marked by Hehir’s thought was
published, Hehir wondered aloud of the relationship between pacifism and just war
theory: “In the new state of the question, do we have moral complexity or simply
contradiction in the two positions?”153 It is no small irony that the pastoral letter only
made this question more difficult to answer with certainty. I contend that there is much
common ground from which to work in this area, and Hehir has done much to provide
this common ground, regardless of his own doubts.
Excursus: Whatever Happened to the Holy War?
Traditionally, there have been three paradigms through which to view the debate
between war and peace: just war theory, pacifism, and holy war.154 The holy war
paradigm reached its most prominent point during the crusades of the Middle Ages,
where Christians believed that they were being commanded by God to go to war with
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“heathens” or infidels in order either to convert them or maintain the purity of the
Christian empire. As Mark J. Allman notes, “Properly speaking, it refers to a series of
military raids by European Christians into Muslim-controlled territories in the Middle
East and Asia Minor between 1095 and 1291.”155
Although I do not have the space to enter into a lengthy discussion on the holy
war paradigm, it is enough to note that Christianity has properly excised this
understanding of international violence from its legitimate tradition. However, there is
another line of thought on the subject of holy war that I will first consider. The Christian
ethicist who has written most prolifically on the topic has been James Turner Johnson. He
explains his position:
The pacifism-just war-crusade typology…is a misleading conceptual tool
for understanding the developments I am describing, despite its wide
currency and general acceptance. Holy war doctrine in the early modern
period is fundamentally a form of just war doctrine inherited from the late
Middle Ages, and it takes its bearings from the idea, at least as old as
Augustine, that God himself inspires and commands some wars.156
Johnson’s position that the holy war actually falls under the just war paradigm seems to
be quite a stretch through twenty-first century eyes, yet he seems to be on solid ground in
this judgment. For example, Frederick H. Russell notes that in Augustine’s thought it was
of primary concern to pay what was due to God and it is possible that this could entail
carrying out the divine command to participate in war.157 For his part, Johnson goes a
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step further than his original claim: “Holy war is not a single phenomenon, but a
related group of phenomena. Nor can the Muslim theme of jihad be distinguished from
the concepts of holy war found in Hebraic tradition and in the Christianized West.”158
In the final analysis, however, a suspect understanding of the tradition of teaching
on war and peace with regard to the “presumption” in question could very well cloud
Johnson’s judgment. Johnson believes that the tradition, dating back to the writings of
Augustine and continuing through Medieval thinkers, simply does not line up in favor of
the United States Catholic bishops. He believes that, historically, there has been a
“presumption against injustice” rather than a “presumption against war.” This is a key
difference for Johnson. He believes that this shift in Catholic thought has led to the
position of the church today: namely, that the idea of the holy war is no longer a part of
the tradition. Regardless of whether or not one agrees with Johnson’s interpretation of
why the holy war has been pushed out of the normative Catholic understanding on war
and peace, it should be fairly simple to agree with him that there is no place in Christian
ethics today for this teaching. Like the bishops, I contend that Roman Catholic teaching is
clear that no country can have absolute justice on its side, and therefore, that no country
can claim a divine command to carry out violent war on another country. One may agree
with the bishops or with Johnson, but in either case, the conclusion is clear: there is no
room for the holy war in any Christian concept of justified violence.159

158

James Turner Johnson, The Holy War Idea in Western and Islamic Traditions (University Park, PA: The
Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997), 42.
159

The holy wars between Catholics and Protestants at the turn of the seventeenth century also played a
huge role in an intellectual movement away from the justification of holy wars. For more on this particular
phenomenon, see Johnson, The Holy War Idea in Western and Islamic Traditions, 57-60; 112-115.

75
A Counterargument: The Bishops, Weigel, and the Augustinian Tradition
One of the most prolific voices concerning Catholic matters in the United States
over the last three decades has been the self-proclaimed neoconservative commentator,
George Weigel (b. 1951). Outspoken on the issue of war and peace, Weigel’s most
influential foray into that debate is his 1987 volume, Tranquillitas Ordinis: The Present
Failure and Future Promise of American Catholic Thought on War and Peace.160 In this
section, I cannot attempt a survey of the entire project, but wish simply to highlight a few
areas of Weigel’s discontent with some of the varieties of pacifism in the Roman Catholic
theological tradition, as well as his disagreements with the American bishops who
published The Challenge of Peace. These disagreements also make Weigel’s version of
just war theory different than the standard doctrine advanced by the American
episcopacy. Therefore, not only does Weigel find fault with different forms of pacifism,
he also advances a non-traditional just war theory. Following this brief review of
Weigel’s thought, I render a pacifist (both absolute and contingent) and just war response
to Weigel.
For Weigel, pacifism has a somewhat tenuous relationship to the Roman Catholic
heritage of understanding peace as Saint Augustine had described it: tranquillitas ordinis,
the “tranquility of order.” In response to the authoritative teachings in Gaudium et spes

160

George Weigel, Tranquillitas Ordinis: The Present Failure and Future Promise of American Catholic
Thought on War and Peace (New York, Oxford University Press, 1987). This volume has generated a
substantial body of criticism. For the most detailed, see David Hollenbach, “War and Peace in American
Catholic Thought: A Heritage Abandoned?,” Theological Studies 48, no. 4 (1987): 711-726; John Howard
Yoder, (review), Conrad Grebel Review 6, no. 1 (1988): 95-98; and Jay P. Dolan, “Defining the Good
Fight,” New York Times Book Review (Apr 26, 1987): 30.

76
that made it possible for individual Catholics to practice conscientious objection to
warfare, Weigel seems cautiously optimistic:
The Council’s affirmation of the moral claims of those who rejected
personal participation in mass violence was overdue, and welcome. But
the Church had no developed theory of pacifism – neither a theology of
pacifism nor a means of relating pacifist personal convictions to the
requirements of governance in a world that would always remain, in the
main, nonpacifist.161
Part of the problem with the ensuing practice of allowing conscientious objection to
warfare was the result that the clause would have in practice. Weigel laments what he
believes to be the reality that “postconciliar American Catholic pacifism did not, in short,
contribute to the necessary development of the heritage of tranquillitas ordinis, but was a
prime mover in the abandonment of that heritage.”162 For Weigel, the heritage introduced
by Augustine and confirmed and expounded by Thomas was actually harmed by the way
the reforms of Vatican II were implemented in the United States.
Weigel also takes exception to pacifism by critiquing some of the particular forms
of expression that pacifism takes in some of its principal practitioners. For the purposes
of this study, I will focus on the individuals I mentioned earlier whom Weigel singles out
for their activism. Of the group, Weigel is undoubtedly harsher in his criticism of
Berrigan and Douglass than he is of Day and Merton. It is clear that Weigel is not blind
to the positive contributions of each of the figures he studies. Of each of the figures,
Weigel maintains that a certain apocalyptic worldview is an enduring aspect of their
thought and subsequent activism on the ground. Of Day, Weigel writes, “Dorothy Day’s
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life and witness remains a powerful sign in modern American Catholicism, and the
power of that sign derives in part from the pain she suffered out of commitment and
love.”163 It is clear, however, that Weigel’s own theological outlook prevents him from
endorsing the Catholic Worker movement in its entirety. This fundamental disagreement
also leads him to an alternative reading on the lifework of Day.
Weigel expresses his disagreement with the Catholic Worker movement by
maintaining that it delves too deeply into politics and “made many judgments: about the
character of the American experiment, about the nature of conflict in the world, about the
meaning and threat of totalitarianism, about the relationship between individual
conscience and civic responsibility – and about the implications of all these for U.S.
policy in the world.”164 Weigel does not believe that Day had erred in directing herself or
the Catholic Worker movement into the realm of politics; his problem with Day was her
insistence on criticizing American imperialism and never attending to the evils taking
place throughout the rest of the world. Weigel writes: “The Catholic Worker approach to
the problem of communism remained distorted by the apocalyptic horizon and its failure
to distinguish relative evils. Dorothy Day claimed that she objected to Soviet nuclear
weaponry and nuclear testing as much as she did to American weapons programs, ‘but
the personalist way was not in name-calling.’”165
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Among Weigel’s profiles of pacifists in his study, that of Daniel Berrigan is the
most scathing. As in his profile of Day, Weigel makes clear that Berrigan has had a
significant influence on many American Catholics. Weigel argues that even more than
Day, Berrigan and his followers used their apocalyptic worldview to enter into the
political realm. Weigel again finds fault with this approach and he is disturbed by the
intensified and dramatic manner in which Berrigan entered politics. Weigel laments,
“Polarization was the order of the day. The times were too ‘inexpressibly evil’ to allow
for the gentler political arts of persuasion, civil debate, compromise, and mutual
agreement. Politics was about utility, and what was needed was not utility, but
cleansing.”166 Since Berrigan’s political approach was not meant to unify but to purify,
Weigel found fault with Berrigan’s philosophy. This philosophical difference is
concretized in Berrigan’s unique practice of nonviolence and Weigel’s interpretation of
this vis-à-vis “legitimate” nonviolence.
As I highlighted above, Berrigan’s first major foray into nonviolent civil
disobedience involved using homemade napalm to burn draft files. The choice of napalm
was no coincidence: United States soldiers in Vietnam were also using it. Weigel, among
others, took offense that supposedly nonviolent activists would choose such “violent”
means of carrying out their activism: “Classic Gandhian nonviolence – insisting on the
prerogatives of just law, believing in the convertibility of the adversary who is also a
seeker of truth, willing on principle to take the legal consequences of one’s acts of civil

critique the personal lives of her disciples in the Catholic Worker movement, so it is unlikely that she was
as averse to “name calling” as Weigel suggests.
166

Weigel, Tranquillitas Ordinis, 168.

167

disobedience for the sake of the law – was rejected.”

79
In other words, only Gandhian

nonviolence is truly “legitimate.” Moreover, Weigel accuses Berrigan of an imbalanced
critique of the United States and an insufficiently critical position on the Viet Cong, the
Weathermen,168 and the revolutionary movement in Latin America.169
The influence of James Douglass went far beyond his own writings, according to
Weigel’s critique. As with Day and Berrigan, Douglass’s theology has some major
shortcomings, according to Weigel. Moreover, Douglass’s worldview is deficient for
Weigel because, like Day and Berrigan, Douglass finds greater fault with the actions of
the United States than he does with other nations and groups. In addition to Douglass
seeming hypocritical on this front, Weigel also finds Douglass guilty of moving the
church away from an intellectual approach to war and peace and towards an overly
sentimental approach. After recounting a day-long retreat led by Douglass and his wife
Shelley, Weigel recounts being “told by the Douglasses that the purpose of our time
together was not to think analytically about the arms race, or the varieties of Catholic
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Weigel makes it

clear that this was the result of a misguided shift in careers for the professor-turnedactivist Douglass.
The real crux of Douglass’s damage, according to Weigel, was the impact he had
on the Catholic bishops of the United States, in particular his local ordinary in Seattle
during the 1980s, Archbishop Raymond Hunthausen. Weigel reports, “Douglass’s
tutelage led Archbishop Hunthausen to become one of the most prominent episcopal
critics of U.S. deterrence strategy, a stance that helped pave the way for the 1983 pastoral
letter, ‘The Challenge of Peace.’”171 Like Day and to a larger extent Berrigan, Douglass
felt obligated to name the political implications of his theological understanding. Unlike
Day and Berrigan, however, Douglass directly influenced a major player in the National
Conference of Catholic Bishops, and thus had some impact on the drafting of the peace
pastoral letter.172 Weigel sees this influence as a major role in the larger abandonment of
the heritage that comes to fruition in The Challenge of Peace.
Weigel chronicles the years-long process of drafting The Challenge of Peace and
documents some of the themes that were common aspects of the episcopal debates during
that time. Many of these themes seem to have been adopted from the writings and
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activism of Day, Berrigan, and Douglass. For instance, Weigel notes, “An apocalyptic
sense permeated their rhetoric. The bishops seem to have believed that they stood in an
utterly unique historical moment…This in itself was an extraordinary claim for bishops
who carried a fifteen-hundred-year-old heritage of thought on the moral problem of war
and peace.”173 Likewise, Weigel argues that many of the bishops had been drawn into an
anti-American ethos that unfairly criticized the United States for lapses in moral
judgment, while seemingly turning a blind eye to other nations who were acting
similarly. In Weigel’s estimation, the final version of the pastoral letter was even worse
than no letter at all.
The Challenge of Peace spearheaded the tradition of what Weigel calls
“abandonment of the heritage,” but Weigel presses beyond this point in his critical
response to the document, noting that the letter “was a decisive moment in that process
[of abandonment], because it involved the adoption, by the National Conference of
Catholic Bishops, of key themes of abandonment that had become pervasive in American
Catholicism in the years following the Second Vatican Council.”174 Even more
worrisome for Weigel is that American culture in general has influenced the bishops. He
laments that the “claim that The Challenge of Peace has had a major impact on the
American political culture could just as easily be inverted, and in a way that ought to
provoke serious examination of conscience among bishops, social ethicists, publicists,
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But what would the payout be in taking this

message on war and peace seriously?
According to Weigel’s assessment, one of the key failures of the bishops in the
letter was to pose pacifism and just war theory as complementary moral theories. Weigel
contends, “The principled pacifist opposes all resort to armed force; the just-war theorist
allows the proportionate and discriminate use of armed force in carefully defined
circumstances. The confusion of these two positions leads to the corruption of both.”176
For Weigel, there is no legitimate way in which these two moral theories can be equated
in the way the bishops maintain. The basic reason here is that Weigel is certain that the
bishops have abandoned the heritage. In abandoning the heritage, the bishops adopt
terminology such as “presumption against war” which does not align with the genuine
tradition as Weigel understands it. As long as the bishops advance such an argument in
the war and peace debate, Weigel believes, there is no way in which their “new” rhetoric
on the issue will have any resemblance to the Augustinian understanding of peace as the
“tranquility of order.”
It is clear that Weigel believes that the American bishops broke new ground in the
debate on war and peace in the Roman Catholic tradition. Similarly clear is Weigel’s

175

George Weigel, “The Bishops’ Pastoral Letter and American Political Culture: Who Was Influencing
Whom?” in Reid, Peace In a Nuclear Age, 187.
176

Weigel, Tranquillitas Ordinis, 283. There are three points to be made in response to this objection to the
pastoral letter: 1) This is part of a larger objection that attends to various criteria in the just war theory,
however, this objection is most pertinent to our interests here; 2) Weigel is not alone in having this reaction
to the document. It is shared by some pacifists and just-war theorists alike; 3) The objection does not
preclude members of both parties working “together in the practical order on building international political
community sufficient to sustain legal and political means of resolving conflict” (Tranquillitas Ordinis, 283).

diagnosis of this “groundbreaking”: “a tragically lost opportunity.”

177

83
So what can we

take away from Weigel’s displeasure with varieties of pacifism and The Challenge of
Peace? I would argue there are three salient points moving forward: first, Weigel believes
the bishops have abandoned the Augustinian tradition; next, he calls into question the
bishops’ competency to address certain questions; finally, he wonders if it is even
possible for an individual to be a nuclear pacifist.
The first of these is undoubtedly the most important from Weigel’s point of view:
“the abandonment of the heritage.” As I have tried to show in this section, Weigel firmly
believes that beginning with Saint Augustine and extending through the present day, the
Christian tradition has staunchly defended the rights of nations to use force in defending
themselves from unjust attacks. The tradition, as Weigel understands it, is based on moral
and political questions regarding the use of violent force, and instead of approaching it as
such, the bishops have taken nuclear weapons as their entry into the debate. According to
Weigel, “This made the bishops vulnerable to intellectual currents and emotional
passions that were not only external to their own tradition, but fundamentally opposed to
its central claims.”178 The bishops, then, have utterly failed at understanding their roles as
interpreters of the tradition.
This unfortunate consequence of the letter brings us to the second problem from
Weigel’s perspective: the competency of the bishops to address questions such as these in
the first place. During the 1987-88 “American Search for Peace” seminar,179 Weigel
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offered a response to a presentation by David Hollenbach in which Weigel “argued
that the way in which the churches had become involved in the peace and war debate was
problematic. The churches claimed to come to the debate in a teaching and pastoral
capacity. But they often wound up engaging in finely tuned policy analysis and
prescription, a task for which they have no special competence.”180 Weigel claimed that
the offshoot of the bishops acting in this way was threefold: they would lose their moral
authority in general; they would slip into playing to one political party or another; and
their analysis would continue to become overly psychological.181 For Weigel, there exists
a very distinct line that the bishops must not cross in order to remain within their sphere
of competency. Foremost among the issues that comprised this boundary line were issues
of public policy as applied in times of war and peace. The payout of the bishops’
misunderstanding of their competency in this area was the “presumption against war” that
The Challenge of Peace proclaims to be the starting point for the just war theory.
Third, and finally, Weigel fails to see the validity of one particular type of
contingent pacifism, namely nuclear pacifism. Instead, in a later essay he refers to this as
“terminological imprecision.” He goes on:
What is termed “nuclear pacifism” is in fact a set of judgments (about
either nuclear war or the threat of escalation to nuclear war from a
conventional war between the superpowers) that is based, not on pacifist
moral premises, but precisely on the just-war norms of proportionality (ad
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bellum and in bello) and discrimination. I continue to suspect that the
nomenclature “nuclear pacifism” was, and is, used on the assumption that
identification with pacifism places one on the moral high ground, so to
speak. Since this is, at best, a dubious position, I think we would all be
better off if things were called by their proper names. “Nuclear pacifism”
isn’t pacifism, and it shouldn’t describe itself as such.182
In all likelihood, this rejection of nuclear pacifism constitutes as well a broad rejection of
the many varieties of contingent pacifism. This rejection results in Weigel lumping
together all pacifists under a single belief system of absolute strictness in their objection
to warfare. Weigel would differentiate between them by alluding to their tactics in how
their pacifism plays out in the world.183 While it is not impossible for pacifists to have a
de facto morally sound mindset, according to Weigel, it is crucial for them to be honest in
what they call themselves. Even though Weigel fashions himself a Roman Catholic just
war theorist, it is helpful to study that tradition to determine whether it would be
appropriate to place Weigel squarely within it.
A Response to the Counterargument: Yoder, Weigel and a New Variety of Pacifism
and An Updated Just War Theory
In this section, I first wish to respond to the three points raised at the end of the
previous section. Having done so, I will conclude the chapter with an effort to sketch the
necessary characteristics of a new and realistic understanding of pacifism to work
alongside an updated just war theory in the twenty-first century. First, Weigel makes the
sustained argument that the United States bishops have abandoned the heritage that they
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are bound to advance through their episcopal office. This is a particularly serious
claim. There are three responses to this part of Weigel’s counterargument.
The first response to Weigel’s claim about the heritage being abandoned is that it
remains unclear what role in the heritage is occupied by the earliest Christians who
refused to serve in the military for the reasons listed above. While Weigel readily admits
that “St. Augustine of Hippo was not the first Christian to reflect on the moral problem of
war and peace,”184 he nonetheless fails to consider at any length some of the figures
mentioned above from the first few centuries of Christian practice who adamantly refused
to justify violent force in defense of rights. It is patently unfair to overlook this evidence
in the earliest days of the “heritage” and thereby claim that the heritage in question is one
that only advocates criteria for a just war. Pacifism surely has a legitimate role in the
heritage, and for the bishops to claim there is a presumption against war is to highlight a
well-documented aspect of the heritage, indeed.
The second response to Weigel’s claim focuses on the figure of Augustine. As I
noted above, Augustine advocated a stance of personal pacifism. This fact alone should
remind us that any understanding of Augustinian just war doctrine must be couched in the
reading of violence – even in defense of the rights of others – as rooted in evil or in the
privation of the good. Even though Weigel would argue that the presumption against war
was simply manufactured by the American bishops, it is difficult to read the origins of
Catholic just war thought without also noticing the clear desire to avoid the use of violent
force. Moreover, Augustine’s personal pacifism has a particular place in the tradition that
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stands as a witness to the dignity of nonviolence. As the bishops explain, the justified
war overcomes the presumption against violence in Augustinian thought: “Faced with the
fact of attack on the innocent, the presumption that we do no harm, even to our enemy,
yielded to the command of love understood as the need to restrain an enemy who would
injure the innocent.”185 The presumption against war is the principal facet of the
Augustinian just war theory that understands peace as the tranquility of order.
Finally, there is a third response worth exploring to Weigel’s accusation that the
heritage has been abandoned: there must always be room for the development of any
heritage. Since the time of Ambrose and Augustine, Christian thinking on war and peace
has developed. Saint Thomas Aquinas is rightly credited with the most significant
development of the heritage of Catholic thought dealing with war and peace. In point of
fact, Weigel himself acknowledges this development at some length.186 Pope John XXIII
(Pacem in terris) and the council fathers at Vatican Council II (Gaudium et spes) also
developed this doctrine. As Hollenbach observes, “Only by a one-sided reading of
tradition, recent discussions of war and peace among the Catholic theological and
episcopal leadership, and contemporary political and military realities has Weigel been
able to make a case for his thesis that the Catholic heritage has been abandoned.”187 By
his “one-sided” reading of the heritage – only through the lens of tranquillitas ordinis –
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Weigel has closed himself off from accepting legitimate developments of the heritage
in question. In this way, his admonition of the bishops for abandoning their heritage is a
failed attempt.
The second key point of Weigel’s critique is the bishops’ competency to make the
types of statements they do in the letter in the first place. Clearly, I am not accusing
Weigel of denying the bishops their rightful place as teachers of the Catholic faithful in
their local churches. The accusation Weigel does make, however, that the bishops are
simply not qualified to make policy suggestions as they do in The Challenge of Peace
rings hollow because it sets up an apparent double standard in Weigel’s analysis. In one
sense, The Challenge of Peace inherited the legacy that the American bishops had
established with the “Bishops’ Program of Social Reconstruction” of 1919. As a body,
the American Catholic bishops were known as the National Catholic War Council from
1917-1919, and then as the National Catholic Welfare Council.188 As Charles Curran
explains, “The 1919 ‘Bishop’s Program’ indicated that the U.S. Catholic Church was
now in a position to address in a more systematic and consistent way the issues of justice
and peace facing the United States as a whole. Throughout the twentieth century, and into
the twenty-first, bishops continued to speak out on such issues.”189 It would be nearly
impossible to imagine The Challenge of Peace (among other pastoral letters) without the
developments of 1919.
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Prominent among the influential, public, and political statements of the
American episcopacy in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries have been its
outspoken advocacy against abortion and same-sex marriage. Similar to The Challenge of
Peace, this advocacy has the effect of placing the bishops on a very particular side of
divisive societal issues. The result has been a distinct movement into the political sphere.
Simultaneously, the American episcopacy has focused less on issues of war and peace
since it published the pastoral letter. Instead of committing themselves to what Joseph
Cardinal Bernardin called the “consistent ethic of life,” the bishops zeroed in on one
particular part of that overarching message.190 To my point: it is clear that Weigel would
not counsel the American bishops to absent themselves from the ongoing debate over, for
instance, whether women have the legal right to procure an abortion. If there is a question
of competency, then it must be said that the bishops are no more experts in bioethics than
they are in public policy. Either they remove themselves from all public policy debates or
from none. One cannot have it both ways in this matter. It is my argument that the Roman
Catholic bishops of any nation belong squarely in the midst of controversial debates such
as warfare, capital punishment, and abortion.191
In responding to the third of the above points Weigel makes, I readily admit I am
responding to the most crucial argument for the purposes of this dissertation. Weigel’s
opposition to the term “nuclear pacifism” and by association to all varieties of contingent
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pacifism is misleading. I wish to focus my response on two aspects of the extended
quotation above. First, Weigel argues that “nuclear pacifism,” as its practitioners
understand it, is not really pacifism because it really has more to do with just war
thinking than with the pacifist tradition. Weigel and I agree that there is a clear distinction
between pacifism and the position in question. The overarching problem, of course, is
that when the categories are simply “pacifism” and “just war theory” the result is a badly
deficient understanding of the complexity of the scale on which individuals and groups
find themselves with regard to the issue of war and peace. In truth, all varieties of
contingent pacifism benefit from the just war criteria in explaining their rationale.
Nuclear pacifists, for their part, point to proportionality and claim that it is impossible
that this criterion ever be fulfilled with the use of nuclear weapons; therefore, when it
comes to nuclear weapons, they are pacifists.192 Viewing pacifism and just war thinking
as so diametrically opposed to one another is an injustice to both intellectual traditions.
The second claim is derived from the latter half of Weigel’s above accusation: “I
continue to suspect that the nomenclature ‘nuclear pacifism’ was, and is, used on the
assumption that identification with pacifism places one on the moral high ground, so to
speak. Since this is, at best, a dubious position, I think we would all be better off if things
were called by their proper names.” There are two rather glaring problems with this point.
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First, Weigel makes a claim about people, in general, believing that pacifism
represents a “moral high ground.” This is a curious suggestion. I would hope that Weigel
also believes that those (himself included) who adamantly believe that war can, in some
tragic situations, be justified, also find themselves on “the moral high ground.” I wish to
warn against using this term pejoratively, however. It is my argument that the grave
situation of warfare necessarily requires each individual to make a crucial decision about
her or his general conclusions regarding the permissibility of violent force. In the case of
pacifists and just war theorists alike, it is my conclusion that all individuals will consider
themselves to be on the “moral high ground” because they believe that is the most
morally sufficient response. It is worth noting that a pejorative use of the term,
conversely, assumes to know the inward beliefs of a particular individual or group. Such
a judgment is not a worthwhile investment of time, and not the purpose of this study. One
purpose of my work, however, is to make a coherent argument for the emergence of a
new variety of religious pacifism in the twenty-first century.
This new variety of religious pacifism for our time can be known as “ecological
pacifism.” While I will deal with this variety of contingent pacifism particularly in the
final chapter of the dissertation, I will conclude this chapter with a brief overview of the
necessary characteristics of a just war theory that will be useful in the world today, as
well as a realistic variety of pacifism. The criteria of the just war theory, as laid out in
The Challenge of Peace, are a suitable starting point for the doctrine as it should be
implemented in the years ahead. Nevertheless, each criterion should be augmented by

more stringent standards
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that make it clear that the dangers of our world today are

greater than those in the time of Augustine or of Thomas Aquinas. As I will argue, the
effects of war on the natural environment and non-human animals must register as
significant concerns when we consider creating a more just society. Moreover, regarding
“ecological pacifism,” it must not be a type of contingent pacifism that places its
advocates on the periphery of society. Ecological pacifists must not be viewed as passive
idealists, as many groups have painted contingent and absolute pacifists in the past, and
continue to do so. Rather, ecological pacifism must embrace much of what is good about
the just war theory. In particular, ecological pacifists must rely upon the realism inherent
in their position. Being realistic means that the continuation of war as it is currently being
carried out will mean the continuing destruction of God’s creation, as well as our natural
habitat. A realistic reading of the problem of warfare leads to a greater respect for all of
creation. Such a realistic reading necessarily includes a discussion of justice after
warfare, and the relationship between just war theorists and pacifists. These discussions
are a key part of Chapter Two.
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CHAPTER TWO
JUS POST BELLUM AND JUST PEACEMAKING: TWO DEVELOPMENTS IN THE
WAR AND PEACE DEBATE
On 1 May 2003, in one of the most infamous presidential gaffes of recent
memory, George W. Bush appeared aboard the USS Abraham Lincoln under a banner
reading, “Mission Accomplished.” The bold statement, of course, referred to the war in
Iraq that commenced fewer than two months earlier and would continue for more than
seven additional years. Bush’s ill-timed proclamation of success, however, raised a
crucial question for the United States and the entire world: what is the responsibility of a
“victorious” nation in the wake of warfare? As I indicated briefly in the previous chapter,
the Roman Catholic just war theory has identified two chronological stages in the process
of a given war: ad bellum and in bello. In recent years, a number of thinkers – beginning
with a 1994 article by Michael Schuck – have begun also to address the time after the
fighting has ceased: jus post bellum.1 This burgeoning aspect of war and peace studies
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should take a central place of importance in the Roman Catholic just war theory
precisely because of the inadequacies that it highlights in the current status quo. By
focusing exclusively on the criteria before a war may be justly declared, as well as the
criteria for fighting a just war, Christians neglect the fact that injustice also reigns
supreme in post-war societies.
The second concept with which this chapter deals is another relatively new
development in war and peace studies: just peacemaking theory. In the last 15 years, Glen
Stassen (1936-2014) and his colleagues have argued that the interplay between just war
theory and pacifism has not sufficiently responded to the problems in society that have
historically led to violent conflict. As five just peacemaking theorists note in the
introduction to the most recent edition of their work, there are now “three paradigms for
the ethics of peace and war: pacifism, just war theory, and just peacemaking theory…An
ethic of peace and war that still operates with only pacifism and just war theory is
outdated.”2 As some historians of war and peace will correctly note, properly speaking,
there have been three paradigms before. To go along with pacifism and just war theory
had been the third paradigm of the “holy war,” to which I allude in the preceding chapter.
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This point is important for the current discussion because it brings into question the
proper place of just peacemaking in the current debate. In order to occupy a structurally
dependable position in the war and peace discourse, just peacemaking theory must prove
that it offers something to the debate.
One of the key facets of just peacemaking theory is that it is comprised of the
work of both scholars who are pacifists and those who are adherents to just war theory.
They explain the rationale for such a diversity of thought: “Just peacemaking won’t
always prevent wars, so everyone needs either pacifism to say that participation in war is
never justified, or just war theory to judge whether a particular war is justified.”3 This
naturally leads to two important observations. First, if one must be a just war theorist or a
pacifist in order to subscribe to just peacemaking theory, then how is just peacemaking a
separate paradigm? Does its existence ultimately call for every individual and group
within the other camps also to align with just peacemaking? More positively, however,
the existence of just peacemaking theory does make it possible for adversaries in the just
war/pacifism debate to come together to work for peace through civil discourse and
united action.
After a brief excursus on just peace, this chapter will discuss some of the practices
of just peacemaking theory4 and propose how ecological concerns could be integrated
more seamlessly within that paradigm. In order for just peacemaking to have staying
power in the church and the academy, it must be strengthened with practices that more
3
4
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Each practice takes up one chapter in Stassen, Just Peacemaking. Because of space limitations, I will not
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particularly helpful in understanding just peacemaking theory in light of this project.
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fully acknowledge the dangers of further ignoring the natural environment, particularly
within the context of violent conflicts. Finally, this chapter will conclude with an analysis
of where pacifism and just war theory are open to dialogue and look to the future with
concrete suggestions leading to even greater common work for peace.
Justice After Warfare and the Pacifist Tradition
Perhaps the most interesting and debated question springing from the growing
scholarship on jus post bellum is, “can good fruit come from a bad tree?”5 This question
is challenging for both just war theorists and pacifists. Of course, pacifists would struggle
with this question simply because they believe that, by definition, every single act of
violence leading up to and within warfare is always unjust; violence is always and
unequivocally a “bad tree.” For adherents to the just war theory – many of whom are
contingent pacifists who believe that some particular issues will prohibit the use of
violent force – the question likewise poses a moral quandary. When a war that fails to
meet all the ad bellum and in bello criteria for a justified conflict ends, what can then
happen to create some semblance of justice for those who have been wronged? Is there a
way to make the fruits of this bad tree good?
Mark Allman and Tobias Winright have done a great service in beginning to
answer this question. They assert, “A war that fails to meet the jus ad bellum
requirements, but observes the in bello restraints and fulfills the post bellum
responsibilities does not turn an unjust war into a just war, but it does make it less unjust
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than it would have been if the in bello and post bellum obligations had been ignored.
We envision the justice of war on a sliding scale of sorts.”6 This “sliding scale” of justice
in warfare is surely helpful from the perspective of just war theorists, especially since
there is such a broad range of adherence to the plausibility that in some circumstances
violence might be necessary. The scale, however, is more questionable for pacifists, who
would claim that every single act of violence is de facto unjust. Pacifists – if they
authentically hold their positions – must be on board with post bellum efforts at creating
justice. After the fighting in a war has ended, being a pacifist means the same thing
theoretically and practically as it did before and during the fighting: stringent opposition
to any and all types of violence from all sectors. After a war has ended, however, there is
a practical difference for pacifists regarding just post bellum: they are obliged to work
actively for justice in the areas where the conflict had created situations of injustice.
For the purposes of this project, I wish to reference the four jus post bellum
criteria that Allman and Winright suggest in After the Smoke Clears: the just cause
principle, the reconciliation phase, the punishment phase, and the restoration phase.7 In
briefly describing each of these criteria, I will also address a pacifist response to each
criterion or stage. In so doing, I illustrate how pacifists not only can, but also must,
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participate in movements to create justice after a given violent conflict if they are to
remain true to their philosophical beliefs.
When speaking of pacifism, I am in some ways constrained by having to do so in
a general sense only; thus I am unable to attend to the arguments proposed by every
pacifist or even every group of pacifists. In the pages that follow, however, one area of
pacifist thought in general will emerge: the firm belief that the moral goals, principles
and virtues that guide human beings at the personal and interpersonal levels are the same
moral goals, principles and virtues that guide us at the social and political levels of
existence. Readers will, of course, note that this is a marked difference from traditional
thought concerning just war doctrine, which is perhaps best explicated by twentieth
century Protestant ethicist, Reinhold Niebuhr.
Niebuhr is well known for advancing a line of thought known as Christian
realism. A realist outlook on the world argues, in part, that what may work in individual
cases may not be imposed upon the state. As Niebuhr explains, there is a conflict between
what he calls individual (religious) morality and social (political) morality. He does not
admit that the pacifist will always be wrong in making a seamless jump from personal to
social morality: “Forgiveness may not always prompt the wrongdoer to repentance; but
yet it may. Loving the enemy may not soften the enemy’s heart; but there are possibilities
that it will. Refusal to assert your own interests against another may not shame him into
unselfishness; but on occasion it has done so.”8 Ultimately, Niebuhr maintains that
individual interests, while “related to those of the group,” should take a secondary
8
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position, while the needs of the group take the primary position.” The pacifist position
that I present in this chapter holds – contra Niebuhr – that entire states can and should
take as their policy the ideal of love.
The Just Cause Principle and Pacifism
The first post bellum category is the just cause principle.10 This principle is also a
criterion in the jus ad bellum stage of just war theory, though it differs from the context
of the post bellum phase. The U.S. Catholic bishops note that the just cause principle
means “War is permissible only to confront ‘real and certain danger,’ i.e., to protect
innocent life, to preserve conditions necessary for decent human existence, and to basic
human rights.”11 The bishops continue by noting the danger of new weapons
technologies. In line with papal thought from the preceding decades, the bishops reiterate
the concerns of new weapons by noting, “if war of retribution was ever justifiable, the
risks of modern war negate such a claim today.”12 As Allman and Winright make clear,
“Just cause post bellum is related but not identical to just cause ad bellum.”13 Clearly,
Allman and Winright are alluding to the fact that once a particular conflict has reached its
conclusion, it is not possible to wonder whether there is a “just cause” for battle.
The post bellum application of the just cause principle, as Allman and Winright
have catalogued, entails three steps: “accountability,” “means of restraint,” and
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“proportionality.” These steps are important in contextualizing the jus post bellum
criteria within just war thought as a whole. The doctrine calls for “accountability” from
the first moment of discernment about the legitimacy of violence in a given situation; the
just war theory is itself meant to “restrain” the justified party from overt aggression.
Finally, “proportionality” is a criterion in both the jus ad bellum and jus in bello stages of
just war thinking. In the time after a war has officially ended, the virtues of
accountability, restraint, and proportionality are especially important because this stage is
typically when the vanquished nation is at its most vulnerable. Such a state of
vulnerability means that the “victors” could take their opportunity to bring the amount of
devastation to an even greater level. The Roman Catholic understanding of justified
conflict would disparage such a malicious and opportunistic mindset.
Admittedly, the line between in bello and post bellum becomes very blurred due
to a lack of clarity about the official cessation of conflict. Therefore, extra care and
attention to the human and ecological rights of the defeated nation are even more
important in the closing stages of battle and in the earliest post-war stages. As I noted
above, a pacifist would have trouble initially accepting the term “just cause” because of
her or his prior allegiance to a mindset that believes there is no such thing as just cause
for violence. However, since the post bellum criterion of “just cause” is essentially
different from the ad bellum criterion, a pacifist must accept it as a just cause to create a
new situation of peace in a recently vanquished land. For adherents to the just war theory,
and those who believe the jus post bellum criteria fits nicely within this tradition, there
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follows a particular tension with pacifists who should also fruitfully employ the jus
post bellum criteria. Pacifists may well disregard the ad bellum and in bello criteria, but
they may also see those criteria as more than mere checklists. In this way, pacifists would
likely disagree with Allman and Winright, who critique a “segmented approach [to the
categories of just war theory], as the three categories are intimately related.”15
A pacifist struggling to accept the legitimacy of a post bellum category within the
just war theory might consider it as impossible that the three categories of just war theory
could be “intimately related” because the actions of preparing for (ad bellum) and
participating in (in bello) warfare differ significantly from the attempt to create a
situation of justice after a conflict has come to an end (post bellum). The latter stage,
however, is something that is incumbent upon not only those who prepared for the
warfare and those who take part in the combat itself, but also for all human beings as part
of the common good. This is not only a key tenet in Catholic social teaching but also a
pillar of the just war theory—a pillar that thus calls the pacifist to action in the post
bellum stage. In his encyclical Mater et magistra, Pope John XXIII defines the common
good as “the sum total of those conditions of social living whereby men are enabled more
fully and more readily to achieve their own perfection.”16 Particularly in the case of
warfare, the notion of the common good places a serious challenge on those who would
champion going to war. As Cahill puts it, “The proclivity to view foreigners not only as
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outsiders, but as enemies to whom one does not apply the same requirements of
justice, much less compassion or love, is converted in recent encyclicals into a view of all
persons and groups as constituting one community of human persons.”17 Since the
common good is essential in Catholic social thought, it applies to pacifists and just war
theorists alike. Jus post bellum could rightly be described as a post-war return to standard
ethical concerns that should always govern the international sphere.
Simply because one, as a pacifist, might reject the ad bellum and in bello criteria
for justified violence does not mean that this individual is also permitted to excuse
himself or herself from participating in efforts to create new situations of accord in a
vanquished land. As Charles Curran helpfully observes of jus post bellum, “such a
condition reminds us of the inherent limitation in any use of force. Force can and at times
should be used to stop an injustice, but it can never bring about true justice and peace.”18
Therefore, I agree with Allman and Winright in their assertion that the three categories of
just war theory cannot be taken as totally separate entities in the eyes of just war
theorists. However, I do make the important caveat that jus post bellum is also especially
important for pacifists given their categorical objection to the other categories indicated
by the just war theory. These individuals, regardless of their disavowal of the ad bellum
and in bello criteria, must take very seriously the post bellum criteria. Allman and
Winright posit, “If Christians wish to be just war theorists, then they must be equally
committed, if not more, to proactively eliminating the conditions that lead to war. They
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must be vigorous peacemakers.” To this I would add that pacifists are likewise
obligated to carry out the gospel command to be peacemakers by seeing the conclusion of
a war—a war they opposed from its very outset—as a “just cause” calling them to action
in finally bringing about a time of peace, albeit an imperfect one given the conditions of
warfare that precede and necessitate it.
The Reconciliation Phase and Pacifism
Next, I turn to what Allman and Winright term the “reconciliation phase” of
postwar justice.20 They lament that reconciliation is often dismissed by some who believe
that victims should never be expected to forgive their attackers: “We believe that such
worries possibly evince an impoverished understanding of reconciliation, seeing it
primarily as a forgive-and-forget approach, whereas a richer understanding of
reconciliation demands acknowledgment of guilt, contrition, reparations (penance), and –
only then – absolution.”21 To be fair, one of the widespread problems in understanding
the process of reconciliation is this precise misunderstanding of the terms involved.
Allman and Winright explain a crucial difference between reconciliation and forgiveness:
“Forgiveness seeks reconciliation, which is mutual. It is an action directed toward the
other. It does not imply condoning or accepting the behavior of the other, only that one
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wishes to set oneself and the other free, to move on. Reconciliation is relational,
mutual. It is the result and goal of forgiveness.”22
The relationship between reconciliation and retributive justice is as intimate as the
relationship between the three categories of just war theory. It is impossible to have full
justice and peace after a conflict has ended if reconciliation is not a part of the equation.
Allman and Winright note, “Robust post war justice includes elements of restorative
justice alongside retributive, social, procedural, and criminal justice…Restorative justice
approaches conflict by engaging ‘those who are harmed, wrongdoers and their affected
communities in search of solutions that promote repair, reconciliation and the rebuilding
of relationships.’”23
According to Allman and Winright, post-conflict reconciliation entails six key
elements: “immediate post conflict period,” “acknowledgment of wrongdoing,”
“apologies,” “punishment,” “forgiveness,” and “amnesty.”24 While I cannot attend in
depth to each of these areas here, I do wish to focus particularly on apology and
forgiveness as especially crucial in the process of reconciliation.25 First, before a guilty
party can apologize for their actions, they must acknowledge their guilt. At this time,
however, they enter into a distinct phase of the time after a wrong has been carried out. In
the case of national and international conflict that have engendered massive amounts of
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violence and countless casualties, it is interesting that both parties can learn from
other instances where reconciliation has occurred. In point of fact, interpersonal relations
may serve as the most meaningful example of cases of true reconciliation. Almost every
individual has experienced in his or her life cases of committing wrongs as well as those
of being wronged. In these instances, the effects of an authentic and heartfelt apology –
springing from the realization that one has wronged another – are startling. Likewise, a
person may apologize for institutional sins committed over a period of time. As Allman
and Winright contend, “Apologies involve a great reversal as they require perpetrators to
surrender the position of power, to become vulnerable (humble) before the ones they
have wronged, leaving it to the victims to decide whether the apology will be accepted or
rejected.”26
Once an apology has been offered and accepted, it becomes more likely that
forgiveness may be offered to the offending party. Allman and Winright contend here,
“Only that which has been fully disclosed can be forgiven.”27 They go on, noting that
acknowledgment and apology for the wrong done are prerequisites for true forgiveness:
Forgiveness not only empowers victims, it can also liberate them from the
past. Having the horrid things done to them acknowledged and having the
perpetrators ask their forgiveness allows victims to close that chapter of
their lives and move on (without forgetting). This is why forgiveness
cannot be rushed. It must proceed at the pace the victim sets.28
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Here, I quibble with Allman and Winright over their understanding of forgiveness
and reconciliation. I agree that in order to accomplish authentic reconciliation, both
parties – the perpetrator and the victim – have a role to play. The perpetrators must
acknowledge, apologize, and serve some type of penalty for their actions; the victim must
forgive the penitent guilty party. Only then can true reconciliation take place. But what
happens when the guilty party does not accept responsibility for their actions, or can
otherwise not be forgiven?
One of the most noteworthy examples of such a situation as this occurred on 2
October 2006 in West Nickel Mines School, Lancaster County, PA. This one-room
Amish school building was the scene of a heinous shooting that took the lives of some
five young girls, aged 6-13, before the shooter took his own life as well. In the immediate
aftermath of this act, the Amish community forgave the shooter, befriended and
comforted his wife, and took the opportunity to practice Christian forgiveness. This
action does not fit the model for forgiveness that Allman and Winright note in their study,
yet it does show the victims pursuing forgiveness on their own terms and in their own
time. In this case, their terms did not have conditions, and their timing was immediate.
Yet, such a gesture of forgiveness should not be mistaken for condonation of the violent
act, since through their words and actions they still showed grief and anguish over such a
terrible event ever having taken place. It is just such an event that should stir the creative
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imaginations of pacifists who consider the relationship between forgiveness and
reconciliation. 29
There is little question that the pacifist response to the reconciliation phase of jus
post bellum would be quite positive. While some pacifists would emphasize
reconciliation more than others, it is undoubtedly the case that it would be difficult, if not
impossible, to be a pacifist (particularly a Christian pacifist) if reconciliation was not a
fundamental part of one’s life. By no means does this indicate a universal agreement on
what reconciliation entails, and certainly does not mean agreement on the various parts of
reconciliation. For example, it is altogether probable that many individual pacifists would
disagree with Allman and Winright’s assessment of the six key elements of reconciliation
listed above. For the purposes of this discussion, I will highlight two potential responses
offered by pacifists on the topic of exceptionless forgiveness.
The first possibility is represented in the work of Miroslav Volf (b. 1956).30 For
this possibility, I wish to note Jesus’ well-known teaching on the nature and frequency of
forgiveness: “Be on your guard! If another disciple sins, you must rebuke the offender,
and if there is repentance, you must forgive. And if the same person sins against you
seven times a day, and turns back to you seven times and says, ‘I repent,’ you must
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forgive” (Lk 17:3-4). Here, it is clear why Volf (along with some other pacifists as
well as Allman and Winright) claims that forgiveness should only follow an apology by
the offending party. As Volf notes, “To offer forgiveness is at the same time to condemn
the deed and accuse the doer; to receive forgiveness is at the same time to admit to the
deed and accept the blame.”32 This argument from some pacifists would clearly hold that
it is not a fundamental requirement of the pacifist to forgive as soon as one has been
wronged. Before forgiving the offending party, acknowledgement and apologies must be
made by the offenders. Only then does the forgiveness not become false in nature.
The other possible response that a pacifist might make when on the receiving end
of an injustice is in line with the response proffered by the Amish community after the
2006 shooting: to forgive without seeking any sort of acknowledgment on the part of the
offender. In the case of the Amish community, since the wrongdoer had also killed
himself, it was truly impossible for him to apologize and actually “receive” forgiveness,
as Volf would put it. However, the strand of Christian pacifists who would look to this
Amish community as their guide can also point to the decisive figure of Christ as he was
being crucified. His proclamation of forgiveness goes beyond forgiving based on the
condition of the offending party repenting. From the cross, Luke records Jesus imploring,
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“Father, forgive them; for they do not know what they are doing” (Lk 23:34). There is
no record of Jesus’ executioners acknowledging their faults and seeking forgiveness
before Jesus utters these words. The response from some pacifists, when referring to this
passage, must certainly be confusion as to why the guilty party must apologize in the first
place. Furthermore, if the act of forgiving is partially to free the burdens of the
victimized, why should it require the prior acknowledgment and apology by the doer of
the evil deed? It would be altogether reasonable for a person or group (like the Amish) to
take matters into their hands and decide to forgive their offenders independently of
whether or not the offenders requested it.
Regardless of which of those two particular groups a pacifist finds herself or
himself in, it is clear that the reconciliation phase of jus post bellum is the particular
criterion most readily accepted by pacifists at large. It is also fitting to note that with the
shift in magisterial church teaching since Pacem in terris, these pacifists may look
especially at the example of Pope John Paul II in offering their forgiveness. According to
Daniel Philpott, “no pope strongly and systematically advocated forgiveness as a political
practice until John Paul II did in Dives in Misericordia in 1984 [sic] and in several
subsequent statements.”33 For John Paul II, however, forgiveness was not merely a
political or institutional arrangement. John Paul II is also a model for the group of
pacifists who might believe that forgiveness can be extended even before the guilty party
apologizes. On 13 May 1981, John Paul was shot in the abdomen while greeting pilgrims
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in Saint Peter’s Square. Only four days later, the faithful gathered in that same place
for the regular Sunday Angelus prayer and weekly papal address heard a tape-recorded
message from John Paul, in which the pope expressed his own prayer for that day: “I pray
for that brother of ours who shot me, and whom I have sincerely pardoned. United with
Christ, Priest and Victim, I offer my sufferings for the Church and for the world.”34
Surely, this model of forgiveness can appeal to those pacifists on either side of the issue
of forgiving without first receiving some recognition of wrongdoing by the offender.
Particularly in the case of jus post bellum, however, it is important to carry out certain
penalties in the course of restoring justice.
One of the most common critiques of the reconciliation process is that the act of
forgiving an individual or a group for a wrong that has been committed is actually
tantamount to forgetting that the action had ever occurred at all. As I have tried to
illustrate, in cases of authentic reconciliation, this is far from the reality because instead
of forgetting the action has occurred, the victim(s) forgive not out of a sense of amnesia,
but rather out of a sense of being changed by the event. Not only is it impossible to forget
the injustice, but to do so would be decidedly unhelpful. Remembering the evil action
that has been done makes it possible to grow and to rebuild. Part of this remembering
includes holding the guilty party accountable for the injustice in question. Accountability
may begin with the guilty party acknowledging their role in a particular action, but it
surely must not end there. Not only should apologies be proffered, but those who are
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guilty of heinous acts of war crimes should also have to pay some price for what they
have done.
The Punishment Phase and Pacifism
Allman and Winright settle on two interrelated and key components of
punishment: compensation and war crimes trials.35 The first component – compensation –
is necessarily preceded by acknowledgment of guilt: “At the most basic level, post war
restitution refers to returning property unjustly or justly seized during conflict (returning
annexed land, seized financial assets, war booty, and so on) or paying for what has been
unjustly destroyed.”36 As the authors point out, quite reasonably this would return the
state of affairs to a situation very similar to what was present before the war took place:
status quo ante bellum, or “the condition that led to war in the first place.”37 Allman and
Winright go beyond the types of things for which there ought to be compensation after a
war has taken place. They make it clear that, as a point of justice, in the process of this
compensation “the perpetrators, not the victims, should be the ones who bear the burdens
and costs of the bad behavior.”38 Who are these people?
In considering who actually ought to pay for the reparations after a war has ended,
Allman and Winright suggest that “due care needs to be exercised to ensure that the
civilian population of an unjust aggressor nation does not bear the burden of decisions
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Granted, this brings up a number of significant and controversial issues, but it is certainly
a fair way to initiate the conversation for such post war penalties. There is no doubt that
the political leadership of an aggressor nation must be the first party held responsible in
the wake of combat. If this is not the case, it becomes impossible to judge war properly
from the perspective of serving justice after the war has ended.
Finally, with regard to compensation, Allman and Winright consider the question
of how much is owed to the victimized nation. They claim, “Compensation agreements
need to be proportional: enough to make restitution more than a token gesture and enough
to serve as a penalty that satisfies, at least in part, the victims of the crime, but not so
severe that the vanquished never recover.”40 Perhaps the greatest element to glean from
the writing on compensation after a conflict has ended is the rehabilitative nature of
punishments such as these. Here an ecclesiological analogy might be in order. These
types of financial compensations (along with prior acknowledgment of guilt and
apologies) are similar in some ways to a variety of canonical penalties. As has been the
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tradition of the church, these punishments are never meant to be a permanent
penalty.41 As one canonist explains, “Since the purpose of medicinal penalties is
conversion, a censure must be lifted when the offender repents and is willing to repair the
harm done or the scandal caused.”42 Just as those found guilty of committing grave
canonical offenses are permitted to return to the community following a period of moral
rehabilitation, so too should guilty parties in warfare be returned to the international
community following their own offenses.
The second aspect of the punishment phase, according to Allman and Winright, is
war crimes trials. These trials are carried out in order to determine guilt in both the ad
bellum and in bello stages of the warfare.43 This seems a natural component of any postwar justice, for similar reasons that civil trials are used to create situations of justice after
a civilian crime has occurred: “War crimes trials are a key component of jus post bellum
in that they endeavor to end war well by holding accountable those who violate the norms
and standards of just war theory.”44 Depending on when the particular war crime took
place (ad bellum or in bello), there will be different defendants in the trial. If the crime of
aggression took place in the stages leading up to the combat, then it is likely that the
governmental leadership that orchestrated the aggression will be held responsible. If the
injustice took place during the fighting itself, the onus for the injustice will shift to the
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military responsible for carrying it out. As I noted earlier in the chapter, the level of
justice in the war is important here. If the war met neither the ad bellum or in bello
criteria necessary for it to be considered justified, then both government and military
officials will be tried in these affairs.
Undoubtedly, there would be a variety of opinions with regard to the punishment
phase of jus post bellum among pacifists. Merely because one is a pacifist does not mean
that she or he is willing to let guilty aggressors (whether in personal or war crimes) go
unpunished. There is a clear difference between making the conscious decision not to use
violence against another human being and believing that a person who has committed an
act of injustice should not have to pay some price for their transgression. While the South
African Truth and Reconciliation Commission of the late 1990s was not a war crimes
trial per se, it does helpfully illuminate the question at hand. Archbishop Desmond Tutu,
who served in an integral role throughout these proceedings, was guided by ubuntu. As
Peter-John Pearson explains, “ubuntu orients one to look at one’s torturers, to realize that
they need help, and to stand ready to enable them to regain their humanity…But ubuntu
does not allow perpetrators to escape the necessity of confessing and making restitution
to survivors, because it places the needs of society – the restoration of relationships – at
the heart of reconciliation.”45 I would contend that some forms of pacifism ideologically
cling to the same foundations as ubuntu and derive their own beliefs from that
worldview.
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One critique that some pacifists might well make towards war crimes trials is
that they stray from the ideal toward which pacifists strive to create in the world. Here,
the best course of action would be to hearken back to the writings of Augustine and other
important figures in just war theory, all of whom remind us that there is a vast separation
between the ideal and the real. This conclusion does not mean that war crimes trials are
meaningless. In point of fact, they can be very fruitful in bringing about a close
approximation of justice, a goal for which all pacifists must at least strive. As David
Carroll Cochran explains in his study on abolishing warfare, pacifists must look to the
progress that has already been made in eliminating other sources of injustice in society
such as dueling, slavery, and lynching. He argues that opposing these forms of violence –
an opposition now commonly accepted as being on the right side of history – was a lost
cause in the time during which these practices were common: “Opponents of these
various forms of institutionalized violence consistently faced charges of being unrealistic
and foolishly utopian, but what their critics always missed was the fact that we can make
moral progress without achieving moral perfection.”46 Ironically, even though Cochran is
pointing to the shortsightedness of those in favor of these types of violence, this same
advice is very helpful to pacifists now. Even though war crimes trials may seem to some
pacifists to be a way of rehashing old conflicts and keeping a war alive, they can actually
be a way to move forward, and create situations of reconciliation, so that peace may be
achieved in formerly combative areas.
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The Restoration Phase and Pacifism
The final phase that Allman and Winright pursue in their study is the restoration
phase of jus post bellum. As they put it, “A just war ends with the creation of conditions
that permit citizens to pursue a life that is meaningful and dignified.”47 These conditions
are met through five particular concerns.
The first of these concerns is security and policing. Looking to the future with any
optimism about real reform in a war-ravaged society without security is almost
impossible. As the authors suggest, “A secure peace that protects civil liberties and
human rights should magnify the probability of success of other tasks necessary for
restoring public life.”48 They go on to argue for measures taken to ensure a “positive
peace” in countries after a war has ended rather than simply the absence of conflict,
which only has the result of leading to more situations of violence.49 One need look no
further than Iraq and Afghanistan to see the validity of this point.
The second concern is for lasting and effective political reform. Allman and
Winright make a vital point that has two important consequences: “Simply reinstating the
same political powers that waged the war in the first place (status quo ante bellum) is
undesirable and unjust, but triumph in battle does not confer upon the victor the right to
restructure the vanquished in any way it sees fit.”50 The first of the important
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consequences from this overview of post bellum restoration is the caution regarding
the reinstatement to positions of authority of those individuals who directed the nation
before and during the war. Quite obviously, having already proven their incompetence in
bringing about peace and justice in the nation, these individuals should be prevented from
returning to office. The second consequence, though, balances the first by placing a limit
upon the victorious nation regarding who may fill these leadership posts. Crucially,
Allman and Winright note the difference between initiating a war with the stated goal of
regime change and changing the regime during the post bellum stage. While the victors
must take initial responsibility for filling the political voids, according to Allman and
Winright there is a limit on this interim regime: “The goal is a just and lasting peace
inclusive of robust defense of human rights, a functioning and stable government
pursuing the common good, and socio-economic conditions that allow the citizenry to
flourish.”51
The third concern in the restoration phase is economic recovery. Here, it is clear
that many nations that have been plagued by war for some time will have a very difficult
experience in this part of the restoration phase, since the effects of war are not only
damage on the battlefield: “If a conflict has waged for decades, then countries face the
possibility of a workforce that knows no vocations other than soldiering. In such
situations, vocational training is paramount for peace.”52 I would add that such broad

51

Ibid., 160. This is the optimal result. In the preceding lines, they write, “Minimally, the political,
policing, and military structures of the vanquished aggressor need to be reformed to the extent that the
conditions that led to the aggression are eliminated and new threats are removed, but not to the extent that
they become vulnerable or are reduced to a puppet government” (160).
52

Ibid., 161.

118
vocational training is squarely in line with the Catholic social thought tradition, which
has been carried out by recent papal encyclicals.53 As Allman and Winright rightly note,
“If the aim of a just war is the tranquility that comes from order, then the jobs,
infrastructure, and banking and financial institutions needed to bring economic stability
must be seen as concomitant duties implicit in the reasons cited for going to war in the
first place.”54
The social rehabilitation of nations is the penultimate concern of the restoration
phase. Here Allman and Winright build on the argument of retired Admiral Louis
Iasiello, who “identifies the need to safeguard the innocent and vulnerable and to pay
attention to the transition of the military as two vital components to post bellum social
rehabilitation.”55 Of the five concerns, this is the one that most clearly focuses on
representatives from both sides of a conflict. Allman and Winright correctly note the
biblical foundation of caring for the innocent and vulnerable, and this should have clear
ramifications in any Christian understanding of post war justice. The care of soldiers
should extend to soldiers on both sides of a completed conflict. As the authors suggest,
“When a nation sends it citizens to war, it turns ordinary men and women into potential
killers. In so doing, nations should assume the responsibility to assist warriors in their
transition back to civilian life once the fighting has ended. This includes rehabilitation for
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physical injuries sustained in combat, as well as the care of emotional and
psychological disabilities.”56
The fifth, and final, element of the restoration phase of jus post bellum is
environmental cleanup. I will deal with this particular issue in more detail in the final
chapter of this dissertation. For the purposes of this chapter, suffice it to say that the
authors broach this subject because of the clear impact of depleted uranium and cluster
bombs and land mines.57 This work is foundational for the terrible impact that warfare
has had on the environment. It is impossible to consider true justice after a war has ended
without thinking of the sacrifice necessary to create justice for the natural environment,
upon which all living beings depend for their vitality.
The pacifist responses to these five restoration concerns in creating post-war
justice are varied. In a general sense, one must admit the vast majority of pacifists would
support the complete restoration of the ravaged nations based purely on the principle that
they would have believed that the war was unjust in the first place. In this sense, the
pacifist response to this stage is similar to that of the reconciliation phase: there is little
with which to argue. For pacifists, perhaps the most interesting of the aforementioned
five key concerns in the restoration phase is security and policing. I note this as the most
interesting concern because it seems most likely to involve violence and will thus be of
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particular importance to those who eschew violence in all its forms. I will briefly
consider one approach to this issue.
The most recent response by a pacifist to the problem of security and policing is
the concept of “just policing” advanced by Gerald W. Schlabach.58 Schlabach takes as his
starting point the crucial question posed by John Howard Yoder, with which many
pacifists would likely sympathize:
The question, May a Christian be a policeman? is posed in legalistic terms.
The answer is to pose the question on the Christian level: Is the Christian
called to be a policeman? We know he is called to be an agent of
reconciliation. Does that general call, valid for every Christian, take for
certain individuals a form of a specific call to be also an agent of the wrath
of God?59
Even if Yoder attests to having never met a Christian who genuinely discerned her or his
calling to be a police officer, the question must be taken seriously if it is even a
possibility. What does this mean for the ethics of policing among pacifists? There is no
unanimous agreement, but it is at least a worthwhile starting point among pacifists for
there to be agreement that security and policing must have the best interests of the
rebuilding nation in mind. This means that pacifists must agree with Allman and
Winright that there must be a positive peace in a restored society.60
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In this section, I have attempted to advance Allman and Winright’s jus post
bellum as a serious addition to what the Roman Catholic church considers the official just
war tradition. In so doing, I have taken each particular post bellum phase in turn and
examined some of their salient points in order to propose a clear connection between jus
post bellum and pacifism. I propose this connection primarily because just war theorists
(the primary audience for Allman and Winright’s study) and pacifists can and must work
together to build up society after a war has torn it apart. After a brief interlude to
introduce the concept of “just peace,” I will examine some key elements of just
peacemaking theory in order to show a way of bridging the divide between pacifists and
just war theorists. In so doing, I will introduce further attention to the element of the
environment in creating this positive, just, and lasting peace.
Excursus: Is Jus Post Bellum Good Enough?
In her work, Maryanne Cusimano Love issues a challenge to those who have
written on the topic of justice after warfare: “We must go beyond statist, legalist, topdown, ethics-of-occupiers conceptions of just peace. Catholic approaches to just peace
begin at the other end of the spectrum, with the fundamental dignity of the human
person.”61 I would contend that we must extend this statement to appreciate “the
fundamental dignity of all creation.” For her part, Love establishes seven just peace
criteria: just cause, right intention, participatory process, right relationship, reconciliation,
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restoration (repair), and sustainability. What distinguishes these just-peace criteria
from the phases of jus post bellum is Love’s contention that “Peacebuilding is a
continuum that works to prevent conflict, to end conflict, and to restore societies after
conflict; just-peace criteria are not limited to a post bellum time line.”63 While I will not
delve into each just peace criterion in this excursus, it should suffice to say that these
criteria are meant to provide a more robust response to the problems of violence in our
society than the current just war criteria have thus far accomplished.
Before turning to the Just Peacemaking Theory advanced by Glen Stassen and his
colleagues, I do wish to discuss briefly three of Love’s seven criteria. First, Love calls for
a participatory process:
While the primary responsibility for peacebuilding falls to people in areas
of conflict themselves, communities ravaged by war often lack the
capacity and resources to build peace alone. People outside war zones
have the obligation to love our neighbors as ourselves (the golden rule),
because conflict has negative spillover effects for people outside the war
zone, and because we have a moral obligation to help those in need (the
preferential option for the poor).64
This process, if it is truly to attend to the common good, must take into consideration all
of the created order. The participatory process must not be limited only to human beings
outside the war zone, but also include nonhuman animals within and outside the war
zone.
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Second, it seems that Love’s treatment of “right relationship” is crucial if we
are to envision a truly just peace that transcends the criteria for a justified war. The right
relationship to which Love refers in her work necessarily means a consistent way of
being in communion with others, “not just a goal, but a process.”65 It is instructive to
understand the right relationship among human beings as something that is only a starting
point for a greater experience of right relationship among all of creation. Through a
careful understanding of the mutually supportive and sustaining relationship that all of
creation shares among the many species, it will become possible for the entire created
order to practice actions that uphold the dignity of every created thing. As Pope Paul VI
noted, “Peace cannot be limited to a mere absence of war, the result of an ever precarious
balance of forces. No, peace is something that is built up day after day, in the pursuit of
an order intended by God, which implies a more perfect form of justice among men.”66
Once again, I would argue that the “more perfect justice” to which Paul alludes is not
something that we can rightly limit to human beings in our world today. Rather, the most
perfect form of justice now must consider the rights and necessities of all divinely created
things. Such a renewed mindset calls for a world with an eye focused on sustainability,
the last of the three of Love’s criteria I wish to highlight.
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As Love explains, “Sustainability means developing new societal and
international structures that can help peace endure over time.”67 I submit that the virtue of
solidarity is precisely the element that brings these criteria together and makes it possible
for a just peace to come about in society. As Pope John Paul II notes, solidarity “is a firm
and persevering determination to commit oneself to the common good; that is to say to
the good of all and of each individual, because we are all really responsible for all. This
determination is based on the solid conviction that what is hindering full development is
that desire for profit and that thirst for power.”68 The pope continues by noting
solidarity’s special connection to peace: “World peace is inconceivable unless the
world’s leaders come to recognize that interdependence in itself demands the
abandonment of the politics of blocs, the sacrifice of all forms of economic, military, or
political imperialism, and the transformation of mutual distrust into collaboration.”69
Such a transformation – not the product of an overnight shift in international relations –
can only be achieved through a new mindset that is committed to a long-term engagement
between peoples. Solidarity is precisely the virtue by which we can establish peace, not
only among humans but also between humans and the rest of God’s creation. In order to
arrive at a fuller understanding of what a just peacemaking theory might entail, I now
turn to Stassen and his colleagues’ formulation.
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Just Peacemaking Theory: What Is Its Role in the Debate?
As I mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, there are some fundamental
questions as to the particular role that just peacemaking theory plays in the relationship
between war and peace. The most important question is whether or not it actually should
be considered a “new paradigm for the ethics of peace and war” at all. I would suggest
that the argument for placing it as a third alternative in this conversation is actually fairly
weak. This is not to denigrate any of the positions taken by these thinkers; rather, I hold
the simple belief that it is counterintuitive to necessitate that each just peacemaking
theorist must also, by necessity, be either an adherent to just war thinking or pacifism.
However, I agree wholeheartedly with the editors that such a dual identity must be
necessary for this paradigm to be tenable. The reason noted above is wholly accurate:
since the practices of just peacemaking do not always prevent war, each thinker must
hold a fundamental understanding of the morality of violence, so that she or he can then
argue that a given war is either justified or unjustified, or to hold that war is never
justified.
The questions remains, then: “If just peacemaking theory is actually not a third
paradigm in the war and peace debate, does it warrant a place in the conversation at all?”
I submit that just peacemaking theory provides a number of very important practices that
serve to bring together just war thinkers and pacifists. The ongoing conversation of just
peacemaking theorists (comprised of both just war thinkers and pacifists) over the past 15
years is proof that this approach to the ethics of peacemaking is one way in which both
intellectual groups can come together to discuss their similarities and differences on the
issue of warfare. In this section of the chapter, then, I will select three of these ten
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practices and examine how they can be used to bolster Catholic social teaching’s
approach to peace, therein presenting just peacemaking as a bona fide part of the Catholic
tradition. I will then examine the just peacemaking theory alongside Allman and
Winright’s treatment of jus post bellum and examine how these two newer topics can
enhance Catholic teaching on war and peace.
There are three parts to Just Peacemaking, each under a general heading that
describes the chapters (practices) in that part. In order to give a broad overview in limited
space, I will choose three practices of the theory, one from each part of the text. I have
selected these practices on the basis of only one criterion: the practice that makes it most
possible for just war advocates and pacifists to come together in active dialogue.
Pacifism, Just War, and Nonviolence
The first of the practices of the just peacemaking theory I wish to present here
falls under the section entitled “Peacemaking Initiatives” and urges all people to “support
nonviolent direct action.”70 This support for nonviolent direct action is crucial to the just
peacemaking theory because it is “designed to deal with injustice that is already
happening.”71 Since it is meant to respond to such injustice, it is something that admits
that there is a way to solve problems that have already erupted into violence and led to
deaths, injuries, and broken relationships among many peoples.
By advancing this practice, John Cartwright and Susan Thistlethwaite are easily
able to point to a number of historical instances where this nonviolent response has been
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quite effective. By explicitly pointing to figures such as Martin Luther King and
Gandhi, the authors are able to conjure up images of pacifists in readers’ minds. Such
imagery is important as it also points to lesser-known nonviolent actions, such as those
organized by César Chávez and Archbishop Jorge Manrique. By pointing to actions both
celebrated and relatively unknown, the authors make it possible to envision a new
understanding of nonviolence: it is a tactic that can work for pacifists and just-war
thinkers alike. Simply because one believes that violence may sometimes be licit does not
mean that it always is the preferred method. All types of ideological positions can support
nonviolent direct action at most times.
It would seem relatively clear that the immediate response to this practice from
both sides of the debate would be that supporting nonviolence should come naturally to
pacifists; but, is it really fair to expect that adherents to just war theory could support
nonviolent direct action in their daily lives and in response to injustice that already
existed? Such a just war thinker might well say, “this isn’t just peacemaking; it is
unbridled pacifism. Why should I have to support a pacifist worldview while pacifists
need to make no concessions to my own way of thinking?” I would contend, however,
that a careful reading of the practice’s tenets should force such a just war thinker to
reexamine her or his notion of what it means to adhere faithfully to the presumption
against warfare. This presumption is that nonviolence is one of the means that must be
tested before the “last resort” criterion can genuinely be met.
Cartwright and Thistlethwaite propose a number of concrete steps through which
individuals and groups can support nonviolent direct action. These steps include boycotts,
strikes, marches, civil disobedience, public disclosure, accompaniment, and the
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implementation of safe spaces. In order to highlight the common ground between just
war thinking and pacifism in carrying out this practice of nonviolent direct action, it
would be best to begin with the practices of strikes and marches. These are two areas that
speak broadly across ideological lines that might divide the two parties. In the realm of
Catholic social thought, the notion of a strike is nothing new. In his encyclical Rerum
novarum, Pope Leo XIII proclaimed that sometimes conditions for laborers are so unjust
that strikes are necessary, but he warned that strikes could have negative consequences:
“Such paralysis of labor not only affects the masters and their work-people, but is
extremely injurious to trade, and to the general interests of the public; moreover, on such
occasions, violence and disorder are generally not far off, and thus it frequently happens
that the public peace is threatened.”72 Of course, in the case of just peacemaking, such a
result would directly contradict the point of the strike itself, which would be to bring
about peace.
If the point of nonviolent direct action is, in fact, to bring about peace, then it is a
relatively short leap to show support for nonviolent marches in favor of bringing about
social change. As Cartwright and Thistlethwaite explain it, marches attempt to do this
through
a mass public demonstration by a group or groups seeking to dramatize an
issue, a concern, a point of view, or an injustice. Externally, its purposes
may include one or more of the following: education, fund raising, a show
of force (in terms of numbers, recruitment of new or marginal adherents,
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or engendering of so-called creative tension and crisis. Internally, the
march serves to build group morale, to identify the sympathetic, and to
foster cohesion among the participants with regard to the group’s aims and
goals. A march usually involves both a parade and a rally, the latter
characterized by speeches and celebration.73
There is no doubt that a march can garner a significant amount of media attention and
thereby inform the conscience of society. It is especially helpful if there is a key voice
behind the march, such as was often the case with Martin Luther King.
To use King as an example of the quintessential organizer of a march necessarily
invokes the example of his marches that were carried out to bring attention to the civil
rights movement in the United States. Cinematic representations74 of these marches have
also accurately highlighted some key aspects, three of which are worth mentioning here.
First, these marches are focused on an issue of human rights, such as the civil rights
movement. Second, the marches are grounded in religious belief and were historically
ecumenical and interreligious in nature. Third, since the focal issue of these marches was
a fundamental human right, it makes it possible for people on different sides of the
political and ideological divide to join hands in addressing an injustice. Therefore, this
third point becomes crucial for the relationship between pacifists and just war thinkers.
By supporting nonviolent direct action before a conflict has reached the stage of violent
warfare, it becomes possible to create a situation of peace. In so doing, both sides would
have successfully enacted the presumption against war.
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A Common Ground Initiative for Justice and Sustainability
The second part of Just Peacemaking focuses explicitly on the issue of “justice.”
In their single chapter entitled “Foster Just and Sustainable Economic Development,”
David Bronkema, David Lumsdaine, and Rodger A. Payne dedicate more attention to the
natural environment than in the remainder of the chapters combined. It is this attention
that sets apart this practice –fostering just and sustainable economic development – from
the others. As I will argue in the remaining chapters of this dissertation, the natural
environment is a critical consideration of any movement towards peace and justice in the
world today, and one upon which Just Peacemaking should have focused more
carefully.75 Because of the importance of the environment in creating peace, I argue that
it is vital for consensus to exist between pacifists and just war thinkers on this issue. If
this is not something that unites them in the years ahead, it becomes almost impossible
for us to foresee a planet that survives human abuse and mistreatment.
It has become painfully obvious that there is no risk of exaggerating the damage
that is being done to the natural environment and all living creatures: this damage is
unthinkably widespread, deeply impactful, and unceasing. The authors of this chapter go
to great lengths to call our attention to the importance of caring for creation in the process
of carrying out authentic human development. They note, “Wholesome ‘development,’
then, might best be defined as ‘processes of change in peoples’ relationships to their
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environment that increase their well-being, standards of living, or quality of life.’”
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One of the areas that emerges forcefully from their essay is the relationship of the poor to
environmental degradation. The authors rightly state, “Ecological destruction often
threatens poor people’s basic needs; poor communities often have an interest in longterm, ecologically sustainable development; and in any case, both involve a humane
commitment to permanence and human flourishing.”77
Within the corpus of Catholic social teaching, the terms “development” and
“integral development” have a noteworthy history. The most important magisterial
documents dealing with that topic are the encyclical letters Mater et magistra,
promulgated by Pope John XXIII in 1961, Populorum progressio, promulgated by Pope
Paul VI in 1967, and Justitia in mundo, the 1971 Synod of Bishops’ document. John
believed that there were fundamental norms to this human development. Chief among
these norms was the assurance that “wealth produced be distributed equitably among all
citizens of the commonwealth.”78 Second, assisting poorer nations should not be the
occasion for the aiding nations to take advantage of the weaker ones; rather, “they should
aid the less developed nations without thought of domination.”79 Perhaps predictably, this
document was not readily accepted by certain political sectors of society. As Martin L.
Mich explains,
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Some of these disgruntled Catholics were avid readers of William
Buckley’s journal National Review, which had criticized the encyclical in
its July 29, 1961 editorial, calling it a “venture in triviality” and observing
that “like Pius IX’s Syllabus of Errors it may become the source of
embarrassed explanations.” A few weeks later Buckley quipped that the
phrase “Mater Si, Magistra no” – “Mother Yes, Teacher no” was “going
the rounds in Catholic conservative circles.”80
The church’s teaching on development, however, reached a new high point with
Pope Paul VI’s 1967 promulgation of Populorum progressio. This document advances
the idea of “integral development” for the first time.81 As David Hollenbach points out,
the document “does not regard economic well-being simply as a minimum standard
which is extrinsic to the development and dignity of the person. This kind of dualism is
both foreign to the concept of integral development and unresponsive to the historically
concrete situations of the vast number of poor persons who are the concern of the
encyclical.”82 So, when we consider the just peacemaking understanding of development,
we must recall that truly sustainable and just development must be integral in the sense
that Paul lays out in Populorum progressio. That is to say, integral development must go
beyond the simple owning of goods. As Hollenbach continues, though, “Possession of
economic well-being, when properly coordinated with the other aspects of development,
is thus perceived by the encyclical as a positive value directly related to human
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dignity.” Respect for human dignity is impossible without economic development,
but economic development by itself is insufficient for integral development.
The other fundamental point that Paul makes in this encyclical is the relationship
between development and peace. This relationship is one of equivalence. Paul spends two
paragraphs of the encyclical under the heading, “Development, the New Name for
Peace.”84 By noting the long-held Christian tenet that “peace is not simply the absence of
warfare,”85 Paul is able to drive home the point that a positive understanding of peace
advances the image of a world where the entire human family may live together in wellordered harmony. As one commentator explains, “The pursuit of peace requires a war on
poverty, human misery, and inequality.”86 While it may sound counterintuitive to say that
peace requires a type of war, in this case it makes perfect sense; moreover, it is
terminology to which pacifists would assent. This type of warfare is one that can garner a
newfound relationship between pacifists and adherents to the just war theory in order to
reach a common goal.
Catholic social thought regarding the natural environment – a focus of Chapter
Three of this study – is still burgeoning, as is the thought surrounding the topic from the
just peacemaking perspective. What role does the environment play in sustainable
development? The authors claim that there are lenses through which to view the
importance of the ecological question in this matter: “Sustainability understood in ‘green’
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terms can also be important because resource scarcity, ecological deterioration, and
relative deprivation might contribute to violent conflict. Positively, peace embraces as
well as depends on a wholesome and ecologically aware economic order that allows
human flourishing and good working relationships.”87 Both of these aspects are crucial
for a holistic understanding of development that focuses not only on integral human
development (which has traditionally been at the forefront of the Catholic social teaching
on the topic), but also on integral environmental development. Noting that peace is
imperiled particularly through poverty and ecological destruction, it becomes even
clearer that integral development must consider all of creation.
The proponents of this practice also rightly point to the “negative” possibility that
environmental degradation can lead to violent conflict. Specifically, the issue of water
resources in certain countries is an issue that could certainly lead to violence. As the
authors note, “People impoverished by environmental calamities may become
increasingly exasperated by their plight, leading to ‘deprivation conflicts,’ which result
from the gap between actual and expected living conditions.”88
The authors also explain, however, the positive aspects of sustainable
development provide a wonderful opportunity to link economic development with
environmental development. As we move ahead in the twenty-first century, Catholic
social thought may no longer refer to “integral development” without witnessing in its
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magisterial documents to this important connection. From the human perspective, the
people who will be affected most positively by such an evolution in the official teaching
are the materially poor. In order for such destitute poverty to be eradicated in the world,
there must be a concerted movement to protect all of creation and the environment. With
such care for creation comes direct concern for the poor, who are already the human
beings most adversely affected when the natural environment is ignored. As the authors
note, there are concrete solutions that would lead to situations of sustainable, just, and
integral development. Just peacemaking in this area is defined by five such explicit
methods: direct work with the poor; creating community ties with the poor; protecting the
legal rights of the poor; increased transfer of material and natural resources; ecologically
sensitive practices by individuals, organizations, businesses, governments, and
international aid institutions.89
Implementing these five practices is a clear extension of Catholic social thought
in the area of integral development. The development of this social teaching is crucial if
the church will continue to be an entity that works with a “preferential option for the
poor.” This fundamental concern for those living in conditions of poverty is at the heart
of the gospel message and is also central to just peacemaking initiatives. As such, it is a
point of agreement between just war theorists and pacifists and therefore is an area that
can provide common ground for further dialogue. A third area that can provide such
common ground is a hopeful look to the future.90
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Grassroots Peacemaking Groups for Dialogue
In the final chapter of Just Peacemaking, Duane K. Friesen makes a sustained
argument for a practice that, at first blush, would seem to speak only to pacifists. Friesen
explains, perhaps more clearly and succinctly than at any other place in the volume, how
it is possible to overcome the impasses that have formerly challenged pacifists and just
war adherents: “Pacifists are stressing what the label ‘pacifism’ means: pax, or
peacemaking, not passivity or withdrawal from conflict. Just war theorists recognize that
peace should be the aim or intention of action and that war must be a last resort. Both
traditions, consequently, converge…in order to identify and practice the norms of just
peacemaking.”91 Friesen suggests that this convergence between pacifists and just war
theorists can come about most effectively through “grassroots peacemaking groups and
voluntary associations.”
Perhaps the part of the Just Peacemaking volume that the contributors most
keenly present to the reader is that “peacemaking” practices are not only meant for
pacifists. Since the just war theory is meant to bring about peace where disorder and
conflict had been the order of the day, just war theorists should, in theory, be as inclined
as pacifists towards creating situations of peace. Friesen, for his part, points to an
endemic problem that may unfortunately be another common thread between just war
theorists and pacifists: “Communities that nurture a commitment to a social vision are
increasingly being eroded by an ethic of ‘self-interest’ that acts on the premise that
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individual well-being is the ultimate value.” Of course, just peacemaking theory, as
well as Catholic social thought, maintains that the ultimate value is the common good,
which considers the value of all areas of social life and the entire community. Today, the
scope of the common good also includes non-human creation.
Himself a scripture scholar, Friesen makes very interesting use of the parable of
the Good Samaritan (Lk 18:18-30). He notes, “Jesus’ parable jars us to consider that it is
the social outcast, the excluded one, who shows compassion. The story forces us to
consider ways in which divisions between rich and poor, black and white, male and
female, citizen and alien can be overcome.”93 It would seem to be even more possible for
pacifists and just war theorists to overcome the ideological divisions that separate them.
Friesen suggests ten results stemming from instances when these divisions are overcome
and people (who may have different worldviews) dialogue and work together to create
peace. A few of these results are worth pondering here.
Friesen reminds us that these groups comprised of peacemakers “often serve as
advocates for the voiceless, especially those who are poor and powerless.”94 As I have
already noted, extreme poverty in the world today is intimately linked with violent
conflict and ecological destruction. A holistic view that would support justice for all
creatures is in the best interest of all people, regardless of whether they believe warfare
may sometimes be justified. Likewise, in another payout of this dialogue across party
lines on the question of justified warfare, Friesen believes that the members have “less
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investment in defending what has been.” This may seem to be something of a side
note in this discussion, but I maintain that it is central to the process in question. Part of
what should bring together people of opposing views on the question of war and peace
should be a movement toward a better life for the planet. Since peace is the goal for both
theological positions, it is clear that there is work to be done to move from discord to the
idyllic destination. Believing that we have a common purpose towards which all people
should strive means that what is currently in place is imperfect. Since the present reality
is incomplete, all people should be committed to looking to the future with an open mind.
One of the most important suggestions that Friesen makes is about the long-term
nature of the citizens’ groups that he recommends. The tenure of these associations is so
important because, as we have seen, many public events, conflicts, and newsworthy items
lack staying power. As Friesen puts it, such a group “sustains concern and interest when
the media and world opinion are unaware, forget, or flit about from one thing to the
next.”96 I wish to focus on this issue in particular because the environmental concern that
should be sweeping the planet does not resemble other issues that have been fleeting in
recent years. As many scholars who have advanced jus post bellum criteria have rightly
noted, once a war concludes, it often fades from the public spotlight. In fact, even during
the midst of most wars, the general public remains unaware of the grave nature of its
casualties.97
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Reflecting on the capabilities of citizens’ networks in the effort to bring about
peace in the world, Friesen finally turns to one last (and first!) strategy in any effort at a
lasting dialogue between pacifists and just war theorists within the community of
Christian ethics: prayer. Friesen points to a fundamental Christian tenet that all people in
this discussion on war and peace should be sharing from the very start of their work
together to create a more orderly and peaceful world: “Prayer and meditation are spiritual
disciplines that open people to a transcendent reality beyond themselves…Prayer helps us
to be more aware of our limits to predict and control the future.”98 All too often, Christian
adherents to either pacifism or just war thinking fail to draw from the rich spiritual
resources of their faith tradition. I contend, with Friesen, that these resources should form
the bedrock for any future alliance between these groups. It is the starting point and will
lead to an ultimate destination.
Pacifism and Just War Theory: A Way Forward
One of the finest studies on the convergence and divergence of pacifism and just
war thinking is found in the work of Richard B. Miller.99 His work points out a very
interesting reality: “divergences may reveal yet more profound points of convergence.”100
Miller identifies three particular areas of convergence between the two worldviews. First,
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Next,

he suggests that all people recall that justified warfare is not the norm in the world today.
This fact means that, “in the normal (rather than the exceptional) course of human
commerce we should work more assiduously to make the requirements of peace central
to the moral discourse and practice.”102 Third, and finally, Miller indirectly refers to what
John Howard Yoder termed a “just war without teeth.” Miller reminds us that if just war
thinkers are honest in applying the tenets, they will converge with pacifists in that neither
group “may endorse uncritically the impulses of nationalistic fervor or patriotic zeal.”103
These three points of convergence between pacifism and just war thinking help us attend
to the resources that I have brought forth in this chapter: jus post bellum and just
peacemaking theory. In the final pages of this chapter, I will suggest one way both of
these developments in the war and peace debate enhance these three points of
convergence to which Miller points us.
As I noted in the first chapter of this dissertation, Cahill explains Christian
pacifism primarily as a commitment rather than a theory, per se.104 Therefore, Miller’s
first point is not one that goes without some contention among pacifists. This contention
notwithstanding, I argue that the concept of having a “theory” for peace need not be a
stumbling block in the dialogue for pacifists. It is in such a light that I propose that jus
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post bellum presents itself through its post-war stages to be an aid in bringing about
the peace that all pacifists work toward achieving through their unwavering commitment
to nonviolence. Once a war has ended, the movement towards a peaceful existence is
almost never completed immediately. Therefore, pacifists must work together with just
war theorists in order to bring about this peace. That is why the four post bellum stages
are so important. Once the fighting has concluded, it is theoretically plausible that both
parties can agree on what is necessary to bring about peace. Certainly, this dialogue is
part of any theory for peace. Once war has ended, we move back to ordinary ethical
commitments to justice, peace, and sustainability.
From this same standpoint, the ten practices of just peacemaking also advance a
clear theory for peace: in order to bring about peace in the world, actual concrete actions
on the ground are required. In the three particular practices I mentioned in the preceding
section of this chapter, the initiative is clear: peace is the work of all people in their
everyday lives. It is accomplished mainly through solidarity and collaboration with
others. Since just peacemaking purports to be a theory, it is crucial to state that a theory
must not be limited to intellectual thought, and thereby separated from concrete actions
on the ground in pursuit of peace and justice. If there is a theory for peace it must begin
with the belief that peace is the result of tireless work on the ground.
Miller’s second point of convergence is particularly interesting because in
reminding us all that there should always be a presumption against warfare, he points us
to deeper reflection. This reflection must remain with each individual before, during, and
after a particular war. Allman and Winright have provided, in their jus post bellum
criteria, a clear framework for how we may continue reflecting on the best ways to bring
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about peace in the tertiary stage of conflict. If the requirements of peace are truly
central to our moral discourse, then justice after warfare will also have a role in pointing
us away from the next war. If we are faithful to the criteria that Allman and Winright set
forth, then it is likely that we will all move towards peace together as a unified world in
solidarity with all of God’s creation. This is the solidarity that constantly focuses our
minds on thoughts of peace. Truly, just war theorists who take the criteria seriously will
join pacifists in this common goal.
As just peacemaking theory considers how best to keep peace at the forefront of
its concerns, I suspect that some deep reconsideration of the name they have chosen for
their movement is in order. Just as I previously suggested that they strongly consider that
for their movement, the word “theory” must signify that concrete work on the ground
must be carried out, I also wish to call attention to the first two words of the phrase. To
focus on the word “peacemaking” is a relatively straightforward suggestion when
advising to keep peace as the normative expression of relations between nations in
today’s world. However, let me briefly consider the other word that this movement shares
with the just war theorists: “just.” In many applications of the jus ad bellum and jus in
bello criteria of the just war theory, it is all too easy to forget that the criteria are overly
stringent so as to avoid the most possible human casualties in warfare. It is very difficult
to meet these criteria, and so “just” wars are few and far in between. At all times,
however, authentic peace is “just” and so just peacemaking theory must reframe the just
war theory such that peacemaking becomes all the more inclusive, and warmaking
becomes even more rare.
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In finally suggesting that just war theorists and pacifists converge in their
common opposition to acting “uncritically” with regard to nationalism or patriotism,
Miller makes a particularly challenging point for some in the former camp. Since many
wars have begun under the auspices of justice, and with the backing of a great many
individuals, it is altogether reasonable to suggest that some number of these supporters
would be adherents to the Christian just war tenets. This poses a serious problem to the
church, which cautions a careful application of the traditional criteria. Therefore, the role
of jus post bellum becomes even more important in light of the support that many wars
receive from Christians. In the interest of forthrightness, I cannot admit to knowing many
pacifists who struggle with an overt sense of patriotism or uncritical nationalism.
Therefore, it would be easier for pacifists to meet just war thinkers on this point of
convergence. I would maintain, however, that the postwar phase would be an ideal place
for just war thinkers to approach pacifists in this area of agreement. Ideally, all adherents
to the just war theory would stray from uncritical nationalism in the ad bellum and in
bello stages, and recognize the tragic effects of the given conflict. However, once a war
has been completed, the criteria that Allman and Winright suggest compel this group to
view nationalism in a healthy and balanced way. Such an outlook maintains that the
“victorious” nation’s good is intimately tied up with the good of the vanquished people.
The actual payout when both sides meet at this point of convergence in a conflict’s
aftermath is that national difference will finally be put aside in favor of creating the peace
that was the alleged purpose for the fighting in the first place.
The just peacemaking practices also lend themselves to this third point of
convergence between pacifists and just war theorists. To take the practices that I
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highlighted in this chapter as only three examples would be to turn our attention
toward what could aptly be described as countercultural practices. Like the other seven
just peacemaking practices, the three practices analyzed above force citizens to
reconsider their relationship to governmental officials. Embodying the virtues necessary
to carry out these three practices will almost surely put any individual or group at odds
with the politicians who often support a given war for political reasons that are wrapped
in rhetoric about love of one’s country. Christian theology, however, challenges all
human beings to recognize a primary love that is not bound by national borders. This love
is at the heart of the practices put forth in Just Peacemaking.105
The love to which I refer, of course, is a love for God, which is also joined by a
love for neighbor and self. I propose in this chapter that jus post bellum and the just
peacemaking theory are helpful ways to engender these loves in the world today. What I
propose in the next chapter, however, is a rereading of the Christian tradition to widen
even further our understanding of “neighbor.” In his teaching, Jesus paints shocking
imagery of our neighbor as our human enemy. From what we have learned over the past
few millennia, the time is now ripe to broaden this divine teaching even more and to
admit that our neighbor is not only the person who hates us, but also the creature that
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cannot speak our language; our neighbor is not only the family pet, but also the
vegetation that nurtures the earth; our neighbor is not only our favorite tree or plant, but
even the air that we breathe.
Over the past century, while a great deal of debate has been taking place between
just war theorists and pacifists, the world’s population has more than tripled. Now with
over seven billion human beings living on this planet, we must begin to take heed of the
many warnings ecologists have been delivering while their colleagues have been debating
the justification for conflict. In my coming discussion, I will introduce a few of these
ecologists and examine their role, if any, vis-à-vis Christianity. Often, I will note that the
Christian treatment of ecology has been lagging behind the more secular approaches.
Even later to the discussion have been official, magisterial documents dealing with these
pressing issues. In the coming chapter, I will engage the first ever papal encyclical to
focus primarily on care for all of God’s creation, Laudato si’. Many times over the course
of that text, Pope Francis declares, “everything is connected.” Therefore, I argue that any
treatment of war and peace in the twenty-first century that does not also consider the
natural environment as our neighbor is impoverished. It is to this neighbor that I now
turn.

CHAPTER THREE
CATHOLIC SOCIAL TEACHING ON THE ENVIRONMENT: SHADES OF GREEN
The history of modern Catholic social teaching, dating back to 1891 and Pope Leo
XIII’s promulgation of Rerum novarum, is marked by a number of key concepts that date
even further back in the magisterial documents issued by Leo’s predecessors in the chair
of Saint Peter.1 As I have already noted in this study, one of these key concepts that has
been of great concern to the popes has been the challenge of warfare. Since the
pontificate of John Paul II, the natural environment (and all of God’s creation) has been a
new concern in the corpus of Catholic social teaching. As any careful observer will be
aware, however, the fact that it has been a “new” concern in the last twenty-five years is a
point of contention for Roman Catholics.
There are three camps within the church with opposing viewpoints on the
renewed emphasis on creation in Catholic social teaching. The first of these camps could
rightly be considered as beholden to the status quo. This group believes that the last three
papacies have actually overstepped the limits of their teaching office and have
misunderstood the relationship of individual believers to the entirety of creation. They
might argue that God’s creation may rightly and justly be used by all human beings for
their own needs. They also tend to downplay the reports regarding the severity of
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ecological degradation or rising climate change concerns. The second group of
Catholics tends to hold that the teachings of Popes John Paul II, Benedict XVI, and
Francis have been on a trajectory leading towards the right approach regarding the
environment and non-human animals; that is to say, they would agree that there is what
Pope Francis terms an “integral ecology.”2 Finally, the third group of Catholics would
say that the church has much more to learn from ecological scientists who have been
warning for many decades that the global environmental crisis is reaching dire levels.
This chapter will deal primarily with the beliefs of the latter two groups.3
First, we must consider why the natural environment should properly be
considered a part of Catholic social teaching. That is, why would Popes John Paul II,
Benedict XVI, and Francis consider it to be part of their papal responsibility to deal with
the good of all creation?4 To answer this question, I will detail a number of ecological
scientists who called the world’s attention to this issue. I will then turn my attention to
the third group of Catholics mentioned above. This turn will begin with an analysis of the
contributions of ecological scientists of the latter half of the twentieth century that
predated any magisterial concern on this issue. This group offered the first prophetic
warning that the natural environment is a moral subject; in so doing, it opened the eyes of
many Christian theologians and ethicists who utilized a fair amount of environmental
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ethics in their own thought on the issue and applied it to the Christian theological
tradition. It became clear that increasing damage of the natural environment by humans is
an important moral and religious concern. I will examine a sampling of these arguments.
Following an exposition of the foundations for the place of creation in Catholic
social teaching, I will examine the early chapters of sacred scripture. Both stories of
creation in the book of Genesis explain the importance of all of creation, and even more,
God’s pleasure in that creation. In exploring the Hebrew Scriptures and the theological
view of creation, we will see how biblical scholars are indebted to ecological science for
their own scholarship on the issue. Moreover, I will show some of the christological
implications of this scientific research.
Next, I will turn my attention to the actual magisterial documents of the three
popes mentioned above, including a careful reading of Pope Francis’s 2015 encyclical
Laudato si’, which is the first papal social encyclical to be dedicated to the topics of
God’s creation, and humanity’s need to exert much greater care of it. This analysis will
be essential to advancing one particular argument of this dissertation: the church’s
teaching vis-à-vis the entirety of creation is in flux and must continue to develop to
address the deleterious effects of violent conflict, a topic which has already been a point
of consideration in my first two chapters.
It may well be a fair question for the reader of this chapter to wonder what
importance ecological scientists (many of whom are secular figures) should have for this
study. By including them here, I am explicitly responding to the directive of the Vatican
II fathers who remind us, “the Church has always had the duty of scrutinizing the signs of
the times and of interpreting them in the light of the gospel…We must therefore
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recognize and understand the world in which we live, its expectations, its longings,
and its often dramatic characteristics.”5 The signs of the times in today’s world
necessitate examining the climate crisis that is degrading the planet. Pope Francis has
taken up this call in his own magisterial teaching. This chapter is an attempt to bring
together the ever-present ecclesial call to examine the signs of the times and determine
how to preach the gospel based on our knowledge of the world. I begin that attempt by
surveying a selection of ecological scientists who have impacted the church’s theological
development in the area of care for creation.
Environmental Ethics: A Matter of Global Conflict
One concerted group would argue that, using almost any logical standards,
Roman Catholic magisterial documents have been disappointing when it comes to their
ability to deal with the natural environment. I note this point at the outset of this section
as a means of contextualizing the discussion that is to follow. That is to say, the corpus of
Catholic social thought has made serious strides in the last 25 years with regard to its
teaching on environmental ecology, but at least until May 2015, it still had some way to
go in order to be taken seriously. In particular, any number of ecological scientists and
ethicists would be justified in noting the tardiness of the papacy in responding to the
crisis that plagues the planet at the present moment. Indeed, many Catholic and Protestant
theologians and ethicists share a frustration with their churches’ slowness to see the
seriousness of our rising ecological problems as serious issues for theology and ethics.
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Until the 1990 World Day of Peace Message promulgated by Pope John Paul
II, there was little or no serious engagement with God’s creation outside of human
beings. But, while the Vatican was slow, many other theologians were drawing attention
to the importance of these issues. As I show in the previous section, such a glaring
omission in the social teaching of the church causes serious problems for the way the
faith is practiced by the Body of Christ. On the other hand, however, it is never too late to
admit past shortcomings and carry out a development of the doctrine regarding the
natural environment. In the pontificate of Pope Francis, the church is in the process of
making such a step forward. The Catholic church has a great deal to learn from the
aforementioned ecological scientists. In this section, then, I will turn my attention to only
five of these figures: Barry Commoner, Lester R. Brown, Rachel Carson, Edward O.
Wilson, and Bill McKibben.
Barry Commoner
Barry Commoner (1917-2012), who first published his landmark The Closing
Circle: Nature, Man, and Technology in 1971 and Making Peace With the Planet in
1975, was one of the best-known scholars who advocated for a widespread response to
environmental degradation. His own activism and scholarship led to a failed run for the
United States presidency in 1980. The importance of Commoner’s argument touches a
nerve with most Americans and is evident on the first page of the 1990 revised edition of
Making Peace With the Planet. In describing the “two worlds” in which people live,
Commoner shows there is a clear break between the natural world and the world of our
own creation. He points out the obvious fact that (still) plagues most people: “We accept
responsibility for events in our own world, but not for what occurs in the natural one. Its
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storms, droughts, and floods are ‘acts of God,’ free of human control and exempt
from our responsibility.”6 In other words, each human being lives in a bubble that
separates them not only from their fellow humans, but especially from nonhuman animals
and plants as well as the meteorological conditions surrounding these and humans alike.
Commoner continues his argument by asserting that there is a necessary shift in
the way humans must interact with nature: “Now, on a planetary scale, this division has
been breached. With the appearance of a continent-sized hole in the Earth’s protective
ozone layer and the threat of global warming, even droughts, floods, and heat waves may
become unwitting acts of man.”7 Now, years later, we can proclaim with even greater
levels of certainty the many dangers about which Commoner cautioned some five
decades ago. What is particularly noteworthy about Commoner’s approach, though, is the
imagery that he utilizes. The principal images that Commoner brings forth are those
examined in the first two chapters of the present study: war and peace. The title of the
volume itself, as well as the titles of some of the chapters therein, make it clear that
Commoner sees an obvious linkage between the practice of warfare (as classically
understood between at least two violent groups of people) and the current deleterious
activities that human beings are carrying out against the earth.
To highlight his purpose in his study, Commoner puts forth this rather chilling
statement: “In the short span of its history, human society has exerted an effect on its
planetary habitat that matches the size and impact of the natural processes that until now
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solely governed the global condition.” Here, Commoner makes it clear that despite
the scientifically verified fact that human beings arrived on earth much later than other
species, humans have acted in such a way as to deprive other creatures of what they need
to survive or thrive. This is in line with the hierarchical Great Chain of Being which
many theologians have criticized for its anthropocentric worldview, and of which more
will be said below. Such a worldview places humans (and angels) so far above other
created things that it makes it not only explicable but even natural to relegate these
nonhuman beings to secondary and tertiary statuses on the earth. In a world where certain
factions of creation are ignored or killed, secular ethicists might well call the practice
unethical. Christian ethicists believe that these types of actions are not only unethical but
also sinful actions that disrespect the God of all creation.
Not only are the anthropocentric practices enumerated above unethical, but they
are also deadly. As I have noted, Commoner often uses the imagery of warfare. He
chooses this imagery carefully and advisedly. The facts certainly bear out his belief. He
notes the obvious connection in no uncertain terms:
Clearly, we need to understand the interaction between our two worlds:
the natural ecosphere, the thin global skin of air, water, and soil and the
plants and animals that live in it, and the man-made technosphere –
powerful enough to deserve so grandiose a term. The technosphere has
become sufficiently large and intense to alter the natural processes that
govern the ecosphere. And in turn, the altered ecosphere threatens to flood
our great cities, dry up our bountiful farms, contaminate our food and
water, and poison our bodies – catastrophically diminishing our ability to
provide for basic human needs. The human attack on the ecosphere has
instigated an ecological counterattack. The two worlds are at war.9
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Using warfare as the image to describe the delicate relationship between
humanity and the natural environment may strike many people as odd. Commoner’s
reasoning, though, is important. There is a certain subjectivity that belongs to the natural
world that human beings have often failed to acknowledge through many millennia. This
human failure – resulting in widely held anthropocentric beliefs and practices – results in
a “human attack.” Since many people have long considered the natural environment as
unable to carry out actions on its own, the idea of a “human attack” on an object is an odd
idea indeed. For instance, if a human being sets fire to a stack of newspapers, the human
is not thought to be carrying out an attack on those sheets of paper. If a military unit sets
fire to oil, however, such as occurred in Kuwait in 1991, it should also be considered a
direct human attack on the environment, and not only an act of war against the military of
the opposing nation.
Commoner is not the first thinker to bring together the images of warfare and the
natural environment. Over a century ago, in his famous essay entitled “The Moral
Equivalent of War,”10 William James argued that the United States should begin a
conscription of force against nature in order for the horrors of modern warfare to be
avoided. According to James, there existed any number of virtuous characteristics that
came from the practice of fighting in warfare. James believed that we, as a society,
should save these honorable traits and put them to use against nature. As William French
explains, “James imagined this ‘war’ as a bloodless enterprise, for he viewed nature as a
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passive sphere subject to human transformative agency.” It is now clear that James
was wrong in his understanding of nature as passive. Instead, nature has the capacity to
inflict great suffering on humans who declare war on it. The natural environment is
meant to sustain humanity, and vice versa. Throughout the same twentieth century that
has produced even further developments in the destructive technology of weapons for
warfare, we have also learned a great deal about our natural environment through the
ecological sciences that give us a new understanding of our utter dependence on the
integrity of the entire created order.
It is this integrity of the created order that is foundational to Commoner’s
argument. Commoner, of course, would disavow James’s understanding of nature as
passive and writes with conviction of the moral imperative to work for a world where we
avoid creating war with nature. Although he is not a theologian, Commoner makes use of
Pope John Paul II’s 1981 encyclical Laborem exercens and the 1986 pastoral letter of the
United States Bishops, Economic Justice for All.12 Here, Commoner makes it clear that
the goal he shares with the church leaders in question are to revise the economic outlook
of the United States and to remove control of natural resources of the nation from the
hands of private interest groups. One of the most concrete ways of revising the economic
system in the United States, according to Commoner, is by the government making a
drastic shift in its military budget.
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Lester R. Brown
The military budget of the United States is a key point of contention for Lester R.
Brown (b. 1934), who asserts that the increased military budget over the last two decades
in this country has been a mistake of epic proportions. Brown makes it clear that the
United States must join the entire world in preparing to combat the innumerable problems
that have already come with climate change, as well as the impending damages sure to
befall our society. Brown explains that the United States carrying out its war in Iraq
caused great problems: “The Iraq war may prove to be one of history’s most costly
mistakes not so much because of fiscal outlay but because it has diverted the world’s
attention from climate change and the other threats to civilization itself.”13 Brown argues
that a shift of some 13 percent of the world’s military budget to his proposed “Plan B”
budget would be more than ample to bring out a path of sustainability that would curb the
damage already done to the environment. As he correctly suggests, “The challenge is not
to provide a high-tech military response to terrorism but to build a global society that is
environmentally sustainable and equitable – one that restores hope for everyone. Such an
effort would do more to combat terrorism than any increase in military expenditures or
any new weapons systems, however advanced.”14 The image of warfare thus proves to be
apt for Brown’s theory as well as for Commoner’s.
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Also like Commoner, Brown does not directly appeal to religious sensibilities
in his work. This does not, however, mean that the major religious traditions should not
take these two secular thinkers very seriously. Since both of the arguments proposed here
affect all of creation, they are de facto religious arguments. The time has obviously
passed to disregard a given argument because it does not begin with one’s own religious
sentiments. In fact, it is high time for people of all (and even no) religious traditions to
work together to admit that human beings are largely at fault for global climate change, to
confront the issue head-on, and to work together in the face of certain climate change
“deniers” who maintain that any change that takes place in nature is purely coincidental.
Rachel Carson
One of the most important works in the burgeoning environmental,
conservationist movement to be published was Silent Spring. The author, Rachel Carson
(1907-1964) was a pioneer in the scientific movement to stand up in protection of the
natural environment. At the very outset of Silent Spring, Carson enters into a chilling
narrative which she entitles, “A Fable for Tomorrow.”15 In these few pages, Carson
describes an American town that devolves from beauty into wasteland:
Some evil spell had settled on the community: mysterious maladies swept
the flock of chickens; the cattle and sheep sickened and died. Everywhere
was a shadow of death. The farmers spoke of much illness among their
families. In the town the doctors had become more and more puzzled by
new kinds of sickness appearing among their patients. There had been
several sudden and unexplained deaths, not only among adults but even
among children, who would be stricken suddenly while at play and die
within a few hours. There was a strange stillness. The birds, for example –
where had they gone?16
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The most unsettling part of Carson’s tale was the swiftness with which this
transformation had happened. It took place right in front of the people’s eyes, and
seemingly overnight, even though in reality it had all been building over time to its eerily
silent crescendo.
It was not only the living beings who were affected in this town, however; where
it had once been so beautiful and aesthetically pleasing, the town was now an eyesore:
“The roadsides, once so attractive, were now lined with browned and withered vegetation
as though swept by fire. These, too, were now silent, deserted by all living things. Even
the streams were now lifeless. Anglers no longer visited them, for all the fish had died.”17
It is no coincidence that there is for Carson a very intimate relationship between the
living beings (anglers and fish) and their habitats (roadsides and streams). The change in
that town was affecting everything, not only small factions of the place. Carson then
completes her tale with the most daunting words of all: “No witchcraft, no enemy action
had silenced the rebirth of new life in this stricken world. The people had done it
themselves.”18
As we know now, and even Carson knew over fifty years ago, these terrible things
were not just potentially devastating developments but realities. Part of the
groundbreaking nature of the work was Carson’s careful and extensive discussion of the
use of dichloro-diphenyl-trichloro-ethane (DDT), especially in pesticides. Carson was
explicit about the close relationship of all living things in the way that DDT was “passed

17

Ibid., 3.

18

Ibid., 3.

19

158

on from one organism to another through all the links of the food chains.” The
problem, as Carson observes, may not be that a “safe dose” of DDT by itself is deadly for
a living being (human or otherwise) but that when combined with “safe doses” of other
harmful substances, it can become exceedingly dangerous: “The individual exposed to
DDT, for example, is almost certain to be exposed to other liver-damaging hydrocarbons,
which are so widely used as solvents, paint removers, degreasing agents, dry-cleaning
fluids, and anesthetics.”20 The point here is not to dwell specifically on the deleterious
effects of DDT on living organisms, but rather to highlight the interconnected nature of
all living beings. This interrelationship between all living things is something upon which
Pope Francis would expand more than a half-century after Carson wrote her own
warning.
All hope is not lost, according to Carson. In much the same way that human
beings are responsible for the ecological destruction that the planet now suffers through
(and indeed, was already experiencing in 1962), human beings have the opportunity to
turn the tide on this destruction. In the final chapter of her text, Carson suggests three
“biotic controls” that could slow or potentially end the environmental destruction of the
earth.21 This is noteworthy not for the measures she suggests (although those are also
interesting), but rather for articulating the simple notion that human beings have it within
their power to curb their already-disastrous actions against the common good of the entire
planet. In bringing forth her argument in Silent Spring, Carson has set the stage for a
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theological reading in two ways: first, by being one of the very first pioneers from the
platform of ecological science to call the world’s attention to the consequences of its
actions; and second, by alerting us that it was not too late to save the beauty of the earth.
Edward O. Wilson
Like the other ecological scientists I mention in this section, the work of Edward
O. Wilson (b. 1929) has been very influential in the movement towards greater awareness
of the ecological emergency we are currently experiencing – greater awareness not
simply for the scientific community, but also (and equally important for this study) the
theological community. Wilson presents a particularly interesting case because he is a
scientist who has also attempted to dialogue (in monograph form) with a fictional
Southern Baptist pastor. As a scientist, Wilson has published a number of seminal works.
Here, I will limit my comments to only four of these: The Diversity of Life (1992), The
Future of Life (2002), The Creation: An Appeal to Save Life on Earth (2006), and The
Meaning of Human Existence (2014). In each case, Wilson makes it clear that human
beings are at the heart of any recovery process from their own misdeeds. Like Carson,
Wilson has a plan for future life on the planet.
Wilson presents a five-step agenda aimed at the goal “to save and use in
perpetuity as much of the earth’s diversity as possible.”22 Wilson lays out the four steps
as follows: survey the world’s fauna and flora;23 create biological wealth;24 promote
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sustainable development; save what remains; restore the wildlands. His third
item is most important for my study: promoting sustainable development. In his
description of this step, Wilson is making it clear that the poor, especially of the
developing world, are those who are suffering at an exponentially greater level than the
wealthy. As Wilson puts it, “The rural poor of the Third World are locked into a
downward spiral of poverty and the destruction of diversity. To break free, they need
work that provides the basic food, housing, and health care taken for granted by a great
majority of people in the industrialized countries.”28 Wilson links poverty with another
problem that he believes is evident in the world today: overpopulation. What follows,
then, in Wilson’s argument is laying the groundwork for the preferential option for the
poor and a genuine respect for life.
These terms are pillars of Catholic social teaching and so Wilson becomes a
secular bedfellow with the church’s mission of reading the signs of the times. Wilson
makes a fascinating point about the ways that all living creatures overlap with one
another. This overlapping leads to one of the theological virtues: love. As Wilson
explains, “It is not so difficult to love nonhuman life, if gifted with knowledge about it.
The capacity, even the proneness to do so, may well be one of the human instincts. The
phenomenon has been called biophilia, defined as the innate tendency to focus upon life
and lifelike forms, and in some instances to affiliate with them emotionally.”29 The term
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“preferential option for the poor,” which was first introduced by Latin American
bishops and then introduced into the papal magisterium by John Paul II in Sollicitudo rei
socialis,30 bears special consideration in discussion of biophilia.
A biophilic outlook on the world entails a worldview that encompasses all of
creation. As Wilson has noted, the degradation of the natural environment adversely
affects poor people at an alarming rate. Moreover, the natural environment itself is a
source of poverty in the twenty-first century. In other words, the option for the poor in
today’s world must extend to all of creation, especially species that are going extinct.
Insomuch as we shift our special care to all living things, but with preferential concern
for those most acutely affected by injustice, we are living up to the calling of the
preferential option for the poor. Moreover, in doing so, we are engaging in a fundamental
respect for all forms of life. The rhetoric “respect for life” in ecclesial terminology
usually refers to the anti-abortion stance of the Roman Catholic church. I am proposing
that Wilson’s own thought on this issue, while not necessarily dealing explicitly with
abortion, falls under the auspices of respect for life – human and otherwise.
While not a theologian himself, Wilson engages in a hearty, book-length open
letter to a Southern Baptist pastor.31 He chooses a religious leader in that particular
denomination, ostensibly, because that was the religion in which he was raised. More to
the point, however, he is able to write this letter to someone with whom he seems to share

30

See Pope John Paul II, Sollicitudo rei socialis (1987), no. 42: “This is an option, or a special form of
primacy in the exercise of Christian charity, to which the whole tradition of the Church bears witness. It
affects the life of each Christian inasmuch as he or she seeks to imitate the life of Christ, but it applies
equally to our social responsibilities and hence to our manner of living, and to the logical decisions to be
made concerning the ownership and use of goods” (emphasis in original).
31

See Edward O. Wilson, The Creation: An Appeal to Save Life on Earth (New York: W.W. Norton and
Company, 2006).

162
very little in common, at least from the point of view of scientific understanding of
the planet earth. Very much in line with the Catholic church’s teaching of preferential
option for the poor, Wilson refers to a “pauperization of the Earth.”32 He explains to his
clerical interlocutor – who, Wilson notes, may not believe these scientific facts due to his
literalist reading of the Bible – that there have already been five great extinctions of life
on the planet, and then paints the picture for the pastor: “Kermit the Frog, to summarize
the situation in a phrase, is sick. And to varying degrees so is much of the rest of the
living world. Might Homo sapiens follow? Maybe, maybe not. But with certainty we are
the giant meteorite of our time, having begun the sixth mass extinction of Phanerozoic
history.”33 Despite the ideological differences between Wilson and the pastor, Wilson
believes that the two parties also have a reason to come together: stewardship of life.34
This stewardship of life is based not on overcoming their significant differences
of opinion. Rather, Wilson suggests simply forgetting them entirely.35 He continues,
offering the possibility for the two opposing parties to, “Meet on common ground. That
might not be as difficult as it seems at first. When you think about it, our metaphysical
differences have remarkably little effect on the conduct of our separate lives.36 If I may
conclude my short survey of Wilson’s thought in this text by offering a Catholic
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response. Wilson is absolutely correct in suggesting that scientists and people of any
religion meet on common ground: this is one of the guiding principles of interreligious
dialogue, which has been an integral part of Catholic teaching for more than fifty years. I
would maintain that responsible science on the part of Catholics, and other people of
faith, could enable the “common ground” to grow in its scope. What would be the result
of such growth? Quite simply, this enlarged common ground would lead to a new
relationship between secular scientists and people of faith – scientists or not – on issues
of how best to attack the climate crisis. If all we do now is rest on the laurels of being in
agreement on certain moral points, it is still unlikely that we will make any progress
together. I agree that Wilson’s point is a necessary first step, but if we stop there, the end
result will once again be stagnation.
There will also be times in which people of faith must also go far beyond what
Wilson is arguing. In his recent text, The Meaning of Human Existence, Wilson does
provide something of an impasse for Catholics and all people of faith in coming to meet
him on the common ground to which I allude above. Wilson contends that tribalism is at
the heart of everything that is wrong with organized religion. He explains that the
fundamental tenet of each religious tradition “teaches that members of other religions
worship the wrong gods, use wrong rituals, follow false prophets, and believe fantastic
creation stories. There is no way around the soul-satisfying but cruel discrimination that
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organized religions by definition must practice among themselves.” Wilson also
makes it clear that religious faith is at the heart of many evil actions that human beings
carry out on one another, and presumably, the natural world: “The true cause of hatred
and violence is faith versus faith, an outward expression of the ancient instinct of
tribalism. Faith is the one thing that makes otherwise good people do bad things.”39 I
contend that this type of rhetoric is both incorrect and also unhelpful in the interreligious
movement to care for creation that I lay out above. Faith should be the primary thing that
moves people to care for creation. This is a topic that Pope Francis has picked up as a
clear aspect of religious belief.
Bill McKibben
At the forefront of the ecological movement today is Pope Francis, who
promulgated his second encyclical, Laudato si’, on 24 May 2015. In this document, he
turns the world’s attention to the environmental crisis. As another prominent ecological
scientist Bill McKibben (b. 1960) reflects upon reading the document,
My own sense, after spending the day reading this remarkable document,
was of great relief. I’ve been working on climate change for a quarter
century, and for much of that time it felt like enduring one of those
nightmarish dreams where no one can hear your warnings. In recent years
a broad-based movement has arisen to take up the challenge, but this
marks the first time that a person of great authority in our global culture
has fully recognized the scale and depth of our crisis, and the consequent
necessary rethinking of what it means to be human.40
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McKibben is one of the most important ecological scientists of our time. What
makes him especially significant for the purposes of this study is that he has taken and
run with the encouragement of Wilson for scientists and people of faith to find common
ground. He is able to do this himself because, as he writes in the preface to his The
Comforting Whirlwind: God, Job, and the Scale of Creation, “I am by training a writer
and an environmentalist, and by coincidence a Methodist Sunday school teacher.”41 As
the subtitle suggests, the book in question is a brief examination of the Book of Job.
Towards the end of his work, McKibben provides a helpful answer to a
challenging query: “Why are we here? At least in part, or so God implies in his answer to
Job, to be a part of the great play of life, but only a part. We are not bigger than
everything else – we are like everything else, meant to be exuberant and wild and
limited.”42 As McKibben explains, our humanity is meant to be a blessing in that it comes
directly from God’s creative power, but also in the sense that our limited nature means
that we need not create things without God’s aid and issue our authority over things.
Rather, human autonomy is practiced through solidarity with all of creation rather than
domination of it. That an ecological scientist writes these words is further proof that faith
and reason are not inimical. Christians can (and should) be scientists, just as scientists can
be (and often are!) Christians.
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Before returning to Pope Francis’s landmark contribution to Catholic social
teaching on ecology, I do wish to bring to light one more issue that many ecological
scientists have brought to the fore: the overpopulation of the earth. Writing in this text as
both a scientist and an exegete of the Book of Job, McKibben makes the very interesting
observation that the only of God’s commandments we have managed to follow is to be
fertile and multiply: “We have done it – we have filled the earth. In fact, we may have
overdone it, overfilled the earth to the point where our reproduction throws into question
every other goal God set for us. This is one injunction we can cross off our list, and the
sooner the better.”43 In advancing this particular argument, McKibben is thinking along
the lines of some of the other scientists mentioned here and others like Jeffrey Sachs44
and Norman Myers.45 On the point of population control, Catholic teaching remains
firmly opposed to anything other than natural family planning. Yet, it must be said that as
long as the magisterium supports even this type of (natural) birth control, the door
remains at least cracked that the doctrine could develop to support other means of
(artificial) birth control in the future. Perhaps, further dialogue with the scientific world
will lead to such a decision.
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Responsibly managing the population of the environment is a part of caring
for the planet. It is also a fundamental respect for all life and a preferential love for the
poor. I note this here in a section that deals with ecological science not because of these
scientists’ view that there is an ecological crisis on this planet. That is now a matter of
accepted scientific thought. Rather, I bring up this in this section of the study in order to
place the Catholic thought on the environment within its proper context. After World War
II, it became apparent that the rising human population and rising industrial and
technological powers pushing new scales of production and consumption were having a
rising impact on the natural ecosystems that are so critical to the wellbeing of all
societies. Therefore, it became important during the last three pontificates for the popes
to speak about these issues. Likewise, theologians began taking up the issue in their own
work, adding to the papal thought on the topic. In the next two sections of this chapter, I
turn explicitly to these two sets of contributions, beginning with the theological output.
The Bible, Theology, and the Natural World: Foundational Thoughts for Catholic
Social Teaching
Creation in the Hebrew Scriptures
There is little confusion that the natural world plays a crucial role in the creation
stories in Genesis. As many theologians have pointed out, however, there is significant
confusion among Christians regarding what God intended the relationship to be between
human beings and nonhuman creation. A careful reading of the creation stories sheds
some light on this problem and speaks to how Catholic social teaching should address
this relationship. We see in the Priestly account of creation in Genesis 1:26 that God
commands the protological humans “to have dominion over” the nonhuman creation
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already upon the earth (Gen 1:26). As Richard J. Clifford explains, “In the ancient
Near East, the king imaged or ‘re-presented’ his divine patron in heaven by acting for the
god and thus resembling this god in a dynamic rather than static way. The king
promulgated laws establishing divine justice on earth.”46 As Randall Smith eloquently
notes, there is a sense in these first pages of the Hebrew Bible that God is calling human
beings to a role much very much like that of a farmer: “An experienced farmer
understands that one either learns the ways of animals – how and when to feed them,
what and when not to feed them, how large a pen they need, how much exercise they
must have, how they give birth to their young, how long they must stay with their mother
– or farmer and animals alike will not survive.”47
There is another interpretation of these texts that is decidedly less helpful for
Christian ecological ethics in the twenty-first century: the portrait of a hierarchically
organized world where human beings and angels reside atop of the “Great Chain of
Being” while nonhuman creatures and vegetation occupy incrementally inferior positions.
As Elizabeth Johnson wittily remarks of the non-human creation finding itself below
humans on this resulting Chain of Being, “That these creatures might have their own
reasons for existing apart from human use does not enter the picture.”48 The creation
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story of Genesis 1, however, is not the primary creation narrative. Instead, as Clifford
comments, it is meant to introduce the reader to the next ten chapters of Genesis and
highlight “that the human race is part of a system, only here the length and sophistication
of the story illustrate the historical, cultural, and ecological dimensions of the system.
The story belongs to the genre of creation-flood epic that explores human culture through
narrative.”49
This close relationship that human beings have with the earth is a fundamental
aspect of a proper reading of the texts in the Hebrew Scriptures.50 It comes out in a
number of places. Allow me to take only one further example, this from beyond the first
chapters of Genesis: the book of Job. The beleaguered Job has come before God seeking
to bring God to task for Job’s misfortunes. Johnson focuses intently on the question that
God asks of Job in this account: “Where were you when I laid the foundation of the
Earth?” (Job 38:4).51 Where, indeed, was Job when God created the Earth? The question,
however, merits a more anthropological response than it does a personal response from
the biblical character in question. As Clifford comments, “even Job, legendary for his
wisdom and justice, cannot fathom the world God has created. The book forces the reader
to reinterpret biblical anthropocentrism within an irreducible theocentrism.”52 If God is
responsible for the creation and sustenance of all creation, then it is impossible to
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continue acting as if the ways of human beings are far and above the ways of all other
creatures. Most fundamentally, it is God whose ways are far and above the ways of all of
Her creatures. Moreover, this also suggests that all life forms have their own distinct
relationships with God, quite apart from their usefulness to humanity.
These distinct relationships with God that each creature enjoys are partially
explained by the process theology of John Haught.53 The primary aspect of process
theology that Haught outlines is that the beauty of the universe is enhanced by all of
creation, and in a particular way, by human beings: “Process theology calls us not only to
the preservation but also to the compounding of cosmic beauty. It goes without saying
that such a vocation requires us to attend constantly to the welfare of all levels of cosmic
reality without which this adventure of maximizing beauty would be impossible.”54 In
many ways, Haught’s work points to the doctrine of panentheism, which posits that God
is inherently found in each creature. Or, as Haught describes it elsewhere, “A
metaphysics of hope thinks of God as both the inspiration and the everlasting recipient of
all the events that make up the larger cosmic story.”55 The hope to which Haught refers is
found primarily in the ministry of Jesus. It is to the doctrine focusing on Christ that I will
now turn.
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New Creation and Salvation in Jesus Christ
The chasm between God’s ways and the ways of the created order is hammered
home in the teaching and ministry of Jesus. Some of the most groundbreaking work on
the relationship between Jesus and environmental ethics has been done by Australian
theologian Denis Edwards. Edwards has written eloquently about the symbiotic
relationship between creation and incarnation. These two theological doctrines are
brought together in a fully human and fully divine way through Jesus. Edwards describes
Jesus of Nazareth as the Wisdom of God, hearkening back to the book of Wisdom
(sophia). He writes, “A Wisdom Christology sees creation and incarnation as intrinsically
connected in the one divine plan, while still insisting that the incarnation was a totally
free act of God. In this view, there can be no separation of creation and redemption.”56
In fact, for St. Paul, it was clear that Christ proved to be the point of unity for the
entire created order. Speaking of Christ, Paul writes: “He is the image of the invisible
God, the firstborn of all creation; for in him all things in heaven and on earth were
created, things visible and invisible, whether thrones or dominion or rulers or powers –
all things have been created through him and for him. He himself is before all things, and
in him all things hold together” (Col 1:15-17).57 This is an incredibly rich text for the
church. It is an especially important place to start in interpreting the life, death, and
resurrection of Jesus Christ. If in Christ “all things hold together,” how do we human
beings interpret our unity with the rest of creation? It would be impossible to see any
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separation at all between humans and nonhuman creation while looking at the world
through the Pauline lens. As Jürgen Moltmann puts it, “Christ died in solidarity with all
living things.”58
Paul himself establishes this solidarity even further, for if Christ holds all things
together, then all of creation holds divine importance in its own right. Many writers have
written eloquently on the following passage from Paul’s letter to the Romans that
substantiates the point even further: “For the creation waits with eager longing for the
revealing of the children of God; for the creation was subjected to futility, not of its own
will but by the will of the one who subjected it, in hope that the creation itself will be set
free from its bondage to decay and will obtain the freedom of the glory of the children of
God” (Rom 8:19-21). Paul here alludes to creation as though creation itself were a
person, or a child of God. He continues with a poignant observation: “We know that the
whole creation has been groaning in labor pains until now” (Rom 8:22). In today’s world
where human beings are responsible for so many of these “labor pains,” we must each
ask ourselves to what extent we are responsible and how we can curb our sinful behavior.
The most prominent answer to this question in the Christian tradition is found in
the life, death, and resurrection of Jesus Christ. As that source of unity for all of creation,
Christ points the way to salvation for the whole world. The primary way he does this is
through his suffering on the cross. This view of salvation is accepted by a wide range of
thinkers. Where there is some parting of ways is regarding the direct connection between
Christ and the cosmos. In many studies there remains an emphasis on Christ having taken
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on human flesh as opposed to Christ having taken on flesh in a general sense, which
places him in greater solidarity with the cosmos. However, these scholars focus in on
what is carried out on the cross. For instance, Jon Sobrino notes, “If from the beginning
of the gospel God appears in Jesus as a God with us, if throughout the gospel God shows
himself as a God for us, on the cross he appears as a God at our mercy and, above all, as
a God like us.”59 Throughout the twentieth century, most dominant streams of Christian
theology understood the “us” that Sobrino speaks of to be human beings. The “us” would
show humanity as distinctive creation set apart from other animals. While Sobrino was
writing from the particular perspective of the human beings who suffer, I wish to make
the extension to say that Christ is also in solidarity with the “whole creation” that is
suffering.
Like Sobrino’s, the christology of Joseph Ratzinger – who would later become
Pope Benedict XVI – is also characterized in part by too much focus on humanity and not
enough on the cosmos. However, like Sobrino, Ratzinger does introduce a central attitude
towards the cross that is helpful for our attempt to integrate Christ and the cosmos.
Writing in dialogue with Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, Ratzinger alludes to Teilhard’s
understanding of the human being as ultimately encompassed by God, or the “mysterious
superego.” Ratzinger concludes, “As an ‘I,’ man is indeed an end, but the whole tendency
of his being and of his own existence shows him also to be a creation belonging to a
‘super-I’ that does not blot him out but encompasses him; only such an association can
bring out the form of the future man, in which humanity will achieve complete
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fulfillment of itself.” In the very next paragraph, Ratzinger cites Paul’s letter to the
Galatians in which the community is informed, “You are all one in Christ Jesus” (Gal
3:28).61 Some interpreters may be justifiably confused as to why Ratzinger did not choose
the verse I cited above from Paul’s letter to the community at Colossae that includes an
even broader unity in Christ. To think of humanity in “fulfillment of itself” is to think of
an anthropocentric focus, which may help to explain how later in his thought (as Pope),
Ratzinger would be inclined to taking seriously humanity’s relationship with nature.
In her own christology, Lisa Sowle Cahill relates humans with nonhuman creation
as a single integral creation that is to be redeemed fully and together in Christ. Through
Christ’s resurrection, the entire created order comes together in a new way of life. This
new creation, however, is conditional, based on the way human beings treat their
nonhuman counterparts on Earth: “Humans exist as material, embodied, evolved, living,
and social only in their ecological niche; they have a place in the world that is really a
point in a network of indefinitely extenuating relations. Human existence will not be
resurrected fully without its constitutive relations to other creatures.”62 This is something
of an incredible statement because it turns many understandings of Christ’s redemption of
the world on their heads. Simply because the incarnation was carried out with human
flesh does not mean that human beings are of greater moral worth than nonhuman
creation.

60

Joseph Ratzinger, Introduction to Christianity, trans. J.R. Foster, rev. ed. (San Francisco, CA: Ignatius
Press, 2004), 238-9.
61
62

Ibid., 239.

Lisa Sowle Cahill, Global Justice, Christology, and Christian Ethics, New Studies in Christian Ethics
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 287.

175
While Walter Kasper, like Sobrino and Ratzinger, also falls into an overly
anthropocentric christology at times, he makes other salient points that link his own
thought on the nature of Jesus Christ to the aforementioned thinkers, especially Cahill.
Kasper concludes, with Saint Paul, that Christ’s resurrection leads to a new freedom for
all Christians. Kasper notes three things from which followers of Christ now have
freedom: sin, death, and the law. I wish to focus only on the first of these. Kasper
explains that in being freed from sin through the cross, Christians experience “primarily
freedom from external and internal pressures.” However, he goes on to note that these
pressures manifest themselves in created things which are good in themselves, since they
are created by God. He continues that these things “deprive us of freedom only when they
take on an anti-creative power of their own and become ultimates, idols which no longer
serve man but are served by him…They are a choice of life in transient flesh instead of in
God who makes the dead live.”63 What is crucial here is that “the God who makes the
dead live” actually takes on flesh in Jesus of Nazareth. This flesh – sarx – is the flesh that
connects Jesus to all of creation in a way that perfectly links the human and divine.
Choosing “life in the transient flesh,” then, would mean choosing to create a chasm
between human flesh and nonhuman flesh, instead of proclaiming a common flesh that is
redeemed through the death and resurrection of Christ.
Finally, in the christological studies of Roger Haight and Terrence Tilley, we turn
again to the particulars of God’s revelation in Jesus Christ. The resurrection is the
fundamental Christian doctrine of salvation for the whole cosmos. Human beings have
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had no problem acknowledging its salvific meaning for them, but have historically
balked at extending this final victory over death to nonhuman members of the created
order. Why? Haight’s explanation of Jesus’ role in revealing God’s salvation is worth
citing at length:
Relative to creation, love is the primary affection that God bears God’s
creation…Jesus points to a creator who is a benevolent, loving savior prior
to and in the very act of creating, but creation is not a past event; it is the
always present activity of God. This was the very tradition which Jesus
received. Creating, providential caring, saving are reductively aspects of
the same activity of God…Salvation flows from the love that is prior to an
integral part of God’s creating; it is God’s effective loving of what God
creates…Jesus does not constitute but reveals something that has always
been operative.64
Even though Haight does seem to bring forth a more inclusive picture of salvation in this
passage, there is still some confusion since a good deal of the talk of the resurrection
deals exclusively with its effect on human beings.65 Among these principal effects are the
Christian practices of forgiveness and reconciliation, two themes to which I now turn.
Part of living an authentic life of Christian discipleship is recognizing the need for
forgiveness. Terrence W. Tilley picks up the themes of forgiveness and reconciliation in
his christology, which calls followers of Christ to recognize these practices as being at
the very heart of their lives of faith. Tilley argues that without the resurrection, Jesus’
disciples would have had every reason to despair their lives: “Jesus’ appearances gave the
disciples reason for their hope. The memory of the resurrection carried in the Jesus-
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movement offers the hope that despite the powers arrayed against it and the lures of
other ways of life, there is hope that God will ultimately reconcile all to Godself.”66 Like
Haight and many others, Tilley still tends to favor human creation in his own christology,
but the statement, “there is hope that God will ultimately reconcile all to Godself” still
leaves room for reasonable doubt on this point. Unlike Haight, however, Tilley believes
that without the historical fact of the resurrection, there would be no hope for the
disciples.67 The point remains that until recent christological work, the dominant
consensus served more as an obstacle to eco-responsibility than a helpful resource for it.
Along with Cahill’s view noted above, the most comprehensive and integral
christology is that of Elizabeth A. Johnson. Even in her early work, Johnson points to the
reality that the salvation emanating from the life, death, and resurrection of Jesus Christ is
abounding and without limits among creation. In reading Johnson’s study of Jesus Christ,
we must ask, “What type of figure was resurrected?” In doing so, we recall the many
actions and teachings in the earthly life of Christ. In point of fact, it is the entire life,
death, and resurrection of Jesus Christ that brings salvation to the world. As Johnson
recalls, “Many of his parables and sayings reveal [that] he was in tune with the beatitudes
of the earth, seeing in them a reflection of aspects of God who sends rain on the just and
unjust. Exploitation and destruction of the earth and its creatures are foreign to this kind
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of attitude.” Some 25 years ago, Johnson presciently bemoaned the state of
christological research that had not adequately opened itself to the burgeoning problems
encountered by human sin against the natural world. Only four years later, during her
presidential address of the Catholic Theological Society of America, Johnson saw the
same need as a type of completion of the understanding of the salvation brought about by
God: “The ecological crisis today is pushing the bodily and social dimensions of
salvation even further, beyond the human race to include the whole earth and the cosmos
itself (an ancient theme). This is the ultimate inclusion, bringing all creation into the
circle of divine liberating and healing power.”69
As Johnson and others have so helpfully remarked, though, what prompted such a
wide net for salvation in the ministry of Jesus Christ (including his death and
resurrection), what continued that ministry in the first Christians in the Acts of the
Apostles and beyond, and what enlivens the church even today is the communion that is
the Holy Spirit. This same Spirit enables the church to carry out the mission of ecojustice
in contemporary Catholic social thought.70 It is necessary to mention the Spirit in at least
this truncated way because the Spirit has been all but ignored by most theologians,
ethicists, and indeed, most Christians in recent centuries. The Holy Spirit, however, is at
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the heart of the church’s teaching authority. It is to these authoritative statements that
I now turn.
Roman Catholic Social Teaching on the Natural Environment: Late to the Game?
It is irrefutable that the Roman Catholic church has taken environmental issues
seriously since at least 1990 and the promulgation of the aforementioned World Day of
Peace message by Pope John Paul II. It also irrefutable that taking an issue seriously is
not synonymous with giving that issue priority. Throughout the pontificates of Pope John
Paul II and Pope Benedict XVI, ecological concerns never gained the prominence of
other issues, especially those of abortion and family planning. Since 1990, the
environment has been taken up repeatedly in a variety of different statements by popes
and regional bishops’ conferences. As with John Paul II and Benedict XVI, however,
most of these episcopal conferences did not promote the ecological agenda in the same
ways they promoted other agendas. Moreover, a significant number of Catholic
theologians have dealt with the topic in a direct manner.71 All of these points
notwithstanding, in 1967, the environmentalist Lynn White, Jr., penned one of the most
damning arguments against Western Christianity’s treatment of nature that has been
written. White believed that the ecological crisis through which we are currently living,
and which he detected even a half-century ago, is rooted in Western Christianity and the
dualism that has marred many centuries of its practice. As White explains, “We shall
continue to have a worsening ecologic crisis until we reject the Christian axiom that
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nature has no reason for existence save to serve man.” Even though White was very
clear about the upsetting ramifications of Western Christianity’s dualistic legacy, he did
see hope for the future of Christianity vis-à-vis the natural world, especially through the
figure of one exemplary Christian:
The greatest spiritual revolutionary in Western history, Saint Francis,
proposed what he thought was an alternative Christian view of nature and
man’s relation to it: he tried to substitute the idea of the equality of all
creatures, including man, for the idea of man’s limitless rule of creation.
He failed. Both our present science and our present technology are so
tinctured with orthodox Christian arrogance toward nature that no solution
for our ecologic crisis can be expected from them alone. Since the roots of
our trouble are so largely religious, the remedy must also be essentially
religious, whether we call it that or not. We must rethink and refuel our
nature and destiny. The profoundly religious, but heretical, sense of the
primitive Franciscans for the spiritual autonomy of all parts of nature may
point a direction. I propose Francis as a patron saint for ecologists.73
Whether it was in direct response to White’s critique or not, in his Apostolic Letter Inter
Sanctos, Pope John Paul II declared Saint Francis as patron saint of “those who promote
ecology” in 1979, some 12 years after White’s essay was written. And now, happily, a
pope who is so close to Saint Francis that he adopted his name has taken seriously the
call to revere all of the creation just as his saintly namesake did.
Laudato si’ Within the Corpus of Catholic Environmental Teaching
When rumors began to surface that Pope Francis was preparing a social encyclical
to focus primarily on the natural environment, the pope’s popularity and the urgent
importance of the issue combined to make Laudato si’ the most eagerly anticipated papal
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encyclical since Pope Paul VI’s Humanae vitae of 1968, which upheld the church’s
prohibition of artificial contraception. Indeed, a significant number of people – Catholic
and non-Catholic alike – have read (at least some of) the document.74 This is a good
development because Pope Francis addressed the letter to “every person living on this
planet.”75 Part of the reason for such a broad audience is that Francis wanted to ensure
this encyclical would impact the deliberations at the December 2015 United Nations
Climate Change Conference. Moreover, it is a positive response to an important political
message. In this text, Francis builds on some key foundational beliefs about the natural
environment that have been expressed in previous magisterial documents. It is
worthwhile to examine this argument in light of the principle of solidarity.
Solidarity is one of the most important characteristics of Catholic social teaching.
As Pope John Paul II put it, solidarity is the virtue that allows us to serve all of God’s
human creation: “Thus the process of development and liberation takes concrete shape in
the exercise of solidarity, that is to say in the love and service of neighbor, especially of
the poorest.”76 Pope Benedict expanded this thinking of solidarity in his social encyclical
of 2009, Caritas in veritate: “Every violation of solidarity and civic friendship harms the
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environment, just as environmental deterioration in turn upsets relations in society.
Nature, in our time, is so integrated into the dynamics of society and culture that by now
it hardly constitutes an independent variable.”77 Even with the explication of solidarity
given here by Benedict, there was still a divergence between the papal teaching on the
topic of the natural environment and that offered by environmental scientists. There was
substantial room for development of doctrine on this issue by Francis.
In Laudato si’, Pope Francis makes it clear that the historical definition of
solidarity is no longer sufficient for understanding the relationship of human beings to
non-human creation. He introduces a more nuanced reading of solidarity in his
encyclical. I submit that we should understand him to endorse a radical, ecological
solidarity.78 Historically, the virtue of solidarity has been understood through a
particularly human lens. Not only was it considered to be an action befitting virtuous
human beings only, but it was always directed towards other human beings. In Laudato
si’, Francis makes a careful movement forward in the discussion of solidarity. In line with
Benedict, Francis understands that solidarity in the twenty-first century very much has to
do with non-humans. Unlike Benedict, however, Francis makes it clear that we have been
hampered in the past by “tyrannical anthropocentrism.”79
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To turn away from tyrannical anthropocentrism means to turn towards a more
holistic understanding of the relationship between human beings and non-human
creation. Here, it is clear that Pope Francis wishes to return to some of the sources of
patristic and medieval church mothers and fathers who reverenced all of creation.80 While
the tradition hasn’t always strayed from an anthropocentric bias, there is material from
which we can draw in order to avoid falling even deeper into this troubling condition
today. Pope Francis believes that the gospels propel Christians to work for the good of all
creation. Here, he is drawing on some fundamental concerns first introduced by his two
immediate predecessors.
While there had been brief mentions of environmental issues as early as Gaudium
et spes in 1965, Pope John Paul II was the first pontiff to bring particular attention to the
matter in his own magisterium. In his 1987 encyclical Sollicitudo rei socialis, he makes it
clear that the issue is one that affects us all. He points out that “natural resources are
limited.” While this claim seems clear now, it was a novel thing to read in an encyclical
of almost 30 years ago. Of natural resources, John Paul continues, “Using them as if they
were inexhaustible, with absolute dominion, seriously endangers their availability not
only for the present generation but above all for generations to come.”81 Three years later,
John Paul II dedicated a World Day of Peace message to the natural environment for the
very first time. In this message, his thought matured even more to the point of making a
clear connection between human actions and the already-serious environmental crisis that
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planet Earth was experiencing. To mark a century of modern Catholic social
teaching, in his final social encyclical, Centesimus annus, John Paul II continued his
thread calling for greater care for creation at the expense of personal comfort and human
destruction of nature for selfish reasons: “In his desire to have and to enjoy rather than to
be and to grow, man consumes the resources of the earth and his own life in an excessive
and disordered way.”83 There have been explicit charges of human connection with the
earth’s destruction for the last quarter-century of magisterial Catholic social teaching.
In 2010, Pope Benedict XVI borrowed this concept from his predecessor by
introducing the term “intergenerational solidarity.”84 By employing this particular term,
he was building on the preceding argument of John Paul II in noting that with creation in
present peril, human beings had the responsibility to act so that future generations of
human beings might experience the same gifts of the natural world that current and
previous generations had enjoyed. This commonality between the environmental thought
of John Paul and Benedict could be traced to a fundamental belief that these two popes
shared: there is a clear connection between the way that human beings treat the earth and
the way they treat themselves. First introduced by John Paul, this belief is explained most
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eloquently in Benedict’s 2009 encyclical Caritas in veritate. This encyclical letter
was significant for a number of reasons. Not only was it Benedict’s only social
encyclical, but it also shone a new spotlight on the issue of the environment within
Catholic social teaching. Until the writing of this letter a total of only five paragraphs in
all prior social encyclicals had dealt directly with the natural environment. In Caritas in
veritate alone, Benedict devoted the same number of paragraphs to this pressing issue.
This led to a number of commentators bestowing the moniker of “Green Pope” on
Benedict to match the nickname “Green Patriarch” which had already been used to
describe Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew, the leader of the Greek Orthodox
community.85
In Caritas in veritate, Benedict notes, “The way humanity treats the environment
influences the way it treats itself, and vice versa.”86 For Benedict, this is a way of saying
that the environment brings to the fore the question of solidarity, as I noted earlier. The
question remains, however: Has Francis brought anything new to the table with the
promulgation of Laudato si’, or is his encyclical simply rehashing everything that his two
predecessors have already introduced? In the remainder of this section, I will highlight
some areas in which Pope Francis has made strides beyond John Paul and Benedict, then
conclude with ways in which the encyclical could have been improved even further.
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The first area in which Francis has brought about a major evolution of the
tradition is by introducing the term “integral ecology.”87 In past magisterial dealings with
the natural environment, there have been clear distinctions between “human ecology” and
“environmental ecology.”88 What is ironic about the way these two types of ecology had
been discussed in previous papal statements on the environment is that they were meant
by the popes in question to show the relationship between human beings and the
environment. As I noted above, these two terms were mainly used to show the reader that
the way humans treat the rest of creation would be emblematic of the way they treated
each other. The irony, however, rests in the fact that the result of utilizing these two
separate terms is that they were too easily seen as two distinct issues. Pope Francis has
sought to avoid such a problem by introducing his fresh terminology.
What does it mean to promote an integral ecology? At the outset, it seems obvious
that Pope Francis believes that such an ideological worldview is impossible without first
understanding the present situation on this planet. By coming to a better understanding of
the reality currently facing our society, it should become obvious that human beings have
failed in their vocation as stewards of creation. Following in the footsteps of his
predecessors, Francis makes it clear that human beings have become seduced by the
attraction of worldly goods, especially technology. Francis is neither troglodyte nor
Luddite; he acknowledges that “nuclear energy, biotechnology, information technology,
knowledge of our DNA, and so many other abilities which we have acquired, have given
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us tremendous power.” However, this power is abused, Francis argues, when
humans use their outstanding knowledge and gifted minds for purposes that contradict the
moral order. He continues,
We need but think of the nuclear bombs dropped in the middle of the
twentieth century, or the array of technology which Nazism, Communism
and other totalitarian regimes have employed to kill millions of people, to
say nothing of the increasingly deadly arsenal of weapons available for
modern warfare. In whose hands does all this power lie, or will it
eventually end up? It is extremely risky for a small part of humanity to
have it.90
Francis believes that we should take pains to measure the situation and understand that
having such power at our disposal is not a good thing in an unqualified sense.
How does Francis suggest that we move forward in a way that maturely
appropriates the technology at our disposal? In one of the most forthright passages of the
encyclical, Francis proclaims there to be an “urgent need for us to move forward in a bold
cultural revolution.”91 This revolution is one that must be rooted in the gospel but does
not necessitate “a return to the Stone Age.”92 The paradox at the heart of Francis’s
revolutionary message is precisely what the Council Fathers called for during the final
days of Vatican Council II: “the duty of scrutinizing the signs of the times and of
interpreting them in the light of the gospel.”93 To scrutinize the signs of the times in the
twenty-first century and interpret them in the light of the gospel means to broaden our
perspective to include new areas within the purview of Christianity. Pope Francis’s
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declaration that an “integral ecology” is necessary to carry out the gospel today also
means that a careful scrutiny of the signs of the times makes it evident that human beings
are at fault for much of the environmental degradation that we see around us. Even
though John Paul II and Benedict XVI wrote about the natural environment, Francis’s
pontificate has opened up a new priority in Catholic social thought. While the natural
environment was an interest of his two immediate predecessors, even a cursory review of
their pontificates proves that it was not a priority. For Francis, however, the degradation
of the environment stands at the heart of his papal ministry.
Pope Francis makes it clear that one of the greatest challenges to an integral
ecology in today’s society is “excessive anthropocentrism.”94 He continues by noting that
such an outlook has brought human beings to a point in their existence where they
believe themselves to be God’s ultimate gift to creation, to the exclusion of other
creatures. Of this outlook, Francis concludes, “What was handed on was a Promethean
vision of mastery over the world, which gave the impression that the protection of nature
was something only the faint-hearted cared about. Instead, our ‘dominion’ over the
universe should be understood more properly in the sense of responsible stewardship.”95
This teaching is not new within Catholic thought, but it is an original papal insight. Here,
Francis certainly remains faithful to the thought of his predecessors, but he also builds on
their writing to introduce new magisterial terminology for Christian anthropology, an
anthropology that, for the first time in the magisterial teaching of the church, is deeply
informed by the findings of the ecological sciences.
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We have seen Francis’s explanation of what stands in the way of integral
ecology. The question remains, “What adequately fulfills our calling to bring about
integral ecology?” First, a careful understanding of the word “integral” is in order. Here,
Francis is using the word to remind us that it means the “whole.” It is no surprise, then,
that the most often repeated turn of phrase he uses in the encyclical is “everything is
interconnected.”96 In other words, everything makes up the integral whole. The “human
ecology” and “environmental ecology” come together in integral ecology. This comes out
most clearly when Francis declares that human ecology shows forth “the relationship
between human life and the moral law, which is inscribed in our nature and is necessary
for the creation of a more dignified environment.”97 Put another way, human ecology is a
pathway to integral ecology. Francis continues, “It is enough to recognize that our body
itself establishes us in a direct relationship with the environment and with other living
beings.”98
By itself, human ecology has been an explicitly named part of Catholic social
teaching for only 25 years. Implicitly, however, it has been crucial to Catholic thought for
centuries. Pope Francis makes the key move toward integral ecology with a startling turn
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of phrase that underlines the concept of universal interconnectedness: “We are part of
nature, included in it and thus in constant interaction with it.”99 While his papal
predecessors have always acknowledged that we are a part of nature, the concept of
integral ecology is a first step towards moving beyond the “Great Chain of Being,” which
I introduced above. The second evolution of the tradition brought forth by Francis is a
new envisioning of this hierarchical “Chain,” a revision that proposes to lead Catholic
social teaching toward an understanding of a “Great Circle of Being.”100
There are two ways in which to understand the Great Chain of Being. The first
such way – which I have already briefly introduced – is to view it as a hierarchical view
of the cosmos. In this hierarchy, since human beings are far above the remainder of
creation, they naturally dictate what becomes of other (non-rational) creatures. While
Thomas Aquinas is not responsible for introducing it to the Christian worldview, he gets
the most credit. As H. Paul Santmire explains, reading Thomas leaves us only with
“ambiguity” in describing the theology of nature.101
But why should the tradition’s treatment of nature be ambiguous at all? On one
hand, Thomas says very clearly of God,
because His goodness could not be adequately represented by one creature
alone, He produced many and diverse creatures, that what was wanting to
one in the representation of the divine goodness might be supplied by
another. For goodness, which in God is simple and uniform, in creatures is
manifold and divided; and hence the whole universe together participates
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in the divine goodness more perfectly, and represents it better than any
single creature whatever.102
As we know, however, this is not the entire story. The reality is that Thomas still held
closely to a worldview that had a penchant for a particular type of ranking of things.
Along these lines, Thomas held to the inequality of all created things, but for a very
important reason:
Hence in natural things species seem to be arranged in degrees; as the
mixed things are more perfect than the elements, and plants than minerals,
and animals than plants, and men than other animals; and in each of these
one species is more perfect than the others. Therefore, as the divine
wisdom is the cause of the distinction of things for the sake of the
perfection of the universe, so is it the cause of inequality. For the universe
would not be perfect if only one grade of goodness were found in
things.103
The heart of what has been known as the Great Chain of Being is on display in this
explanation. Therein lies the ambiguity to which Santmire points in his work. With
human beings near the very top of the Great Chain of Being (only below the angels),
there has been a hurdle within the Christian intellectual tradition to provide solid
framework for the inherent goodness and dignity of all divine creation.
What is the second way to understand this Great Chain of Being, then? In fact, it
is more appropriate to follow the work of the late Norris Clarke, S.J., who considered the
great diversity of creation (which leads to the perfection of the universe) as “The Great
Circle of Being.”104 Clarke’s proposal meets the inherent problem of the Great Chain of
Being head on. As William French puts it, a potential problem with the “Chain” approach
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is not so much that it naturally eliminates animal and plant life, but rather the fact that
“over time, theological and ethical attention began to take the order of creation for
granted and concentrated concern and attention on the distinct value of the human.”105 In
the medieval worldview, the human person was set within a broader community of
creation. The problem in question is what Pope Francis terms “excessive
anthropocentrism.” The Great Circle of Being tries to correct this problem. This approach
makes it clear that human beings are only one part of God’s creation. True, the Great
Chain of Being, as originally projected, does the same thing. As we know, the resulting
understandings over many centuries of this concept have led to something quite different.
The result has been a society where human beings use all other created beings for their
own purposes. The image of a circle works better than a chain here: the chain breaks
irreparably when such an arrangement is in effect. The only movement away from self
destruction is by establishing a new standard for humans’ treatment of non-human
creation.
Clarke’s own thought here has one major shortcoming. He notes, “The rest of the
vast material universe below the human is incapable, by its very nature, of attaining union
with God, of contemplating its journey back to the One, its Source, by itself. It needs a
mediator that can take it up into itself and somehow carry it back Home with itself. This
is precisely what we humans can do, and we alone.”106 First, the phrase “below the
human” is hardly comprehensible within the image of a circle; that is more akin to the
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“chain” language, which he otherwise consciously avoids. Second, though, it does
appear that Clarke is onto an important insight in the remainder of the thought. It would
turn on its head many centuries of poor relationships between human beings and the
animal world to see humans actually act as mediators for other creation. Mediation is, of
course, far superior to destruction! But, I must pose the question here: why can’t animals
be mediators for human beings? Shouldn’t the intellectual superiority that humans enjoy
give us the insight to allow ourselves to be mediated by plants and animals too? The only
way that the image “Great Circle of Being” can work adequately is if all of creation is
willing to work together. This requires one species – humans – to humble itself.
This all brings us back to Pope Francis, Laudato si’, and the Catholic social
tradition. I submit that Francis – building off the work of his predecessors – makes it
possible to employ the Great Circle of Being in the official magisterium of Catholic
social teaching. Pope Francis rightly calls the entire world to a conversion of heart that
will lead to a new relationship between the human family and the community of nonhuman creation. He calls human beings to cease being so caught up in selfish behaviors:
“We are always capable of going out of ourselves towards the other. Unless we do this,
other creatures will not be recognized in their true worth; we are unconcerned about
caring for things for the sake of others; we fail to set limits on ourselves in order to avoid
the suffering of others or the deterioration of our surroundings.”107 There are three key
things to take from this call to action. First, Francis is calling us to assign true worth as an
“other” to non-human creatures. If we are able to see them as an other toward which we
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can move in order to carry out a relationship, that is a first step toward actually doing
it. Second, we need to drop the selfish behavior that has plagued the poor of the world.
The natural environment is like the poor in the human family. They have both been
neglected for too long. Third, we must be characterized not by our boundless power and
strength, but rather by our boundless compassion and care.
In carrying out this change, or “ecological conversion,”108 Pope Francis is calling
each person to realize that God has created more than only our individual selves.
Moreover, Francis seeks in his reader
the awareness that each creature reflects something of God and has a
message to convey to us, and the security that Christ has taken unto
himself this material world and now, risen, is intimately present to each
being, surrounding it with his affection and penetrating it with his light.
Then too, there is the recognition that God created the world, writing into
it an order and a dynamism that human beings have no right to ignore.109
If each human person understands that every creature – human and non-human alike –
has inherent dignity because of its Creator, Pope Francis is arguing that there should be a
natural change in human lifestyle. Only then will there be any possibility for a Great
Circle of Being. Or, as Elizabeth Johnson explains, “Ecological conversion means falling
in love with the Earth as an inherently valuable, living community in which we
participate, and bending every effort to be creatively faithful to its well-being, in tune
with the living God who brought it into being and cherishes it with unconditional
love.”110
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While I am confident that the magisterium of Pope Francis places us closer to
an official ecclesial acceptance of this Great Circle of Being than ever before, I am also
cognizant that we are still short of this ideal ethical model. There are still times in
Laudato si’ where Francis drifts back into language that is still more consistent with
hierarchical ways of addressing non-human creation than with more “circular” language.
Ironically, this is nowhere more evident than in the encyclical’s section dealing with the
human cause of the environmental crisis. Francis maintains, “Christian thought sees
human beings as possessing a particular dignity above other creatures; it thus inculcates
esteem for each person and respect for others. Our openness to others, each of whom is a
‘thou’ capable of knowing, loving and entering into dialogue, remains the source of our
nobility as human persons.”111 Francis addresses this very issue even more directly earlier
in the text, while pointing to the universal communion that should be at work between
God’s creation:
This is not to put all living beings on the same level nor to deprive human
beings of their unique worth and the tremendous responsibility it entails.
Nor does it imply a divinization of the earth which would prevent us from
working on it and protecting it in its fragility. Such notions would end up
creating new imbalances which would deflect us from the reality which
challenges us. At times we see an obsession with denying any
preeminence to the human person; more zeal is shown in protecting other
species than in defending the dignity which all human beings share in
equal measure. Certainly, we should be concerned lest other living beings
be treated irresponsibly. But we should be particularly indignant at the
enormous inequalities in our midst, whereby we continue to tolerate some
considering themselves more worthy than others.112
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There is no mistaking Pope Francis for someone who believes that non-human
species should be considered more important than human beings. I do not wish to
propose that argument either. I do, however, believe that Laudato si’ could have made an
even stronger rhetorical argument than it does in its current state if it had omitted any
discussion of human beings having a particular “preeminence” over other creatures, or a
“particular dignity above other creatures.” The document could have made an even
stronger argument for a Great Circle of Being than it already does if it had not used terms
implying a vertical rather than a horizontal order to creation. Nevertheless, as Michael
Schuck points out, there is clear development in the statement that “the natural world has
intrinsic value.”113
What does all of this say about Laudato si’?114 It says that the document
represents a strong movement forward in the Catholic social tradition’s understanding of
the natural environment, and the role of humanity in it. This point notwithstanding, it is
also clear that Catholic social teaching is a tradition in flux. For many centuries, there has
been an emphasis on the Great Chain of Being, which has not been without its merits.
Now, though, Pope Francis is ushering Catholic social thought into a new epoch of its
history. No longer is it so caught up in ordering every level of creation on a hierarchical
chain, but it is finally opening the possibility for a Great Circle of Being. Even this
movement, as I have shown, is not a seamless shift; even Francis wishes to maintain
some level of uniqueness for human beings. The dynamic nature of the Catholic social
113
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tradition, though, shows us that its ecological thought is never static. Catholic
ethicists must continue monitoring the tradition and searching for ways to expand it if we
are to push it beyond what limits are currently in place. Likewise, this study will continue
in the final chapter by bringing together the two major topics to this point: war/peace and
the environment. In what follows in this study, I will envision what a future Catholic
social encyclical might look like. This will involve a careful analysis of the relationship
between violent conflict and the resulting degradation to the environment. In the next
chapter, I will consider how the environment should be applied to just war thinking and
examine how pacifists might view the natural environment.

CHAPTER FOUR
THE MORAL STATUS OF NATURE, JUST WAR THEORY STAGES, AND
ECOLOGICAL PACIFISM
Until now, this study has dealt separately with two key areas of concern in Roman
Catholic social thought: war and peace, and ecology. In this final chapter, I will examine
them as one issue that will be fundamental for Catholic social thought in the twenty-first
century and beyond. The first part of this chapter will consider the moral status of nature.
Building off of the discussion begun in Chapter Three, I turn explicitly to this question
through the lens of Saint Thomas Aquinas. I will focus on two areas of Thomistic thought
that are crucial for the integration of ecology and the just war theory: justice and natural
law. I have chosen natural law because it is pertinent insofar as I examine the moral
status of nature itself. Of the four cardinal virtues, justice stands out because it lends itself
to a “cosmic common good.” The concept of the common good, too, is important for
carrying out Pope Francis’s agenda to fruition.
In an excursus, I will consider a case study that will show the necessity of
reconsidering warfare through the lens of ecological ethics. The case in question will be a
major tactic employed by the United States in their military operation in Iraq both before
and during their invasion that began in 2003: the use of depleted uranium. Why is this a
matter of particular concern for this study? The use of depleted uranium, as I will show
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later in this chapter, causes both profound and long-lasting ecological degradation and
human and non-human casualties among the created order.
The next major section of this chapter will return in an explicit way to the just war
tradition. In particular, I will deal with the relationship of the moral status of nature to the
chronological stages of the just war theory. This will serve as an extension of the criteria
for justified conflict. In this section I will consider an additional category of just war
criteria, jus ante bellum, or justice before war. This is necessary because, along with the
ad bellum, in bello, and post bellum stages, it renders just war thinking – like pacifism – a
coherent and sustained life commitment. Also, this section will continue part of the
discussion from Chapter Two that dealt with justice after warfare, and in particular the
role of restoring ecological stability and the practice of solidarity with the natural world.
The greatest part of this section, however, will focus on fulfilling the counsel of the
fathers of Vatican II, who wrote more than fifty years ago that it was already time “to
undertake an evaluation of war with an entirely new attitude.”1 This practice has, of
course, already been part of the church’s discussion of war in the last half-century.
Because the same Council fathers also reminded the church that we “always have the
duty of scrutinizing the signs of the times and of interpreting them in the light of the
gospel,”2 however, it is incumbent upon us in the present moment to view the condition
of a world at war as a wearisome reality.
Instead of radical despair that is embodied by a feeling of helplessness, Christian
ethics must proceed in a spirit of hope to answer the most difficult questions of our day.
1
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Undoubtedly, one of these most pressing and challenging questions is the destructive
nature of warfare. Even though Pope Francis does not connect the issue of war with
environmental ecology very often in Laudato si’, his insistence that everything is
connected provides the motivation for a new study of the ad bellum and in bello criteria
of just war teaching that includes more concerted attention to ecology. As Francis notes in
that encyclical, “War always does grave harm to the environment and to the cultural
riches of peoples, risks which are magnified when nuclear power and biological weapons
are borne in mind.”3 This section of the chapter will reconsider the ad bellum and in bello
stages of conflict and will insert the natural environment into the existing criteria that
must be met for a given war to be considered justified. In each case, I will reconsider the
criterion in question to take into account the effects that violence would have on the
natural environment, with its complex diversity of life forms.
Following this, I will present a final section of this chapter, which will serve as
another alternative to the ecological rendering of just war theory stages and criteria. The
alternative will be a new type of contingent pacifism to consider alongside those I listed
in Chapter One of this study: ecological pacifism. In this final section of the chapter, I
will explain what such a group might look like in the twenty-first century. Why will
many forms of warfare appear morally illicit to this group of people? Will there ever be a
type of war that could be morally justified for this group? What will be their relationship
to pacifists? How will they regard the just war theory, even an updated rendering of the
3
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just war theory as I present it earlier in this chapter? These questions will provide a
substantial starting point for a conversation about the relationship between adherents to
just war theory and adherents to pacifism in this century.
A Facelift for the Moral Status of Nature?
As I noted in the previous chapter, Thomas Aquinas believes that all creation –
albeit through varying levels – contributes to the perfection of the universe. As Jame
Schaeffer has pointed out in her own study of Thomas’s ecological ethics, “Only the
intellectual aspects of the human bear God’s image, whereas the nonintellectual aspects,
those making up the physical body, retain only a likeness of God’s goodness through
their existence.”4 And yet, we should all lament the fact that human beings have lorded
their creation in the divine “image and likeness” over the remainder of creation that is
created in the divine “likeness” only. This is lamentable precisely because of the
Creator’s actual intent for all created beings. As John Kavanaugh puts it, each created
thing has a particular goodness that no other created thing of a different type can
duplicate. He concludes, “Everything that exists, consequently, is affirmable. Each
diverse reality has its own proper goodness. That is why we humans, as a moral kind of
being, are drawn to care for the earth and all its splendid kinds. For Aquinas, the
affirmation of the truth of a being, the affirmation of its own goodness is what love is all
about.”5 The new moral status of nature, then, must really demand a moral stance of love.
In particular, this love is that which God pours out on all of creation and which must be
4
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practiced by human beings in their own ethical engagement with the natural
environment and non-human animals.6
Part of the way that divine love pours out on all creation is through the
sacramental character of created things. As Thomas explains:
It is man’s nature to acquire knowledge of the intelligible from the
sensible. But a sign is that by means of which one attains to the knowledge
of something else. Consequently, since the sacred things which are
signified by the sacraments, are the spiritual and intelligible goods by
means of which man is sanctified, it follows that the sacramental signs
consist in sensible things: just as in the Divine Scriptures spiritual things
are set before us under the guise of things sensible. And hence it is that
sensible things are required for the sacraments.7
The sacraments could never be effected by matter that is not inherently good; therefore,
we see that all creation is good and receives God’s love. In light of this, it is necessary for
us to re-evaluate the ways we humans treat nonhuman creation in the world today and
discern the most virtuous behavior in relation to the created order. I will argue here for
the further promotion of one particular virtue: justice.8
Justice
Justice in particular will help us all strive towards what Daniel P. Scheid calls the
“cosmic common good.”9 The common good is a fundamental aspect of Thomistic ethics
because it shows the priority of the good of the collective over the good of the individual
6
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in Thomas’s thought. In order to view Thomas’s idea of the common good in the
twenty-first century, we must hold a wider view of creation. As Scheid concludes, “Given
Aquinas’s understanding of the importance of biological diversity and ecological
sustainability and the insights of contemporary science that highlight the interdependence
among all earthly creatures, it seems reasonable to extend the meaning of the common
good to include all creatures.”10 In order to protect the common good, it would be helpful
to turn, if only briefly, to Thomas’s treatment of the virtue.
Thomas takes on the Aristotelian definition of justice as “the constant and
perpetual will to render to each one his right.”11 Now, it is clear, especially in the
previous question and the very next article of the ST, that Thomas believes justice
concerns the actions between human beings. He explains, “It is proper to justice, as
compared with the other virtues, to direct man in his relations with others: because it
denotes a kind of equality, as its very name implies.”12 Despite this baseline approach, it
is also clear that we can say something more universal about justice in the twenty-first
century. As Kenneth Himes suggests, “Within the Catholic tradition, justice is understood
as a fundamental characteristic of what constitutes good community. Without justice, life
together involves oppression, neglect, and harm.”13 Even if Himes’s key concern here is
human life, it would be nearly impossible to consider the community in which humans
live without simultaneously considering the other members of the created order that
10
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inhabit the very same community. If we are committed to ignoring these created
things or worse, committed to actions that positively damage or kill them, then we are
also committed to impacting negatively our very own community. As ecologists have
emphasized for the last half century, ecological damage redounds to damage human
individuals and communities. This explicitly impacts what Thomas calls distributive
justice.
Thomas breaks justice into two particular types or species: commutative and
distributive. He explains that commutative justice is the type “concerned about the
mutual dealings between two persons.”14 We may well agree that this particular type of
justice may be, at least primarily if not exclusively, a matter between two individual
human beings. On the other hand, distributive justice is slightly different in its object: “In
the second place there is the order of the whole towards the parts, to which corresponds
the order of that which belongs to the community in relation to each single person. This
order is directed by distributive justice, which distributes common goods
proportionately.”15 Even though Thomas clearly uses the word “person” in this
description, our common experience makes it clear that if the common good does not
extend to all of creation, then the entire community (humans included) suffers in
common.
This common suffering means that acts of justice must be aimed not only from
human beings to other human beings, but also from human beings to nonhuman creation.
Thomas’s general explanation is that “good and evil should be understood specifically
14
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with reference to the good of the neighbor and the common good, in such a way that
one does good by promoting the common good of the community and respecting the
legitimate claims of other persons, and one avoids evil by avoiding harm to the
community or to other individuals.”16 In arguing for the common good, I would extend
Thomas’s explanation to include nonhuman animals and other created things as
“neighbors” and as parts of the community. If human beings ignore other creatures and
creation, they do positive harm and commit sins against justice. In order to understand
justice from a Thomistic perspective, it is necessary to present the various “parts” of
justice, each of which can help us better to see how justice for nonhuman creatures is an
essential virtue.
For Thomas Aquinas, justice is about more than simply intending to do the right
thing; it is actually doing the right, or just, thing. James Keenan explains the key
difference from our more vague understanding of justice: “Contemporary notions of
justice suggest that we are just when we want to be just, or when we love justice, or when
we desire to be just and to act justly. In the Summa, however, concepts of desiring,
wanting, or loving justice are conspicuously absent.”17 Therefore, carrying out acts of
justice – whether to other human beings or to any other created being – is key. Being just
actually involves doing just actions to the entirety of the created order, which
encompasses a dramatic conversion from many of humanity’s current dominant
productive and consumptive practices.
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Acting justly towards the natural world necessarily involves a certain mindset
and fundamental attitude towards nonhuman animals, for example. Why? Precisely
because nonhuman animals are on the margins of society in the sense that, especially in
modern western culture, animals have been understood simply as things to be used, not as
“ends-in-themselves.” Human beings go to great lengths to hunt and kill these creatures
for food.18 Charles Camosy has forcefully argued that the factory farming of our society
today makes it impossible to ignore the injustice done to nonhuman animals.19 While I do
not have the space here to treat the complex issue of vegetarianism, it is worth briefly
noting Camosy’s emphasis on speciesism, originally coined by Peter Singer over forty
years ago.20 Like racism and sexism, which claim that there are superior groups of people
based on a given category, speciesism is the belief that some species of animals are
simply superior to others. Singer and others use the term to refer to the way we humans
simply assume our superiority over all other species. Camosy uses the interesting
example of the outrage that followed the story of football quarterback Michael Vick in
the wake of Vick’s organizing a dogfighting ring.21 Camosy suggests that the public
outrage was due specifically to the fact that Vick used dogs, animals that are commonly
held as pets by people in the United States.22 Camosy argues that this is an inconsistency
on the part of those who were horrified by Vick’s actions and yet still eat meat that has
18
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been produced in the factory farming system of our society today. The point is
helpful for viewing the moral status of animals in our society today, especially when
considered in the context of warfare. After all, because modern war is so destructive to
ecosystems and habitats, nonhuman animals are a particular type of innocent victim of
warfare.
Water is another part of nature that calls out for just treatment by human beings.24
I wish to consider the importance of justice for nonhuman animals in the context of water
because of water’s role in sustaining the vibrancy of the entire created order. Water is a
critical part of the order of creation because it is the lifeblood of all creatures. In a very
particular way, water is a foundational element in the ecosystems that sustain all plants
and animal species. As Christiana Peppard notes, “Access to fresh water [is]…a justice
issue: the goods of creation are meant for the benefit of everyone. Because people living
in poverty are the most likely to feel the negative effects of fresh water scarcity or
pollution, societies must take special care to protect the fresh water access of people
living in poverty and at the margins of society.”25
Today, justice demands of human beings that we extend our understanding of
God’s creation to include in a conscientious way the whole array of nonhuman
ecosystems and species. Liberation theology has taught us plainly that the poorest human
23
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beings in the world are living at the margins of society, that is to say those living in
poverty and oppression, and having few freedoms.26 Feminist theologians have carefully
studied the tradition to highlight the position of women at the margins of society due to
the workings of patriarchy and androcentrism.27 In both instances, these theologians have
explained that God presents herself in a particular way on the margins.28 Now, we must
be cognizant of the fact that nonhuman animals are likewise on the margins due to
notions of their “lesser” status compared to human beings; water falls to the margins of
society when it is wantonly polluted by human actions. In a particularly heinous way, all
of these areas of God’s creation exist on the margins during the outbreak of war. Justice
calls us to work for something greater, something which calls every part of the created
order away from the margins and into communion. This is the vision of interrelatedness
to which Pope Francis refers in Laudato si’. It is the vision of justice that can only be
carried out with a new understanding of warfare.
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In the Catholic sense of the term, ecological justice makes a direct call upon
each human being to work for the good of all creation in such a way that the community
of the created order will live together in a mutually flourishing way.29 In a particular way,
the commonalities between the things listed in the previous paragraph as being “on the
margins” come to fruition in the ecological injustice currently being carried out by human
beings. As philosopher of science Joshtrom Kureethadam acknowledges, ecological
injustice impacts the marginalized first and foremost: “The poor in developing countries
will experience far worse consequences of climate change, pollution, and other
manifestations of the ecological crisis than the wealthy populations living mostly in the
industrialized North.”30 Pope Francis likewise points to this reality throughout Laudato
si’, noting the double injustice at play because not only are the poor not responsible for
the heavy consumption of the natural resources of the earth, but they also will suffer
disproportionately from the consequences of this resource use and depletion that benefits
only the wealthier people of the world.
Natural Law
Since I have been referring to Thomas Aquinas and to nature in these pages, it is
only fitting that I turn briefly to Thomas’s understanding of the natural law. It is in this
context that the remainder of this final chapter unfolds. This is so essential to this study
because of the clear connection between any law and the community. As Clifford G.
Kossel explains, law concerns “the good of the whole community. So, as in other matters,
29
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ordering to an end is the responsibility of the person(s) whose end it is.” As Thomas
declares, the general definition of a law is “an ordinance of reason for the common good,
made by him who has care of the community, and promulgated.”32
According to Thomas, there are four types of law: positive (human) law, divine
law, eternal law, and natural law. “It is evident,” Thomas writes, “that all things”—all
things, not only human beings—“partake somewhat of the eternal law, in so far as,
namely, from its being imprinted on them, they derive their respective inclinations to
their proper acts and ends.”33 Only then does Thomas clarify that the natural law is “the
rational creature’s participation of the eternal law.”34 But how could the natural law or
the eternal law be promulgated, since no human being could make known the standards
of such laws? Thomas foresaw such a query and poses a simple conclusion: “The natural
law is promulgated by the very fact that God instilled it into man’s mind so as to be
known by him naturally.”35 In simple point of fact, in the case of the natural law, God is
the one who is doing the promulgating. Thomas goes on concerning the first precept of
the natural law: “that good is to be done and pursued, and evil avoided. All other precepts
of the natural law are based upon this: so that whatever the practical reason naturally
apprehends as man’s good (or evil) belongs to the precepts of the natural law as
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something to be done or avoided.” This distinction between good and evil is crucial
in a holistic reading of the ST.
As I mentioned in the previous chapter, the Great Circle of Being represents
human beings as part of a continuum of mutual sustainability with all other created
beings. This circle is the result of a reading of the entirety of the ST, rather than simply
focusing on the supposed superiority of human beings. Thomas’s fellow Dominican and
an expert in the ST, Thomas F. O’Meara, notes that “The ST is a plan of human life, a
physics of God’s presence, a psychology of grace.”37 Therefore, in reading the ST, it is
crucial to read the entire work as a whole, rather than simply reducing it to a work that is
only focused on human beings. In analyzing the ST, it is difficult to focus entirely on the
human person when Thomas himself focuses on the created order, or what William
French terms a “creation-centered frame.”38 I point to this creation-centered frame in
some detail in the previous chapter as I introduce the Great Circle of Being.
Lisa Cahill proposes one of the most intriguing fresh perspectives on the natural
law. She explains that her own theory is slightly different than Thomas’s understanding
of the natural law. She believes that what is “most worth recovering in natural law
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tradition is a view of human existence and of morality as purposeful (teleological); a
conviction that basic moral values are ‘objective’ and shared among culturally different
human beings; a moral epistemology of inductive, experience-based, critical practical
reasoning.”39 Cahill, like Thomas, does not deny the importance of human reason and
action in her natural law theory. They both highlight the unique human ability to think
and possess knowledge as foundational in creating a more just communal atmosphere for
the entirety of the created order. Cahill herself makes it clear that environmental ecology
is fundamental in creating this just society and in abiding by the natural law faithfully.
Cahill also makes clear that the preservation, respect, and care for nonhuman
creation based on God’s creation of them (rather than solely for what they can provide for
human beings) are key to bringing about the common good. As Michael S. Northcott
reminds us, there is a key problem with human beings regarding the natural law:
sometimes we don’t properly understand what brings us true happiness. Therefore,
sometimes human beings act improperly under the auspices of acting well and towards
achieving what is good for them. Northcott cautions, “If the good for us is to live in
conformity with our nature, with the objective moral order of nature in us and in the nonhuman world, then the moral ends both of our individual actions and of human
communities, must include within them reference beyond human life to the whole of the
natural order.”40 The whole of the natural order, as any observer of the natural world is
aware, is teeming with conflict. Regarding conflict in nature, Cahill makes an important
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and interesting side note, however, that may give us pause: “Just as with human
society… neither respect for nature in its own right nor hope of creation’s ‘eternal life’
means that all competition and conflict can or will be replaced by earthly, natural
harmony.”41
The issue of conflict is obviously very important for this study which, in large
part, concerns warfare. Before I turn explicitly to a case study concerning warfare and
ecology, allow me a word about the presence of conflict in the natural world. In his
magisterial study of conflicts of claims in debates over human rights, David Hollenbach
proposes three “strategic moral principles” that evolve from Catholic social teaching: “1)
The needs of the poor take priority over the wants of the rich; 2) The freedom of the
dominated takes priority over the liberty of the powerful; 3) The participation of
marginalized groups takes priority over the preservation of an order which excludes
them.”42 Part of Hollenbach’s argument calls for clear rhetoric and an explicit
presentation of ideological conflicts between groups of people. Conflict is, thus, a natural
phenomenon in our world. Even as Hollenbach was writing specifically from the human
rights tradition, it is not difficult to see how nonhuman creation can be accommodated by
these three moral principles.
War is not synonymous with conflict. While conflict is a naturally-occurring
phenomenon in society, war is something for which human beings are responsible, not
out of our nature, but because of our fallen state. The Fall, however, is not an excuse for
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every war; wars may be avoided by the same fallen humans who instead succumb to
the seductions of power, prestige, dominance, or wealth. Conflicts between human beings
are differences that may well be overcome with careful use of the human reason to which
Thomas refers throughout the ST. Cahill makes it clear that not all creatures have such a
luxury: “The suffering of some seems essential to the flourishing of others. In fact, there
is a shocking, even grotesque, level of suffering in the natural world, not all of it
‘abnormal.’ Consider animals that ‘naturally’ survive by consuming the newborn
offspring of other species, and predators who eat their victims alive.”43 Conflict is
something that all of the created order engages in at one point or another. War is a special
type of conflict.
Excursus: War as an Ecological Problem
In this excursus, I wish to frame warfare as an ecological problem by presenting a
case study that exemplifies what is at stake. As a case study, I will examine the effects of
depleted uranium (DU) polluting water, air, and landmasses in Iraq since 1991, the onset
of the first Gulf War. Obviously, and unfortunately, this means I cannot consider other
parts of the environment that have been damaged by weapons in Iraq.44 To begin with,
we know the horrible effects that DU has on human beings alone. Despite the Pentagon’s
protestations, we may point to “the marked increase in childhood cancers and mysterious
swollen abdomens among Iraqi children after the Gulf War…The health problems may
be due in part to children playing with empty artillery shells made from ‘depleted
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uranium,’ a byproduct of the nuclear industry that is desirable in weapons production
because it is so hard.”45 One scientific study explains further why DU is preferable for
use in military combat: “It has been incorporated into both projectiles and armor by the
military of the United States and other countries because of its density, availability, and
low relative cost.”46 Here, we must return to the criteria for jus in bello, and wonder
whether either of these criteria were adequately met in choosing a product based on cost
and ease rather than on justice owed to persons, ecosystems, and future generations. I will
return to this question in the next section, which will address each of the chronological
stages of warfare and the criteria in greater detail.
We can also be sure that the areas in Iraq affected by DU were not negligible.
Already by the year 2000, more than three years before the latest invasion of Iraq even
began, it was reported that “The region is now littered with as much as 300 tons of armorpiercing depleted uranium ammunition used by Coalition (largely US) forces. The
Coalition forces dropped a total of 88,500 tons of ordnance…much of which targeted
environmental infrastructure, such as sewage treatment plants, and some of which
remained on the ground unexploded.”47 It is not hard to imagine that the impacts to the
environment are deadly. Not only does this waste negatively affect human beings, but it
also constitutes a threat to any living creature that relies on water or air for survival. With
blatant disregard for these constitutive parts of the natural environment, it is impossible to
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wage a war that is just, because so much of creation remains unconsidered during the
accounting of costs. The United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) issued a
report in 2003 concerning the environment in Iraq, but this of course could not have taken
fully into account the war which only began in that year. The findings of that study were
accurate, but lacked some sense of urgency. It announced that in 2001, the World Health
Organization had decided to investigate the ways that DU influenced the health of people
in Iraq. Sadly, the report continues: “The study was to cover three areas – surveillance of
diseases (especially cancers and congenital malformations), measurements of DU in
potentially affected people, and prevention/research activities. However, due to the
prevailing political context, no such investigation took place.”48 It is alarming that such
high priorities as disease, humans impacted by DU, and preventive measures for the
future were not considered in detail simply out of deference to a “prevailing political
context.” These facts support the conclusion that DU is a dangerous material for human
beings as well as for the physical environment where it resides.
That same 2003 report has very chilling words regarding the battles that would be
waged. It predicted that further use of DU by the United States (which it singles out in the
report as the only nation to admit using the material at the time) would lead to serious
health and pollution problems in the air, through dust particles; the ground, through
contamination, particles being buried below the surface, and particles remaining on the
surface therefore subject to handling by human beings; and the water, which would affect
all living creatures depending on that water for survival.49 Arthur Westing has noted that
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the use of DU has had “unintentional impacts” on the environment. He contrasts this
with “intentional impacts,” such as forest clearing, steam manipulation, and releases of
oil.50 This concept is hugely important because it forces us to consider how using this
type of material could ever be considered just, if this type of so-called “collateral
damage” is taking place. Not only are innocent victims, including children and poor
people as well as noncombatants at large, being adversely affected, but so too is the
environment, which may in no way be considered an “unjust aggressor,” being
systematically destroyed.
As I note above, the human impact of DU is beyond doubt. The U.S. Food and
Drug Administration has been clear about the negative effects of DU on human beings,
reporting, “DU is especially dangerous when inhaled, or enters the body through the
wound or by swallowing…it can cause cancer and genetic defects once it enters the
body.”51 Medical researchers have found a frightening increase in the number of cases of
terminal diseases in Iraq in the wake of the 2004 United States attack on Fallujah. These
illnesses have now exceeded the number of those impacting survivors of the atomic
bombs in Hiroshima and Nagasaki.52 However, we cannot concern ourselves only with
the impact on human beings; the UNEP study reports that DU has consistently
contaminated the environments of every location in which it has been used. Such
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radioactive contamination was particularly prevalent in groundwater, forcing one
plant in Albany, New York, to close. What is most disturbing is that the United States
military continued to use this material in its weapons, despite the far greater
environmental impact in Iraq than in New York.53 This exposes a troubling double
standard: The United States deems DU too dangerous for its own environment, but
permissible for use against the environment in Iraq. In other words, this policy regards
the innocent, noncombatant living creatures of Iraq as expendable collateral damage. This
violates the criterion of proportionality in the just war theory. Furthermore, it raises a
legitimate question: can this be called “collateral damage” since we are fully
knowledgeable of the outcome?
Noting that DU has such an impact through its contamination of water in Iraq
issues a reminder of the importance of water for the sustenance of God’s creation of life
on earth. As one commentary on a case study reminds us, God uses water “for the
flourishing of all creation, not just human life…(and) as a means for personal, social, and
planetary transformation.”54 Polluting water is thus an affront to God; it makes a mockery
of God’s plan for all created life to thrive on earth. Instead of providing nourishment and
life, this contaminated water brings disease and death: clearly, this is the opposite of
God’s plan for creation. The Christian sacramental mind, which highly prizes the
importance of water in the plan of creation and salvation, should be shocked and
confused by such abominations. Consider, for example, the United States Navy’s
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inadvertently dropping of bombs into Australia’s Great Barrier Reef in July 2013,
which prompted Australian Senator Larissa Waters to quip, “Have we gone mad?”55 The
fundamental sign of belonging to the Christian community, baptism, utilizes water as the
matter of the sacrament. Instead of retaining its sacramental significance, the water
polluted in Iraq by DU is perverted, becoming an anti-sacrament that has stifling rather
than transformative effects. Taking part in the creation of such an abomination as this
poisonous, anti-sacramental, life-taking rather than spiritually renewing water is a
movement away from both creation and the God present in the Church’s sacramental
life.56
Of course, DU is not the only way that war is implicated in the destruction of the
natural environment.57 As J. Milburn Thompson points out, war preparation itself is
tremendously harmful to the planet: “On September 21, 2010, for example, machine gun
training by the National Guard once again sparked a serious fire in Utah. The
manufacture and above-ground testing of nuclear weapons have dispersed radioactive
materials locally, regionally, and globally.”58 Along with the preparation for warfare, the
conflicts themselves can often be caused by a selfish desire on the part of one nation (or a
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group of nations) to take possession of natural resources that belong to another nation.
This is, perhaps, most evident in the case of oil, which many experts believe was
paramount in motivating the 2003 invasion of Iraq.59
Very interestingly, Thompson notes that there are three “sources of environmental
scarcity” that have a particular impact on violence within a given state. In other words,
they might have a prominent impact on causing a civil war. These three sources are
“Resource depletion and degradation, which decreases the supply of a resource;
Population growth and/or increased consumption, which boosts demand for a resource;
[and] ‘Structural scarcity,’ which results from an imbalance in the distribution of a
resource.”60 Even though the link between war and the environment is most often
something that comes to fruition in the in bello stage, it is worth noting that the
environment is also often implicated in the variety of causes that lead nations into war.
Most certainly, as I noted in Chapter Two, environmental cleanup is a very prominent
aspect of the situation post bellum.
As I have already noted above, during the course of fighting the battles of war
itself, the environment falls especially into the line of fire. I do not maintain that
militaries actually target the natural environment directly; however, the environment is
undeniably among the “collateral damage” resulting from the acts of war. While DU is
certainly one of the most prominent materials that causes this collateral damage today,
historically other instruments of destruction have been at the heart of the environmental
damage caused by and during wars. As Matthew Shadle insists in an insightful essay, the
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United States has long used other military tactics – even in the twentieth century –
that cause great damage to the nonhuman creation: “During the Vietnam War, U.S. troops
used napalm, a gasoline jelly, to destroy vegetation used as cover by the Viet Cong. For
the same purpose, they also used Agent Orange, a chemical defoliant that also causes
cancer, birth defects, and deaths among humans.”61 All of these actions show that, to one
degree or another, the environment has been an afterthought within warfare. Now,
however, even the Pentagon itself is admitting that global climate change will likely be
an increasing cause of future wars.62 If we are to take creation seriously as having come
directly from divine providence, then I contend that such tactics have serious moral
ramifications in the Christian worldview.
In her own recent essay on the topic, Laurie Johnston has examined the clear
relationship between war and the environment. Specifically, she does so in a collection of
essays that ask the question, “Can war be just in the twenty-first century?” From her own
essay, it is clear that Johnston answers that particular question in the affirmative. This is
helpful in that it forces those (including the vast majority of Roman Catholics) who
adhere to the just war tradition’s fundamental belief that in some unfortunate
circumstances, war is a necessary evil, to be very stringent in applying the criteria for
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justified violence. Part of Johnston’s argument relies especially on the just war
criterion of proportionality.63 She also focuses on the constant need for two
“environmental virtues,” humility and cosmic solidarity.64 Because solidarity is so
fundamental to Catholic social teaching, I shall say a few words about this. Johnston
remarks that cosmic solidarity is so important in considering the relationship between war
and the environment because it “might be described as the virtue that prevents us from
ever saying ‘that’s not my problem’ in relation to the suffering of others or the wasteful
destruction of the environment.”65
The virtue of solidarity makes it impossible to ignore any created thing. This
virtue should compel us to reconsider the just war tradition from the perspective of all
creatures – human and nonhuman – who are adversely affected by the violence
perpetrated in combat. As Johnston concludes, “While there are certainly occasions when
we must choose between protecting the environment and protecting human lives or
livelihoods, I would contend that far more often it is possible to pursue the common good
of both human and nonhuman nature.”66 The strict conditions of the just war theory
demand of us that we focus on the flourishing of all creatures in considering the best
course of action.
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Before bringing this section of the chapter to a close, I would be remiss if I
did not mention Pope Francis’s landmark address to the United Nations during his
apostolic pilgrimage to the United States on 25 September 2015. This was a step forward
even from the connections he had only recently made in Laudato si’ on the link between
war and the environment. He boldly declared in the address, “War is the negation of all
rights and a dramatic assault on the environment. If we want true integral human
development for all, we must work tirelessly to avoid war between nations and
peoples.”67 This clear opposition to war makes a general statement that, interestingly,
does not distinguish between justified and unjustified conflicts. In other words, Francis
allows for the possibility that even wars that meet the criteria for justified violence still
“negate all rights” and perpetrate “a dramatic assault on the environment.” This makes it
clear that Christian ethicists must deliberate about whether the criteria as they currently
stand are appropriate in a society in which we disregard the rights of the environment at
our own peril.
In this excursus, I have briefly introduced some of the implications for the criteria
of the just war theory as they currently stand within Catholic social thought. In the
following two sections of this chapter, I look to use the paradoxical relationship between
the just war tradition and the pacifist tradition as the groundwork for a way forward in
thinking about issues of war and peace in the twenty-first century, when ecological
deterioration is a rightly overriding concern. In these sections, I intend to present two
67
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structures that will be useful for adherents to the just war theory and pacifism alike.
The first of these structures is a proposal to the United States Conference of Catholic
Bishops to reinvigorate their just war theory as it was presented in The Challenge of
Peace. The ecological degradation that is a well-known reality now – and one their very
conference has addressed – was not yet a central concern for the bishops in 1983, even
though many environmental scientists were already issuing warnings about the
environment’s future. The final section of this chapter, then, will examine yet another
form of contingent pacifism that is emerging in this century: ecological pacifism. These
groups will bring with them insights that hold fast to the just war theory (just as all
contingent pacifists do) as well as insights that pacifists can also take to heart.
An Ecologically-Informed Just War Theory
In their 1983 pastoral letter, The Challenge of Peace, the United States Catholic
Bishops enumerated what stands as the most comprehensive modern treatment of the
Roman Catholic understanding of the just war criteria. It has become clear of late that
these criteria, which address the jus ad bellum (leading up to the war) and jus in bello
(during the war) stages, do not fulfill the whole chronological picture of war. Many
scholars have recently tackled the issue of postwar justice, or jus post bellum, which I
address in Chapter Two of this study. A very few have also introduced the terminology
“jus ante bellum” to refer to a situation which entails a holistic ethic for one’s entire
life.68 In what follows in this section, I argue that the criteria initially set forth in The
Challenge of Peace need to be updated in two ways: revising the existing criteria to meet
68
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the moral challenges that we face vis-à-vis the natural environment, and including
“official” jus post bellum and jus ante bellum standards.
Any discussion of just war theory should begin with the general admission that
war is never a good to be praised. This first principle is eloquently summed up by the
U.S. Catholic bishops as the “presumption against war” which I discuss at some length in
Chapter One. As one proceeds through the bishops’ ad bellum criteria for a just war,
however, it becomes obvious that the presumption against war exclusively focuses on the
human impact of the impending violence.69 Therefore, I will here examine each criterion
to explain how adding an ecological consideration can make the just war theory a more
appropriate doctrine for the twenty-first century.
The first ad bellum criterion is the just cause, wherein the bishops contend that
“War is permissible only to confront ‘a real and certain danger,’ i.e., to protect innocent
life, to preserve conditions necessary for decent human existence, and to basic human
rights.”70 If in 1983 the bishops were pushed for a greater explanation of what they meant
by “innocent life,” I am confident they would confirm the phrase refers to innocent
human life. I wish to pose the question now, though: can a non-human creature ever be
“guilty” so as to warrant being identified as a direct target in an attack of war? I’d like to
suggest that the answer to this question is no: non-human life is always innocent. If this is
69
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the case, then the question of the just cause takes on a totally new dimension in this
reevaluation of the traditional just war theory. In a nation such as Iraq, for instance,
which has already suffered serious environmental human-made disasters, we must
continuously remind ourselves that a just cause for war can never be to take possession of
oil or other non-renewable resources.71
Second, the bishops consider the criterion of competent authority, writing: “war
must be declared by those with responsibility for public order.”72 Since the bishops claim
that those in competent authority are responsible for the common good,73 it is essential to
re-imagine the realm of the common good without excluding any part of creation from it,
as I have already argued above. This means considering not merely the good common to
all human beings, but rather a good common to all of the created order. If this is the case,
then all those individuals in positions of authority must acknowledge their responsibilities
to care for the natural resources of the land as much as for the humans they serve. As I
note in Chapter Three, Pope Francis calls for precisely this type of civil leadership both in
Laudato si’ and elsewhere.
Third, the bishops emphasize the importance of comparative justice, which
recognizes “that no state should act on the basis that it has ‘absolute justice’ on its
side.”74 In attempting to limit the force being prepared, this criterion seeks to keep
71
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nations mindful of their role in a conflict. No nation is guiltless and infallible in any
conflict, even a justified war. The mindset of comparative justice, traditionally utilized to
prevent nations from feeling free to slaughter every person in the opposing country, can
and should be expanded to protect the natural environment as well. Since no nonhuman
animal can ever be guilty in a conflict, all of God’s creation should be spared as a part of
the limits of a justified war, unless the conditions for human beings are so dire that
environmental effects cannot be avoided.75
The fourth ad bellum criterion ensures that right intention motivates the
impending conflict. Here, the bishops stress the importance of “avoiding unnecessarily
destructive acts.”76 Once again, this language of “unnecessary destructiveness” has
historically been applied to attacks aimed at human targets. But what about possible
disagreements over the use of water? Would it ever be necessary to engage in destruction
based on this environmental resource? Jeffrey McNeely reminds us that some “240 river
basins are shared between two or more states…[and] [a]ccess to water remains one of the
major—if generally unspoken—obstacles to peace in the Middle East today.”77 That this
is “generally unspoken” is indicative of the larger problem: human beings take water, air,
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and other natural resources for granted. The bishops would do well to speak more,
and more forcefully, about such assumptions.
Next, the bishops claim that war must always be a last resort. They bemoan “a
tendency for nations or peoples which perceive conflict between or among other nations
as advantageous to themselves.”78 An ecologically-informed just war theory needs to take
into consideration that the last resort needs to be extended even further than this. A nation
might well regard acquiring access to a particular natural resource as something that is
“advantageous to [itself],” thus putting the natural environment in the position of
implicitly motivating a conflict. As I have already noted, making use of such a resource
can never be a just cause or right intention in warfare. Rather, to fulfill the responsibility
of exhausting every possible peaceful alternative to violent conflict, nations must also
consider the inherent innocence of nonhuman entities. Such a creation may never be
treated as a motivating factor in creating conflict.
The penultimate ad bellum criterion is the probability of success. The bishops
admit that it is “a difficult criterion to apply, but its purpose is to prevent irrational resort
to force or hopeless resistance when the outcome of either will clearly be
disproportionate or futile.”79 How does one define a successful war? Let’s take World
War II as an example. One common naming of World War II is “The Good War” and
from it the Allied Forces emerged “victorious.” Surely this war was “successful,” if any
could be so catalogued. And yet, as with many wars since ancient times, a scorched earth
policy was in effect during World War II. This sanctioned as part of military strategy the
78
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destruction of anything that could be potentially helpful to the enemy. The air
campaigns, for instance, destroyed countless urban centers. In addition, much ecosystem
destruction occurred. The result, of course, was the destruction of “nearly 1 million acres
of forest in France,” and the extinction of “numerous bird species.” Additionally, World
War II saw atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki; these events polluted the
water and soil of the innocent land, and radiation wreaked havoc on innocent plant and
animal life.80 Is this “success”? As long as we are assured of the devastating capabilities
of our weaponry, how can we declare any war successful by the standard of protecting
the most innocent and vulnerable?
Finally, the bishops articulate the criterion of proportionality, which is both an ad
bellum and in bello criterion. They explain, “The damage to be inflicted and the costs
incurred by war must be proportionate to the good expected by taking up arms.”81 They
go on, noting the in bello difficulty of employing this criterion: “It is of utmost
importance…to think about the poor and the helpless, for they are usually the ones who
have the least to gain and the most to lose when war’s violence touches their lives.”82
Once again, the anthropocentric leaning of this text is clear. However, the general
principle of concern for the most vulnerable can be a guiding force in a revised criterion
of proportionality that reminds nations and individual soldiers that it is imperative to
protect all of God’s creation, not only the human race.
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Such a revision would also make it possible to fulfill an authentic respect for
the in bello criterion of noncombatant immunity, or discrimination. Here, actually, a little
human-centered thought might be helpful. While nature does have the capacity for
destruction, hurricanes or monsoons are not premeditated attacks to which military forces
can or should respond. Therefore, nature can never be understood as a combatant in times
of war. The bishops go to great lengths to list a wide variety of human persons who may
never be considered combatants, and so may never be attacked directly. This list includes
schoolchildren, hospital patients, the elderly, the ill, the average industrial worker
producing goods not directly related to military purposes, farmers and many others.83 I’d
like to suggest that after this helpful list, the bishops add something like the following:
“Prudence obviously excludes all non-human entities and natural resources such as water,
air and soil from direct attack.”
To add such an appendix to the episcopal teaching would also mean that the
bishops would suspend the use of double effect reasoning with regard to warfare, and in
particular, the justification for nonhuman collateral damage. The principle of double
effect states that the action itself is good or at least neutral, the direct effect is not
intrinsically evil, the intent of the actor is good, and “the good effect is sufficiently good
to compensate for allowing the evil effect.”84 In the new, ecological cases that I bring
forth in these pages, I suggest that the just war must be careful in using the principle of
double effect. My argument here is that at some point, the continued direct attacks on the
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aforementioned natural resources actually do more harm than good. In short, if
attacking a nation to the point that it has no recourse to sustain the living creatures
(human and otherwise) that remain there after a war has ended, then the principle of
double effect actually fails, on account of the fourth step. In other words, the evil effect
would obliterate any moral consideration of the good effect. This is a fine line.
Of course, two areas that the bishops do not address in their pastoral letter are jus
ante bellum and just post bellum. Jus ante bellum is that period before war that would
make warfare very unlikely, if not practically nonexistent. Mark Allman and Tobias
Winright suggest that the topic of jus ante bellum is synonymous with the principles of
just peacemaking, some of which I detail in Chapter Two above.85 Earlier, I expressed a
concern with the nomenclature of jus post bellum as something that was specifically part
of the just war theory because the standards of postwar justice are non-negotiable for
adherents to the just war tradition and pacifists alike. In other words, jus post bellum is an
area in the war/peace debate that has the ability to bring together people on both sides of
the ideological divide. Likewise, jus ante bellum is not something meant only for those
who accept the moral necessity of war on some regrettable occasions. Jus ante bellum is
also meant for those who believe violence is never legitimate. In fact, these pacifists
should be leading the way in creating justice before war with the goal of preventing that
war from ever actually taking place.
While the implications of jus ante bellum have the potential to bring together just
war adherents and pacifists, they also can serve as a way to differentiate between the two
groups. Allman and Winright explain the idea of this ante bellum proposal: “This moral
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framework needs to be more comprehensive in order to better fulfill the right intent
behind what would be a just war. In short, love for the enemy-neighbor, along with their
families and fellow citizens, is not to be suspended or set aside either during or after a
war.”86 I submit that all adherents to just war thinking should enthusiastically support this
point; however, it would be intellectually impossible for pacifists to agree with the
entirety of this claim. Pacifists would surely agree that all people should more carefully
consider the moral situation of the world so as to avoid war and would claim that love for
the enemy is the cornerstone of a gospel ethic of life. Finally, though, pacifists could not
rally behind this idea of jus ante bellum without great reservations. Pacifists claim that
the more comprehensive we get in applying the just war theory, the more obvious it
becomes that war cannot ever be morally justified. Moreover, it remains laughable to
Christian pacifists that love for one’s enemies could ever be demonstrated through killing
them, regardless of the motivation behind such an act. Bearing this in mind, while I
certainly see some crossover appeal on the topic of jus ante bellum, I am also not
convinced it can be wholly accepted by pacifists; therefore, I see some deterrents from its
acceptance as part of just peacemaking theory, which is supposed to be attractive to just
war adherents and pacifists alike. As long as there is any room for war, no pacifist could
accept jus ante bellum without reservation.
On the other hand, jus post bellum, as I note in Chapter Two, is perhaps the
greatest achievement to date in fruitfully bringing together just war adherents and
pacifists. This development fits comfortably in both traditions: whether an individual
believes a war to be justified or not, Catholic social ethics must cling to the rights of all
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creation to life. Once a war has reached its termination, all groups should intensify
their efforts at bringing peace to the ravaged land and its inhabitants, for the attainment of
peace should have been the intended goal of the war in the first place. Allman and
Winright highlight the duties owed to the vanquished nation specifically with regard to
the environment in their work on jus post bellum.87 They highlight the dangers of DU,
cluster bombs and land mines. Because of these weapons that pollute the land, all states
should be concerned about potential wars yet to be waged specifically for the
environmental consequences of such warfare. As Allman and Winright state, the weapons
“challenge the just war theory to consider the countless future victims of war, most of
whom are civilians and some of whom have not yet even been born, thereby extending
the effect and moral responsibilities of war well beyond active combat.”88
As I have suggested elsewhere in this study, though, an unadulterated natural
environment does not just benefit the human beings who inhabit the nation(s) in question;
rather, caring for the water, land and air of a region actually benefits the natural habitat of
the place itself. Yes, the human occupants are beneficiaries, but nonhuman animals can
also once again thrive; if the vegetation is dying on account of polluted water or outright
destruction from warring parties, then jus post bellum has not been achieved. Once a war
has ended, the post bellum restoration phase expectation of environmental cleanup should
require nations to assist in bringing a vanquished land to a better living situation than it
experienced before the warfare began in the first place. As Allman and Winright remind
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us, “Restoration is a logical consequence of the aim of all just wars, namely a just
peace.”89
I would like to suggest that the United States Catholic bishops once again
seriously take up the questions of warfare and the environment. To reframe the interest of
the Catholic laity in these two issues, the bishops must bring these debates to their own
conference and perhaps issue a statement that addresses the clear intersection of these
issues. This statement should attend to a new understanding of the status of all of God’s
creation (hopefully invigorated by Laudato si’) and, as I have argued, to a rejuvenation of
the just war criteria. The bishops would also do well to discuss justice after war has
ended, or jus post bellum. In the postwar phases of conflict, it has become abundantly
clear that environmental restoration is a crucial part of any movement toward authentic
justice. Finally, just as the bishops upheld the virtues of pacifism in The Challenge of
Peace, they would benefit the entire Christian community by redoubling such efforts now
in light of the environmental crisis and the injustice directed toward innocent creatures,
who are all beings created by God. These forgotten corners of creation cry out to heaven
for redress. We must urge our local ordinaries to bring these concerns to future meetings
of the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops. In my final section of this chapter, I turn to a
specific type of contingent pacifism that is motivated by respect for ecological concerns.
Ecological Pacifism
Ecological pacifism, like nuclear pacifism or personal pacifism, is a variety of
contingent pacifism that does not maintain that all violence, in all circumstances, is
necessarily unjustified. For instance, ecological pacifism may not necessarily adhere to
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the Augustinian rejection of self-defense. However, it does clearly state that all
violence that does any kind of substantial harm to the natural environment is unjustified
at its very core. There can be no saving grace to this type of action and no way that it can
be considered just. Just as Pope John XXIII, Thomas Merton, David Hollenbach and
other nuclear pacifists would claim that any use of nuclear weapons would automatically
contravene the just war theory, environmental pacifists would claim that any military
action that wantonly disregarded the natural environment would similarly disregard the
just war theory.
In his classic volume, Nevertheless: The Varieties and Shortcomings of Religious
Pacifism, John Howard Yoder summarized some twenty-nine arguments against warfare.
Yoder explains, “‘Pacifism’ is not just one specific position, spoken for authoritatively by
just one thinker. Instead it is a wide gamut of views that vary and are sometimes even
contradictory.”90 I have explained that pacifism, strictly understood, differs from these
types since it does concede the legitimacy of any violence whatsoever. Already in the
first chapter I have mentioned a few examples of differing types of pacifism, such as
personal and nuclear. Ecological pacifism91 represents a new such variety. As a means of
concluding, I wish to offer a Yoderian analysis of this new variety of religious,
contingent pacifism.92 I will proceed by following Yoder’s framework: giving a
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summation of the variety of pacifism in question, positing an underlying axiom
concerning environmental pacifism, proposing a potential shortcoming for this type of
pacifism, moving beyond that shortcoming, and explaining the failures inherent without
this type of pacifism.93
Ecological pacifism stems from my own inclination to take seriously God’s
reaction to creation in the first chapter of the book of Genesis. Looking upon the entirety
of the created order, God concluded, “it was very good” (Gen 1:31). The goodness of
creation is closely linked with the belief that human beings should not destroy it. In fact,
the goodness of creation is intimately connected with God’s instruction to human beings
to “have dominion over the fish of the sea and over the birds of the air and over every
living thing that moves upon the earth” (Gen 1:28b). By so entrusting dominion of these
living creatures to human beings, God has confirmed in human beings the responsibility
which is theirs to help God’s “very good” creation not only to continue surviving as
species, but also to prosper and thrive in their habitats on earth.94 As Pope John Paul II
laments in his encyclical Centesimus annus, “Instead of carrying out his role as a
present state of affairs having not attempted to practice this type of pacifism. This is the method Yoder used
in almost every description of the varieties of pacifism in his Nevertheless.
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cooperator with God in the work of creation, man sets himself up in place of God and
thus ends up provoking a rebellion on the part of nature, which is more tyrannized than
governed by him.”95 Whatever human beings do to diminish these species of non-human
animals – especially by destroying the natural environment in which they live – is clearly
an affront against God and foreign to God’s view of the created order.
One of the most obscene ways in which human beings carry out this
environmental destruction and large-scale annihilation of living creatures is through the
means of warfare, some of which were alluded to above. Human beings who carry out
operations of vast destruction to the natural environment, especially under the guise of
bringing about justice for society, are acting in direct opposition to God’s act of trust,
which is placed in all of humanity. This act of trust to safeguard non-human creation and
help it to prosper is not carried out in the use of such things as depleted uranium, napalm,
and nuclear weapons. Such actions sin against both God and divine creation.
Furthermore, in Caritas in veritate, Pope Benedict XVI highlights the cyclical nature of
human selfishness and environmental degradation: “Every violation of solidarity and
civic friendship harms the environment, just as environmental deterioration in turn upsets
relations in society.”96
The Axiom: Underlying ecological pacifism is the belief that divinely-inspired
care for the environment is a rejection of an anthropocentric point of view.
Simultaneously, however, it is also in the interest of human beings to protect the natural
environment. When water, land, and air are contaminated and polluted, human beings
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suffer as do non-human animals. The relationship between the entirety of the created
order is one that is so close as to unite all living things intimately in the created order.
Clearly, it is also in the best interest of human beings themselves to safeguard the
existence of the rest of the created order. Nature has both intrinsic value and important
instrumental value for humans. As Hildegard of Bingen writes from God’s perspective in
her Book of Divine Works,
I remain hidden in every kind of reality as a fiery power. Everything burns
because of me in such a way as our breath constantly moves us, like the
wind-tossed flame in a fire. All of this lives in its essence, and there is no
death in it. For I am life. I am also Reason, which bears within itself the
breath of the resounding Word, through which the whole of creation is
made. I breathe life into everything so that nothing is mortal in respect to
its species. For I am life.97
God’s presence in all things means that we human beings are closely related to the
rest of creation. This is a relationship that is hinted at in the papal writings I cite
especially in Chapter Three above. Magisterial teachings, both papal and episcopal, must
continue moving closer to a model of solidarity with all of creation in order to embrace
the ideals put forth in ecological pacifism, modeling themselves after the groundbreaking
example of Laudato si’. The close relationship between human beings and the entirety of
creation is one that should always refer back to that repeated statement of Hildegard’s
referring to the divine presence: “For I am life.” Each time human beings carry out
widespread violence on the environment, we should be mindful that it is a crucifixion of
sorts. It is an attempt to stifle God’s dynamic presence in all of creation. It is a sin. As
Moses is recorded as proclaiming in the Book of Deuteronomy, “I call heaven and earth
97
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to witness against you today that I have set before you life and death, blessings and
curses. Choose life so that you and your descendants may live” (30:19).
A Shortcoming: The technology that is always advancing with the creation of new
weapons to be used in warfare means that subscribers to ecological pacifism must always
be careful to determine how certain weapons may impact the entirety of the created order.
It is important to note a crucial difference here between those who fall under this variety
of pacifism vis-à-vis strict pacifists. Pacifists simply claim that no matter how “smart” a
weapon is, it still kills whomever it strikes: this is unacceptable for the pacifist. The
ecological pacifist, however, may find it morally acceptable to use conventional weapons
or newer technology that can ensure that only the military target is to be struck down
without causing substantial collateral damage to the environment.
As with all types of contingent pacifism, there may also be disagreements among
members of the group all of whom claim to be ecological pacifists. For instance, in the
case of nuclear pacifism some might claim to be nuclear pacifists when it comes to the
use of nuclear weapons but may also allow for the development of nuclear weapons as a
means of deterrence, while others would maintain that nations may not even possess
nuclear weapons. Similarly, some ecological pacifists may disagree now, or even more in
the future, over which weapons may be licit and which may not.
As a matter of practical example, let’s consider the use of unmanned aerial
vehicles, more commonly referred to as drones. Drones may be an instance of
fundamental disagreement between ecological pacifists. There is one group who would
claim that since drones are monitored and controlled remotely, and since they can be used
for “targeted killing,” they pose little danger to the natural environment or any
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noncombatants at all. Another group of ecological pacifists would insist, though, that
no weapon such as a drone can be completely safe. They might reference the incident I
describe above in which two United States Naval jets conducted an emergency jettison of
four bombs weighing some 4,000 pounds into Australia’s Great Barrier Reef, causing
consternation to Australian government officials and citizens alike. The more stringent
group of ecological pacifists would argue that if such a dangerous action could occur
when actual human beings were piloting these jets, then surely some sort of computer
error could also result in vast destruction in the case of drones.98
Moreover, there is another side to the shortcoming here. I am referring to the most
common critique leveled at pacifists by just war theorists: realism. In other words, many
who believe that warfare is sometimes a tragic necessity accuse pacifists of a naïveté that
is willing to sacrifice the lives of countless innocents. In the field of systems analysis,
there has long been a distinction between “wicked” and “tame” problems. Political
scientists have taken on this mantle as a way of describing the problem of fragile and
failed states.99 Kenneth Menkhaus explains that wicked problems are “complex planning
and systems design challenges that, unlike tame problems, are not solvable.”100 There are
two primary challenges for the ecological pacifist. First, is war actually a tame problem?;
and second, is ecological damage a tame problem?
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The question of whether warfare is a wicked or tame problem is an ancient
one, even though the terminology itself is relatively new. Pacifists (and to a lesser degree,
contingent pacifists) believe that war is a wicked problem: there are no solutions found in
the actual fighting of battles. Like pacifists, proponents of the “holy war,” which I discuss
in Chapter One, also believe war to be a wicked problem. Their response (not a
solution!), however, is much different than the pacifists’. Since they believe that fighting
war is a divine command, it actually does not have in mind a solution at all; rather, the
waging of the war itself is a solemn duty. Catholic social teaching denies this mindset
outright. On the other hand, just war theory and just peacemaking theory both believe that
war is a tame problem, which Menkhaus describes as something that
Possesses a well-defined and stable problem; has a well-defined stopping
point, where the solution has been reached; has a solution that can be
objectively evaluated as right or wrong; belongs to a class of similar
problems that are all solved in a similar way; offers solutions that are
easily tried and abandoned; and comes with a limited set of alternative
solutions.101
It seems that this description of tame problems describe just war theory and just
peacemaking rather nicely.
The second challenge for ecological pacifists is the concern as to whether
ecological damage itself is a wicked or tame problem. It would seem that while some
ecological pacifists may still believe warfare to be a wicked problem, all ecological
pacifists would consider the ecological crisis itself a tame problem. The challenge, then,
rests in the reality of fragile and failed states throughout the world, of which there is no
shortage. Menkhaus reports that nearly three quarters of the states in the world are “either
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There is the added problem that

many of these states present an increased security risk. This is the very reality that has
divided just war theorists and pacifists. The special categories of contingent pacifists,
which include ecological pacifists, are stuck somewhere in the middle. The existential
reality is such that just war theorists cannot deny that sometimes violence in the form of
warfare must be necessary. Pacifists, on the other hand, are committed to a worldview
that believes the closest approximation to the Kingdom of God involves no killing,
regardless of the legitimacy of the matter. Ecological pacifists are stuck somewhere in the
middle, trying to discern their response.
Nevertheless: When it comes to the questions of war and peace, we can ill afford
to ignore any longer the concerns about the environment. As Saint Paul wrote to the
Romans, “We know that the whole creation has been groaning in labor pains until now;
and not only the creation, but we ourselves, who have the first fruits of the Spirit, groan
inwardly while we wait for adoption, the redemption of our bodies” (Rom 8:22-23). Just
as human beings await with hope the promise of salvation in the resurrection, all of
creation waits for redemption from death, because as Hildegard puts it above, “For I am
life.” Even though fallen humanity selfishly and sinfully attempts to squelch God’s love
for all creation, this divine love is too dynamic to be drowned out by death.103 The
ultimate fate of the created order is everlasting life in Christ. Environmental concern
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remains the only way for Christians to avoid what Pope Francis aptly terms
“tyrannical anthropocentricism.”104
After All: The environment has been and continues to be so often forgotten by
those responsible for planning, carrying out, and cleaning up after wars in the past and
present. Even by simply inserting ecological concerns into the just war theory as it
currently stands, as I do in the preceding section, there is a major risk that nations will
overlook the immunity of the water, land, and air, just as it has overlooked the innocence
of children, women, and men who have had nothing to do with a given war. Writing in
1973, E.F. Schumacher proposed that peace was intricately linked with permanence.105
He notes, “Nothing makes economic sense unless its continuance for a long time can be
projected without running into absurdities.”106 What is painfully obvious in the early
stages of the twenty-first century is that projecting anything “for a long time” is itself an
absurdity, thanks in large part to the human destruction of the natural world. According to
Schumacher, technological developments, combined with human greed and envy, have
led to the destruction of nature that has been at the center of this dissertation. This
combination is so deadly to the natural world precisely because defenses aren’t found in
nature. As Schumacher explains,
Nature is virtually defenceless. There are no natural agents to attack and
break them down. It is as if aborigines were suddenly attacked with
machine-gun fire: their bows and arrows are of no avail. These substances,
unknown to nature, owe their almost magical effectiveness precisely to
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nature’s defencelessness – and that accounts also for their dangerous
ecological impact.107
As Schumacher prophetically announced more than four decades ago, the relationship
between human technological advances that create these substances to destroy the earth
and warlike societies was one of impermanence. In his own way, Schumacher was a
proto-ecological pacifist. His suggestion can be taken as a starting point for ecological
pacifism: “Stop applauding the type of economic ‘progress’ which palpably lacks the
basis of permanence and give what modest support we can to those who, unafraid of
being denounced as cranks, work for non-violence: as conservationists, ecologists,
protectors of wildlife…and so forth? An ounce of practice is worth more than a ton of
theory.”108 This is the principle resting at the heart of ecological pacifism as I propose it.
In 1996, then-Secretary of State Madeline Albright confirmed on 60 Minutes a
UNICEF report that over 500,000 Iraqi children aged five and under had died as a result
of United States sanctions. She concluded, “The price is worth it.” We need only ask
ourselves what the price is today when considering the fragility of our environment and
the destructive capacity of our weaponry. The final analysis of Christian ecological
pacifism is that its fruits will be known by the practice of nonviolence for the sake of the
earth.
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CONCLUSION
On 8 December 2015, Pope Francis opened the Jubilee Year of Mercy in the
Catholic church. The announcement of this jubilee year was both a surprise – it was not
convoked at the ordinary 25-year interval – and also an opportunity to refocus on what is
often considered a forgotten virtue in the life of faith. Mercy’s importance, however, has
never been lost on Pope Francis. When he was consecrated a bishop in 1992, he took as
his episcopal motto miserando atque eligendo, meaning “looked upon with mercy and
chosen.” Even more recently, in the days leading up to his election as pontiff, Pope
Francis was given a book on the topic of mercy by its author, Cardinal Walter Kasper. In
that text, Kasper laments the fact that mercy is usually “treated only briefly and then only
after the attributes that derive from God’s metaphysical essence.”1 For both Francis and
his colleague Kasper, there needs to be a renaissance of mercy in the church. It was very
propitious that this call for a renewed focus on mercy took place during the course of my
work on the present study. Sustained, critical, and ethical discussions of the relationship
of war and the natural environment have a natural and important place in the merciful
worldview for which Pope Francis longs.
In the ultimate analysis, mercy is actually what both just war theorists and
pacifists claim to be pursuing in their approach to the questions of war and peace. In the
first chapter of this study, I attempted to trace these two strands of the tradition in order to
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allow for the possibility that these two groups might have more common ground than
either side readily admits. In fact, both sides of this intellectual debate agree on quite a
great deal. They both agree, for example, that holy war is always impermissible. They
can work together to form standards and principles for just peacemaking. They can both
agree that once fighting in a war has ended, they need to work together in order to bring
peace to the vanquished land. Ultimately, they both believe they are striving for mercy,
although perhaps neither side believes that the other side is merciful at all. In World War
II, for instance, it would be difficult to imagine that the staunch pacifist Dorothy Day
would assent to the assassination of even a criminal as heinous as Adolf Hitler, even on
account of mercy.
In this study, I have argued that there is the possibility that just war thinking could
become irrelevant if it continues along the same path that it has followed throughout the
twentieth century. That is precisely why I have relied time and again on the prescient
words of the fathers of Vatican II, who implored that the church “undertake an evaluation
of war with an entirely new attitude.”2 These words remain as true in 2016 as they did in
1965, when they were first promulgated by that enlightened group of Catholic bishops
from all countries of the world. Even now, over fifty years after those words moved the
church to reconsider its exclusive relationship with the just war tradition, I am afraid that
we have remained in neutral on the study of war and peace. Still today, there are too
many of us who rely solely on the same ad bellum and in bello criteria for modern
warfare. What Pope John XXIII said about nuclear weapons in Pacem in terris remains
as true today as the day he uttered them. However, just as Saint Augustine could never
2
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imagine the destructive capabilities of nuclear weapons, John could have never
imagined the new weapons technologies which are still being developed on a daily basis.
He could not have included the word “drone” in the magisterium, for instance.
This ever-changing face of warfare is the particular reason why I contend that the
bishops of the world, and particularly of the United States, have done a grave injustice to
the global community by not paying closer attention to the issue in recent decades. At
times in these pages I have been explicit, and at other times implicit, in my strong belief
that warfare presents the most fundamental moral priority to the leaders of any religious
community in the twenty-first century. However, the United States bishops have not
uttered a single word on warfare since their 1993 document The Harvest of Justice is
Sown in Peace, which marked ten years since the more substantial pastoral letter, The
Challenge of Peace. Despite the fact that this is an issue that ravages the entire world, and
an issue in which the United States is both implicated and affected in unique ways, the
bishops have by their silence confirmed that that they have nothing new to offer on this
topic. Simultaneously, however, at each and every opportunity, that episcopal conference
votes to address the same list of pastoral priorities time and again: abortion, same-sex
marriage, and religious freedom.
At the Spring 2015 Annual Assembly of the United States Conference of Catholic
Bishops, Bishop Yousif Habash, of the Syrian Catholic Church of Newark, NJ, begged
his confreres to pay more attention to the violent persecution of Christians in his native
land and less attention to the less-urgent issues of domestic constructions of religious

freedom. In a moving statement, he pleaded, “I am burning. Christianity is burning.”
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Bishop Habash was correct to say that Christianity is burning; he should not have been
shocked, however, by the bishops’ ineptitude in responding to his concerns. As Charles
Curran has reported, the resources of money and time that the United States bishops have
spent on their go-to issues mentioned above would make it nearly impossible to expect
that they would focus on warfare in any meaningful way.4 The result, of course, is that
not only Christianity, but the whole world has the potential to burn if we focus our
attention away from the violence of warfare. We ignore war at our own peril, and the
peril of future generations.
Another primary concern of future generations is the wellbeing of the natural
environment. The air they will breathe, the water they will drink, and the food they will
eat are all our responsibility right now. As Pope Francis writes in Laudato si’,
“Doomsday predictions can no longer be met with irony or disdain. We may well be
leaving to coming generations debris, desolation and filth. The pace of consumption,
waste and environmental change has so stretched the planet’s capacity that our
contemporary lifestyle, unsustainable as it is, can only precipitate catastrophes.”5 I have
tried to maintain in these pages that it is impossible to separate the issues of war and
ecology in the twenty-first century. Even having seen the damage that war has done to
God’s creation in the twentieth century makes it clear that grave consequences are always
3
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likely. We may well say that almost any war waged now is a war on the natural
environment.
And so, I return to the Jubilee Year of Mercy toward which Pope Francis has
directed us. As I noted in Chapter Three, a mantra of Pope Francis’s encyclical Laudato
si’ is the oft-repeated phrase, “everything is connected.” Since everything is connected, it
is easy to see that mercy is connected with war and ecology. Pope Francis, through his
reminding us of the centrality of mercy in the Christian life, also reminds us that mercy is
connected to everything. In that sense, I believe that this particular jubilee year has a
special meaning beyond a year-long celebration of mercy. Pope Francis is pushing for a
world and a church community that act in such a way that poverty comes to an end
through tangible signs and works of mercy, both corporal and spiritual. In the first place,
this Jubilee Year of Mercy calls for us all to recall that God showers us with mercy, not
just in special jubilee years, but at all times. As Francis writes in his Bull of Indiction for
the jubilee year, Misericordiae vultus, mercy has a unique place in the life of the church.
He begins that document by noting the centrality of the doctrine of mercy: “Jesus Christ
is the face of the Father’s mercy. These words might well sum up the mystery of the
Christian faith.”6 To focus continually on this central aspect of the Christian faith is to
recall that God’s mercy is not only a gift to us, but also an expectation that we will share
the same gift with others and with the entire created order.
Sharing God’s mercy with all of creation necessarily means sharing God’s gift of
mercy with other people, nonhuman animals, and all creation. Becoming more like God
6
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is precisely what Pope Francis is challenging us to do, starting now in the midst of
this Year of Mercy, in which we are supposed to live up to the mercy that God shows all
of creation. In a particular way, Pope Francis shows his true Jesuit colors when he
reminds us how God’s love works: “Love, after all, can never be just an abstraction. By
its very nature, it indicates something concrete: intentions, attitudes, and behaviors that
are shown in daily living…Just as [God] is merciful, so we are called to be merciful to
each other.”7 In his “Contemplation to Attain Divine Love” in the Spiritual Exercises,
Saint Ignatius of Loyola makes it clear that “love ought to be expressed in deeds more
than in words.”8 As the late Dean Brackley, S.J. put it, this means, “God’s love should
stir up active love in us.”9 Or, as we might say less eloquently than either Saint Ignatius
or Brackley, “talk is cheap!”
Pope Francis believes that because talk is cheap, in order to love as God loves and
to show mercy as God shows mercy, human beings must go through a conversion that
echoes deep in their soul and makes an irrevocable change in their entire life. As Sallie
McFague bluntly puts it, when it comes to ecological destruction, “The most responsible
person is a first-world, usually white, usually male, entrepreneur involved in a highenergy, high-profit business.”10 This is the very type of person Francis is looking to reach
by calling everyone to a conversion. In Laudato si’, Francis calls for a “bold cultural
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revolution.” Then, in an interview leading up to the Jubilee Year of Mercy, Francis
explained that he is seeking a “revolution of tenderness.”12 These two revolutions are
intimately connected to one another. Both revolutions require a widespread act of
conversion on the part of all people. Of each and every instance where an individual or
group does not act mercifully, Francis reminds us that, even then, God is merciful, and
we are called to repent and convert. Just as Laudato si’ calls for an “ecological
conversion,”13 Misericordiae vultus calls for all of its readers to go through a conversion,
especially readers who fit McFague’s above description.14
Going through a conversion towards mercy means that each convert will
experience greater awareness of God’s mercy and greater movement towards showing
mercy. In a particular way, all human beings must show mercy towards the earth. In the
introduction of this project, I claimed that the thesis I would advance is that striving
towards ecological renewal in the twenty-first century will necessarily require a
renaissance in the debate between just war thinking and pacifism. I am convinced that it
will be impossible to go on treating war using the same models that have been in
common ecclesial parlance for the last centuries. While I believe that the tradition has a
great deal to teach us concerning the debate between war and peace, I am also certain that
the longstanding, if understated, tradition of care for all creation is at the very heart of the
way forward in dialogue between pacifists and just war adherents. Ultimately, even as
11
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human beings strive to live in communion with all of creation, hopefully forming a
“Great Circle of Being,” the final hope for peace remains with God alone. The
differences between pacifists and just war theorists are often severe. Their disagreements,
however, paled in comparison to those between the Jews and Gentiles in the years
immediately after Christ’s death and resurrection. In his epistle to the Ephesians, Saint
Paul instructed the Gentiles how they should live after their conversion. We would do
well to imagine him speaking to divided groups today. Even in the midst of their division,
Christ’s salvific death and resurrection are a means of reconciliation for all people. It is
up to us to work for peace and for environmental flourishing, and up to Christ to bring it
to fruition:
But now in Christ Jesus you who once were far off have been brought near
by the blood of Christ. For he is our peace; in his flesh he has made both
groups into one and has broken down the dividing wall, that is, the
hostility between us. He has abolished the law with its commandments and
ordinances, that he might create in himself one new humanity in place of
the two, thus making peace, and might reconcile both groups to God in
one body through the cross, thus putting to death that hostility through it.
So he came and proclaimed peace to you who were far off and peace to
those who were near; for through him both of us have access in one Spirit
to the Father. So then you are no longer strangers and aliens, but you are
citizens with the saints and also members of the household of God, built
upon the foundation of the apostles and prophets, with Christ Jesus
himself as the cornerstone. In him the whole structure is joined together
and grows into a holy temple in the Lord; in whom you are also built
together spiritually into a dwelling place for God. (Eph 2:13-22)
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